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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

The Unconscious Mind

The object of this work is to establish the fact of an unconscious mind in man, and to trace in brief some of its powers and the various ways in which they are exhibited. The work seeks to show that this mind is the seat of character and of conscience and spirit-life, and a most important factor in psychical and physical life. The subjects of habit, memory, muscular action, therapeutics, education, sensation, disease, character, sex, etc., are discussed in their relation to the unconscious mind.

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The Springs of Character

by A. T. SCHOFIELD M.D. Author of "The Unconscious Mind" etc.

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CHAPTER I.

CHARACTER AND THE MIND.

THE word character means the mark a Babylonian brickmaker stamped upon the bricks he made. Character is the stamp of the individual, and all personality is ultimately based upon it. The word is here used throughout in a purely popular way, as the sum of the distinctive differences in our mental and moral qualities. What Character is.

Character may be defined as the personal shape the mind becomes by use, as a glove or a shoe soon acquires the outlines of its owner's hand or foot.

Character is the psychical, as the body is the physical representation or presentment of the individual, and inasmuch as "I" am a spirit and not a body, character is the true outward personality, the εικων of the *ego*; character, moreover, is no mere sum of isolated qualities, it is an organic whole; just as the body is an unit, and not a mere aggregation of units and organs. It is, as Stout would say,[1] "a noetic synthesis".

The word character may, of course, be used in two senses—(1) as the general sum of all mental qualities, or (2) as the sum of the moral qualities specially. We shall use the word in both ways.

[1] G. F. Stout, *Analytical Psychology*.

The Springs of Character.

We fear that the title of the book perhaps rather conceals than reveals its true scope; for in the first place the consideration of character involves more than the investigation of its sources; and secondly, the word "spring" has two or more meanings. It is both a source of being and a source of power, besides being a season of the year. The Thames originates from springs, and all watches go by springs. It will naturally be asked then why a more descriptive title was not selected; and the answer is that it is because the most interesting questions concerning character are its springs, in both meanings of the word; this being also the part of the subject about which least is known.

The springs or *sources* of character are the instincts of heredity in the unconscious mind, supplemented by others acquired during life through habit; while the spring or *force* of character lies in the conscious will or purpose. It is the former springs which are a part of character, the latter is also an agent. Deeper again, more powerful, and more inscrutable than even these in the Christian mind, acting as a hidden source of inspiration and energy, is found the Spirit of God.

Books on character are few and far between; and are particularly rare in this country. The whole matter is so elusive, so difficult of definition, and indeed so impossible of any analysis, unless the unconscious powers of mind be fully recognised, that we are quite sure this is a needed preliminary, and it is probable that when "mind" is granted its full scope we shall have more and better books on character than we have at present.

In considering what character is, what are its sources, and how it is formed, we are at once met with this initial difficulty, due, as we shall see, to the present position of some of our leading psychologists.

Character lies in the Unconscious.

Character is an intricate complex of psychic elements, and, though the most valued of our personal possessions, is only known very partially to us by conscious efforts of introspection. It is mainly discerned by observation of its manifestations in action; and we thus arrive at our knowledge of character largely by inference, mostly from noting the influence it has on conscious life; just as we discover an invisible planet by the perturbations it produces in other bodies. We arrive at the Unconscious from its well ascertained effects in Consciousness. "The qualities of modesty, shame, mother love, etc., clearly to be seen in their manifestations, spring from the instincts hidden in the unconscious depths of our being."[1]

The Unconscious Mind denied.

And yet the psychic is still dogmatically and imperatively limited to consciousness by many high authorities; and the scorn and contempt aroused by seeking to extend it are remarkably out of place in such a purely intellectual matter. We are told that to talk of unconscious mental states is to talk of the inconceivable; of "wooden-iron". "The psychical *is* the conscious,"[2] says one; another observes: "all and only the phenomena that are conscious are psychical . . . the psychical and the conscious are for us . . . identical"[3]; while a

[1] Ribot, *Heredity*, pp. 226, 228.

[2] G. T. Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 384, 385.

[3] Prof. Ziehen, *Psychology*, pp. 4, 5.

third declares that "nothing shall induce us to corrupt our speculation with monstrous marriages of contradictory notions"[1] (*i.e.*, of unconscious mind).

However, in spite of this fervour of contradiction, we do not think the works of one of such psychologists can be searched without discovering unconscious psychism clearly implied, and indeed in some absolutely stated.

The fact is, truth is generally greater than our definitions, and, as long as we distinguish mind from matter, we must include in the former every form of psychic action, whether conducted in or out of consciousness.

Greater part of Psychic Powers unconscious.

It is now beginning to be seen that the greater part of the mind is in an unconscious state; but that its middle registers are fitfully illumined in varying degree by consciousness. It is to these middle registers that the word "mind" has been unwisely limited—whereas it pertains rightly to the whole, on the ground of common characters of psychic action.

Kant well says, "Unanswerable are the sensations of perception of which we are not conscious. The clear ideas, indeed, are but an infinitely small fraction of the whole. That only a few spots in the great chart of our minds are illuminated may well fill us with amazement in contemplating this nature of ours."[2] Prof. Whittaker observes, "The facts of physiology have led psychologists to see that the series of states of consciousness . . . only form a portion of the mental life. At first it seems like

[1] Prof. Royce, *Mind*, vol. viii., p. 33.

[2] E. Kant, *Anthropologica*, sec. v.

a contradiction to speak of facts of unconsciousness as belonging to psychology. The study of physiology was necessary to bring out clearly the conception of unconscious feelings as factors in mental phenomena."[1]

It must be well understood that we have no wish whatever to speak of two minds—conscious and unconscious; but simply to have it recognised that when we use the word mind we include any and every psychic process. It is only the arbitrary limitations that still rule many minds that oblige us so frequently to use the term "unconscious".

Unconscious is the best name.

Schopenhauer, curiously enough, calls this "the better consciousness"; others, with a view to peace, call it "the sub-conscious"; M'Cunn[2] calls the unconscious "the soul," which is confusing, so that on the whole we think the prefix "un" gives the clearest meaning. Dr. Creighton remarks, "Our conscious life is the sum of these entrances and exits. Behind the scenes, as we infer, there lies a vast reserve which we call 'the unconscious,' finding a name for it by the simple device of prefixing the negative particle. . . . The basis of all that lies behind the scenes is the mere negative of consciousness."[3]

Now the unconscious is by far the larger side of our mental life, and its value is enormous. It is not only the guiding power of the body personified by physiologists as "Nature" or as "Physiology" with a big P,

[1] Prof. Whittaker, *Essays on Psychology*, p. 48.

[2] *The Making of Character*, M'Cunn, p. 7.

[3] C. Creighton, *Unconscious Memory*, p. 7.

and of the feminine gender (Sir M. Foster); but it guides behind the scenes our psychic life. It furthers the conscious process of thought by its inspirations in small as in great matters. That the unconscious can really outdo the conscious is seen in those fortunate individuals who possess naturally all that others acquire by toil, do all with a happy knack and innate tact, endowed in all things with a right instinct.

Most improvement is by effort and purpose; and as the unconscious knows neither one nor the other, the conscious is our nobler part. It is this we can alone guide and control. The unconscious may be influenced and altered indirectly, but never takes direct orders; while the conscious is an ever-ready servant.

Wundt on the Unconscious.

The accuracy of the unconscious in its workings is pointed out as follows by Wundt, one of the most weighty and brilliant philosophers of the day. He admits "the necessity of referring the origin of sensuous perceptions, and of consciousness in general, to unconscious logical processes; since the processes of perception are of an unconscious nature; and only their results are wont to appear in consciousness. It is proved that there is not merely a conscious, but also an unconscious thinking. We believe that we have hereby completely proved that the assumption of unconscious logical processes correctly declares the real nature of these processes. The unconscious logical processes are carried on with a certainty and regularity which would be impossible where there exists the possibility of error. Our mind (as a whole) is so happily designed that it prepares for us

the most important foundations of cognition, whilst we have not the slightest apprehension of the *modus operandi.* This u. **consci**ous soul, like a benevolent stranger, works and makes provision for our benefit, pouring only the mature fruit into our laps."[1]

We make no apology for this long quotation, as it affords a good foundation for, and throws much light upon, a great deal that will follow.

It will be observed that Wundt clearly recognises this unconscious action as being part of, and having all the characters of mind. Those who deny this explain such action as being the result of the mere mechanical interaction of neurons.

To call conscious psychic action a mental process, and unconscious psychic action a neural (mechanical) process, is the absurd result of the psychology of which we have spoken.

Unconscious Action is Mental.

C. H. Lewes says "we class the changes in the sensorium under three heads, of varying relative intensity, and call them conscious, sub-conscious and unconscious states. The two first are admitted by all writers. *The last is proved to have an equal claim,* for the unconscious processes not only take place in the same organs as the others, but are shown to have the cardinal character of sentient states, by their influence in determining ideas to actions. The fact of unconscious intellectual processes carries an important consequence, for it disproves the notion that psychology can be limited to the

[1] Wundt, *Beiträge zur Theorie, etc.*, pp. 169, 375, 436, 488.

fact of consciousness, as this would exclude the greater part of our mental life, etc."[1]

We shall recur to the mental character of unconscious action further on, when we speak of habit; but we may here point out the close analogy between mental and physical operations. We eat our food, but of the steps by which it is digested and assimilated we are as unconscious as we are of the way in which ideas may be incorporated in our characters. One thing we know, that indigestible ideas, like food, cause mental pain and dyspepsia.

Perhaps we have said enough now to show there is a large and important sphere of psychic action lying outside consciousness, which we call the unconscious mind; and it is this sphere that is the hidden home of character. "When I watch," says Emerson, "that flowing river which, out of regions I see not, pours for a season its stream into me, I see that I am not . . . a cause, but a surprised spectator of this ethereal water." In such absolutely unconscious regions do the foundations of our character lie, that we are often ourselves surprised at the instincts that rise therefrom; while, as a whole, our character defies the closest introspection. The deepest and most intuitive qualities indeed often assert themselves with such authority as to carry conviction that they speak with a voice other than our own. One perhaps sees this best in early years before custom and education have overlaid these deep instincts of the soul

[1] C. H. Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, part i., pp. 19, 20.

with poorer material, as is often the case. "The chief gain of increased consciousness," says Maeterlink, "is that it unveils an ever loftier unconsciousness on whose heights do the sources lie of the purest wisdom."[1] The "hall mark" of the Divine potter is still imprinted in the human clay.

It is these flashes of truth from the unconscious logical, æsthetic and moral instincts that reveal to us how "the life is the light of men".[2]

Formation of Character.

The laws of the formation of character can only be found by the deductive method, setting out from general laws of ethics, and verifying them individually by specific experience.

"Each man's character is the product of particular environmental influences, acting upon a particular set of congenital properties or tendencies."[3] We may say, "I am the product of all I have felt . . . not a thrill passes through the body but our sensorium is altered by it . . . the sum of such traces is the human life".[4] The chief product and expression of human life is the formation of character by a process which is mostly unconscious.

Sir William Jones in his *Andromata*, assuming life to last till seventy, thus divides it :—

1. Thirty years for acquiring knowledge and for forming character.

2. Twenty years for active occupation.

[1] Maeterlink, *Wisdom and Destiny*, p. 20.

[2] *St. John*, i. 4. [3] J. Sully, *Human Mind*, ii., p. 283.

[4] C. H. Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, 3rd series, p. 87.

3. Ten years gradually replacing hard work by intellectual occupation.

4. Ten years' leisure and preparation for the future life.

However seldom this typical programme may be carried out, it is at all events certain that it is mainly in the first thirty years that the character is formed.

Life and Character.

The life corresponds more or less with the character of which it is the outcome. If we know the character first, we can predict effect from cause. It is on account of varieties of character that the same causes affect people differently. One derives great pleasure from study and little from sport, and *vice versâ*. Another will die for his honour, while his neighbour sells it for a song. The reason of the differences is by no means always clearly visible.

The very difficulty of reading character, as well as its interest, lends an absorbing fascination to this study. For this reason biographies are of more interest than histories; the former being more occupied with characters, the latter with events.

Importance of Character.

Consider, too, the universal importance of character as property in the whole of life. Beginning with the word in its lowest meaning. What is a servant without a "character"; and who can get chosen to any position of trust without such testimonials? And so throughout life we find that character is property, which may, however, technically be lost. Sometimes it is the only property a person has; though usually, if one has it he has much besides; for our very fortunes in a deep sense

are the fruits of our character. People of good character are indeed masters of the art of living, and a character noble in thought and deed has the elements of immortality.

> We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths,
> In feelings, not in figures on a dial.
> We should count time by heart throbs. He most lives
> Who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best.
> It matters not how long we live, but how.

Our circumstances are little, our character is all. No change of circumstances can of itself repair a defective character.

Epictetus says, "Happiness is not in strength, or wealth, or power, or all three. It lies in ourselves, in true freedom, in the conquest of every ignoble fear, in perfect self-government, in a power of contentment and peace, and the even flow of life, even in poverty, exile, disease and the very valley of the shadow of death."

Motives of Conduct.

Characters respond to very various motives. Many are bad and unworthy. We will consider a few that are good. Some characters (those of a loyal type) respond most readily to the opinion of other men; or to their pledges or obligations to others.

Others of a conservative type are more self-reliant, and act from loyalty to themselves.

Others, again, of an æsthetic type are appealed to most by the sense of the fitness and beauty of a good action. Such are described by Aristotle.

Others, again, of an emotional type (*e.g.*, Charles

James Fox) respond to a consideration of the consequences of action and pleasure or pain ensuing.

Others of an intellectual type (*e.g.*, William Pitt) act from logical causes, seeing the unreasonableness of sin and its inherent folly.

And yet others of a Christian type respond most to a knowledge of the will and purpose of God in their being.

The perfect type of character may be said to include in differing degrees all these motives in its activities.

Intellect and Character.

Intellect itself has no necessary connection with goodness of character. Some of the cleverest men have been the most wicked, and some of the stupidest have the best moral characters. Happiness is no criterion of a good character. Some very low types that are absolutely non-progressive pass through life with a lazy, spontaneous enjoyment that is, after all, rather physical than psychical.

The formation of character gives a value and an interest to life that alone makes it intelligible. Some of us may remember the man in a recent popular society novel[1] standing on the steps of the Royal Exchange and surveying the hurrying crowds of human ants, and wondering what it all meant. It is by the light of its moral end alone that life receives any rational meaning, or this question a satisfactory answer.

[1] R. Whiteing, *The Island* and *No. 5, John Street.*

CHAPTER II.

THE PERSONALITY OF CHARACTER.

My character is my personality, or, if it be preferred, its mental expression, just as the body is its physical expression. Inasmuch, however, as I myself am spiritual rather than material, my character is far more myself than my body. My Character is Myself.

"My body is my image in the minds of others, my spiritual powers form the natural ME."[1]

"Character means Personality, and personality may be felt, but cannot be explained."[2]

"The final stage of self-consciousness is the knowledge of a personality, *i.e.*, a character. This is the highest exercise of abstract thought,"[3] and the reason why the knowledge of a personality is the final stage is because its sphere and home are so deep in the unconscious mind. Nothing is stronger than the feeling of individuality, and yet any knowledge and scrutiny of the *ego*, or of its expression in character, require a strong intellectual effort of introspection and self-analysis.

[1] W. James, *Psychology*, p. 194.

[2] L. Courtenay, *National Review*, March, 1890, p. 29.

[3] J. Sully, *Human Mind*, i., p. 480.

Herbert Spencer says that the *ego* is the "nexus" that holds "states of consciousness" together. But it holds, as we see, more than this. Our spiritual life as a whole *is* our *ego*. The *ego* is the same continuously, and yet continually changes. We look back on what we were, and see we are not the same now, and yet there is no doubt as to the identity of the personality. Some traits, of course, always remain the same, but it is hardly on these that the sense of identity depends, though they confirm it. It is rather in the continuous inherent life of the spirit, though generations of nerve tissue in the brain may perish; just as in the body, though in its cells it dies and changes daily, yet it is the same body as long as it is indwellt by the same spirit.

In common parlance we speak of our character as ourselves. We talk of being ashamed of ourselves, of expressing ourselves, of educating ourselves, etc. And this is truer than we think. No doubt at present the outward bodily form, and even the dress and mannerisms are all essential to complete the mental picture of our friend; but there can be no doubt that when all these have passed away it will be the character that will preserve the personality and the identity. We shall be no mere replicas of each other hereafter; the individuality of character will be still preserved, and one star will differ from another even "in glory".

There can be no doubt, with the increased importance that now attaches to individuality and personality, the study of character has a special interest. It is more and more clearly seen that to begin with the social at the

expense of the personal is really to check progress; whereas, on the other hand, the development of the individual means the development of society and of the nation. We must progress from within outward, and all improvement, like charity, should begin at home.

When we come to look a little more closely into the question, we observe that although our true personality is *one*, there are several fictitious selves. We all know Wendell Holmes' "three Johns"—the real John, the John as seen by himself, and the John as seen by others; and we remember how on this being explained by the "Autocrat" to the astonished John, he immediately acted on the information, and ate three breakfasts—one for each. We can even go a step farther than this; for we think besides the real John, there are always at least three more or less fictitious Johns, and sometimes four clearly distinguishable. There is John himself, the supposed John, the artificial John, and the John seen by others. The various Selves.

I. *There is first the real self*, that is the character and personality of which there is no duplicate. This *ego* is known only to God, and He discerns it not so much by any of its projections in deeds, or words, or even thoughts, but in motives and springs of action. He is a discerner "of the thoughts and intents of the heart". To Him as omniscient all things are "naked and open"; and all that lies in us in unconsciousness is not only as clear as all that lies in consciousness is to us, but is seen by an eye that is not only all-seeing but all-wise, and that understands the inwardness and true meaning of all it sees. The real Self

"Thou, O God, therefore, knowest us altogether, and understandest our thoughts afar off." Such indeed is not only the biblical, but the only possible view of the powers of the Almighty.

The anthropomorphic language in which this truth is stated will be pardoned when it is remembered that all our conceptions of the Infinite must necessarily be presented in language coined to express the finite.

This real true self, however, never stands fully revealed to its possessor. Our character is never in sight as a whole. Indeed we are more easily seen "as a whole" by others. Full self diagnosis as well as prognosis, or seeing what we shall become, is to us alike impossible.

Even with the utmost introspection our consciousness never lights up the whole of our personal temperament, or shows us why we feel or think as we do.

"He who thinks to illuminate the whole range of mental action by the light of his own consciousness is not unlike one who should go about to illuminate the universe with a rushlight." [1]

Cannot be fully known.

To be capable to any extent by introspection of true self-knowledge is one of the rarest of attainments.

We are more than we know, because, as we have seen, the home of the "we" is in the Unconscious; and, indeed, it is when we are acting with the minimum of consciousness that our individuality is most strongly expressed.

We have already spoken of the *ego* or self as

[1] Maudsley, *Physiology of Mind*, p. 44.

permanent, though changing day by day. Herbert Spencer, though regarding the *ego* as "the transitory state of the moment," yet admits the existence of a permanent *ego* which cannot be known.

"I am," if used absolutely, cannot of course be the language of our *ego*. Such is only the language and name of the Uncreate, the eternal God. In us all is relative, and all expressions must be understood in relative terms only.

The supposed Self.

II. *There is next the supposed self*, the self of which also there is only one, the first of the fictitious series and the self that I believe myself to be, and is perhaps better described as a distorted and false self. The amount of its difference from the real article is the expression of my ignorance, and my self-deception. This self is discerned by me mainly from a consideration of my motives, my thoughts, words and deeds. Its conception, however, is incomplete even to myself without some addition of bodily appearance.

"The self who knows and discerns itself, consists merely of passing states of self-consciousness as far as psychology is concerned, though both metaphysics and theology require a soul besides" (James).

Introspection good and bad.

Introspection is a gazing into a mental mirror, and by continual use may be made to reveal much. Ruskin tells us always to have two mirrors on our toilet tables, and see that with proper care both body and mind are dressed before them daily. A looking-glass and a Bible perhaps best represent the mirrors, but both require the faculty of active inspection and observation to be of use

in "dressing"; and both prove injurious if used to excess. Dr. S. Bryant says, "though self-consciousness may by close reflection be made to embrace the intellectual self, it does not do so naturally, except in persons specially marked by the introspective instinct".[1]

The principal objection to all introspection is that it may induce a morbid habit of thought. Good as self-examination may be when conducted at intervals, with a definite view to improvement, nothing is more unhealthy than, by determined effort, to bring the unconscious into consciousness, and to be always occupied with studying our own characters. The unconscious, like the night, is intended to be in obscurity, and as a rule is better left so. There is an introspection that is most pernicious. It is common in melancholy temperaments and sentimental characters, and is fostered by certain forms of religious training and by introspective fiction. But there is an introspection (as we have seen) that is most helpful. In this the searchlight is turned upon the unconscious that the actual attainment may be compared with the moral ideal, so that the man may be guided to fresh progress.

One thing is certain, it is infinitely more needful for us to be conscious of our vices than of our virtues; the former should be unmercifully bared, while the latter grow best in the shade.

[1] Dr. S. Bryant, *Mind*, 1897, p. 89.

The known self has been thus tabulated :— The Self I know.

	Personally.	Socially.	Spiritually.
Self *known* by	Bodily Appearance and Mental Instincts.	Desire to Please, Love, Hate, etc.	Intellectual, Moral and Religious Aspirations.
Self *esteemed* according to our	Pride or Modesty.	Vanity or Social Pride. Humility or Modesty.	Sense of Moral, Mental or Religious Superiority or Inferiority.

As a rule we can only survey ourselves subjectively, though we are aided by considering such external manifestations as words and deeds, and even our faces in a glass. To see ourselves objectively, *i.e.*, without knowing we are looking at ourselves, is rare, and is as startling as when a dog perceives its image for the first time in a mirror.

An external View of him.

It was my lot a few years ago to sit talking one morning with some ladies in an hotel near a table in a drawing-room with many mirrors. I soon noticed another group of persons at some distance round another table. Being short-sighted, I could not tell what they were doing, but they had some appearance of playing cards. I thought this rather dissipated so early in the day, and with insular ignorance put them down as probably Americans. I did not think much of the man I saw. Certain points in his face and expression did not please me. I hardly thought his personal appearance was up to the mark, and noticed several other things (which for obvious reasons shall be nameless) to his detriment. He

appeared to be looking our way, and, as far as I could judge, listening to us, which seemed very rude. My suggestion to my friends, however, not to speak so loud, for "those people over there would be sure to hear us," was met by shouts of laughter; as they explained, the illusion was caused by a mirror. The shock, however, of thus seeing oneself objectively, has not yet passed away; and I am sure we should all know more about ourselves could we thus have this "giftie" so ardently desired by Burns. Not that this would show our true selves, but still we should get a better idea at any rate of our outward expression and appearance.

No one absolutely surveys himself in a physical or mental mirror with an impartial eye, as long as he knows it is himself he is looking at. He unconsciously extenuates the defects and magnifies the excellencies, and likes to think well of himself.

The Amount known depends on the Light used.

The amount we can discover of our real selves depends largely on the search-light used. Ordinary self-consciousness is the most feeble. Then comes active introspection—this again may be greatly aided by light from other minds, telling us what to look for; also by others telling us what they see in us, and showing us our own qualities as displayed in others. Seeing them thus objectively is a great help. The Spirit of God, however, and the Word of God, rightly used, are, as we shall see when we consider character and Christianity, the most effective lights of all. The description of the Word of God as "quick and powerful . . . and piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, of the

joints and marrow (*i.e.*, the most hidden structures), and as a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart," represents strikingly the action of these moral Röntgen Rays. The power of these latter, if described a few years ago, would have appeared a wild fable, though now a scientific fact; and these spiritual rays, though known in power to many, are still fabulous to others.

III. *There is the artificial self*, or the second fictitious self, which is the self *I wish* others to think me, and this is no longer single, but multiple—some indeed have as many selves in constant use as they have suits of clothes. The Self I present to others.

These selves are put on and off, sometimes unconsciously and sometimes consciously; and sometimes the wrong self is worn at the wrong time, with as much incongruity as a shooting suit at a dinner party.

Akin to this fictitious self is the self that *I think* others see me to be. They may really think I am a fool, but I think they think me wise. It is obvious this self is multiple, and, moreover, corresponds mainly with the artificial self I have presented to them, and by which I believe their opinion to be formed. It may not, of course, be formed by it at all; their insight may have discerned much of the real *ego* I have not consciously exhibited. We need not, therefore, dwell on this self further, as to all intents and purposes it is described in the artificial self: the former being really the impression and the latter the picture. The Self I think others see.

These artificial selves or characters are seldom complete all round. They are like the allegorical figures Ruskin speaks of in the roof of a cathedral, which looked

very well from the pavement; but which, when he got a ladder and went up, he perceived were quite unfinished, and never intended for close inspection. We are not always prepared for our friends to walk all round us.

People of strong individuality and self-conceit, as well as those of innate honesty, are seldom conscious of the putting on or off of this public self. Nevertheless, it will be seen that unconsciously the self is made to harmonise, to some extent at least, with its environment; the self, for instance, that is exhibited to our superiors is seldom exactly the same as that shown to our inferiors. We may imagine it is, but it is not.

Of another character altogether from this slight change of self-presentment, unconsciously adopted, is that which is put on consciously for a distinct purpose.

This Self varies with my Surroundings.

While spending four successive weeks in a theological college, on a golf links, in a military camp, and in a city office, there are but few who would exhibit, or even try to exhibit, the same self. It is not only that some special characteristic would be emphasised in harmony with the special occasion, but the whole self exhibited would be consciously, as well as unconsciously, changed each week; the very tone of voice, the very attitude of body, to some extent the whole outlook on life, the thoughts, as well as the words and deeds, being different. We do not say this by way of blame, though often the more inferior the nature the better is it marked. On the other hand, the changes are often signs of a sensitive and sympathetic character that keenly feels discrepancies between the self and its surroundings;

and thus ever tries to bring the former into harmony with the environment. Where the change is conscious it is nearly always effected to gain the esteem or goodwill of others; and only in essentially contrary natures is it put on for the opposite purpose.

The fraudulent Self.

Different from this, again, is the public character that is deliberately and consciously fraudulent. To colour your likeness (or what you suppose to be it) in different tints to suit different tastes is one matter; to substitute a false one is another. Our characters should be always up to the public sample; that is, though in religious company I may emphasise the religious side, I should never pretend to more religion than I have got. Our condition and character may, and should, continually change and improve, but the public sample at any time should never absolutely misrepresent, though it often accentuates, its qualities.

Conscious and unconscious Selves.

Our public self always best expresses our real self when we are least conscious of it. When we pose consciously we represent what we think we are. When we act unconsciously we exhibit what we are. Now, if the real or unconscious self is superior to the supposed or conscious self, we are at our best when unconscious of our actions. If, on the other hand, our unconscious self is at a lower level than our conscious self we are at our worst. Every one must know these two types of character. The man who is always most refined and at his ease when he forgets himself, and only awkward when conscious; and the man who behaves well as long as he is on his guard, but when he forgets himself shows

he is at heart a boor: in the former it is the unconscious mind that is the better educated; in the latter the conscious.

We may say, then, that the public self always is unconsciously varied to some extent to suit the company or pursuit; that it is in addition often further modified consciously and purposively for definite objects; and furthermore that only by the unprincipled are qualities put on that are not possessed at all, or are, at any rate, far in excess of the reality.

Perhaps we should here add one word of qualification, as in any study of character all absolute statements must be more or less incorrect, so complex is the problem to be considered.

While, therefore, the true motto of every upright man is "To be, and not to seem," it is also true that our outward or public self is in many better than what we are (in some, of course, it is worse), because it represents our ideal of what we would be rather than what we are at the time. This is good, and is a constant cause of improvement by bringing our character up to our conduct rather than levelling our conduct down to our character. It will be seen that only if carried to excess such better conduct might amount to deceit and fraud. Good or evil seldom characterise us absolutely, but in relative proportions; and one can see from the foregoing that that person may be absolutely nobler and more progressive whose public self is slightly in advance of the private, than where the two entirely correspond.

IV. *Lastly there is the self others see*, which is the third fictitious self. The judgment of others on us is largely founded upon our outward appearance, including not only our bodies but our dress, coupled with such indications of our spirits as they can read in our acts and words, or perhaps, as we say, "between the lines". The Self as seen by others.

It will be observed that in the various selves described, beginning with what is seen by God, and ending with ourselves as seen by others, the judgment is increasingly dependent upon outward manifestations, including at last even our clothes, and possibly our houses and our productions. Some indeed may even judge us by our children; or, if pastors, by our flock; or, if doctors, by the testimony of our patients. The estimate of a man's character is drawn from a wide field, the greater part of which is external to himself. All beneath our influence have a voice as to our character; and with sovereigns this includes a whole kingdom.

We may notice this progressively external judgment in many things. Take a watch for instance. A friend looking on the case and face says: "A very nice watch". I, knowing its qualities and properties, say: "Yes! a good timekeeper". The maker, knowing the works, quality of mainspring, number of jewels, says: "It is an English lever of the best make, jewelled in six holes." Here are the three progressive judgments from without in. Self judged increasingly by Externals.

A judgment of the character of another, founded upon a close study of its display in his life, and in all over which he has influence, from his clothes to his

friends and pursuits, is generally fairly correct in its main outlines.

A man, roughly speaking, as a rule passes for what he is worth ; only the greater his value, the less likely he is to do so. The nearer the average, the more likely ; because in the former case the minority, and in the latter the majority, of men can understand him.

Instructive Insight into Character.

Every day the man lives before us is in a sense a judgment day ; and in view of the light he unconsciously sheds on his own character, all conscious attempts at concealment or exaggeration avail nothing. Men may not know *how* they know, but they do know ; and a deep-seated distrust of a man is often well-founded. Some indeed, especially women, have special instincts as to character. I know one, who, riding for the first time in a carriage with a man of high reputation and ostensibly of Christian character, came home in great agitation declaring he was a wicked man. Nothing had transpired. It was her instinct alone that produced this conviction, for which she was severely blamed, and which was only justified by what was brought to light years after.

As a rule, people have not this gift, and, like all instincts, it is not a very safe one to rely on. We may seeing the hands keeping perfect time on the face of a watch, safely deduce that there must be a good mainspring within ; and, on the other hand, where a bad character is sought to be concealed, the limits of dissimulation imposed by the face, the body, the unconscious actions and words, often prevent it from being successful.

However much we may think we "see" others, we should be very slow in judging them; particularly if we only know them slightly. The deeper the character, the less likely is it to come to the surface in a short time. Deep characters are thus necessarily more often ill judged than shallow ones.

Growing and stationary Characters.

If our character is growing and we are progressing, the estimate of others is generally rather too high; inasmuch as in such cases our conduct, based on our ideal, is generally in advance of our actual character. If our character is stationary, the estimate is more likely to be true.

If our character is deteriorating, the estimate is again generally too high, for we cling to good conduct even after good principles have been abandoned. Degradation of character is seldom due to the pursuit of an ideal, but rather to the loss of one.

Frequently our friends lay hold of a salient point which is the leading, or at any rate the most conspicuous feature in our character, and see all the rest in its light. A picture based on such a view (generally exaggerated) is called a caricature. Portraiture is a balanced estimate of the man as a whole.

When an honest man finds the opinion of others as to his character is what he believes to be in advance of the truth, it may serve as an incentive to become equal to his reputation; and to make, perhaps, the solitary act, or the temporary impulse that produced it, and on which that reputation is founded, an integral and permanent feature of his character. The opinion of others is indeed

one of the agents that materially assist in the growth of character.

The Conclusion.

The conclusion of the matter, therefore, is that my character is myself, but cannot be known by myself; that it is probably best discerned by one who has had constant opportunity of knowing my thoughts, and words, and deeds, and my manner of life for some years; that the simpler and shallower the character the more likely is such an estimate to be correct; that in some respects I may be able to discern in myself by introspection features that others never see; but that, as a whole, my estimate of myself is not likely to be so true as that formed by a friend who has had the opportunities we have described. That God alone knows all that I *am*, and that He who perfectly knows my character can and will, on certain conditions, aid me to mould it on perfect lines, not with the idea of its ever attaining perfection here—but hereafter.

CHAPTER III.

CHARACTER AND THE BODY.

THE body acts on the mind and the mind acts upon the body, and in certain cases both appear to act together ; so that we cannot say which is cause and which effect, nor even if there be sequence, or what the sequence is. Interaction of Mind and Body.

On the *a priori* conclusion that spirit and matter can have no connection with each other for want of a common term we need not waste time ; for there is overwhelming positive proof that the one *does* affect the other. " The spirit *can* take the body, and by conscious and unconscious activities mould it for a dwelling-place and instrument for its uses." [1] Of the way in which this is effected, and a nerve impression becomes a mental percept, or a mental concept becomes a nerve impression, we know absolutely nothing ; neither can our minds apparently as yet furnish an intelligible hypothesis. In the brain the effect of the mind action is as yet too obscure to be discussed. That there are changes incessantly produced and that the brain of a man differs from a child's we know, but the relation of qualities of mind with characters of brain is profoundly obscure ;

[1] Noah Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 39.

perhaps the more so through the failure of the artificial system suggested by phrenology. As far as we know we have no organs in the brain connected with any special qualities. Wundt says, "Actual neurology has as much connection with the assumption of the brain's mission of moral intuition, as astronomy and geography with Jules Verne's tales".

Character impressed on the Body

Turning, however, to the body generally, we see plainly not only that the mind does re-act upon it, but that we can, in a rough way, see there the lines of character physically impressed. Emerson says: "The human body is wonderfully expressive. If it were made of glass, and the thoughts were written on steel tablets within, it could not publish more truly their meaning than now. Wise men can hear all our past history proclaimed in our looks, gait, and behaviour, for the tell-tale body is all tongue."

The body is altered by the character entirely through the action of the unconscious mind. To it we owe the intelligent and varied permanent expressions of the face, the only characteristic forms being those that are unconscious; so readily distinguished from the conscious imitations put on artificially and temporarily by the force of the will. To it we owe the carriage of the body, so that you can judge of a man's character by his gait, his postures, his physical manner and habits; the unconscious mind in its nobility or degradation being indelibly stamped not only on the face but upon the form.

He is a dull scholar who cannot read a man even from a back view.

Round the statue of the Prince Consort in Edinburgh stand representative groups paying homage to him. If you get a back view of any of these you see mind stamped not even on flesh, but on stone, and can tell at once the sailor or soldier, peasant, scholar, or workman, and this not alone by the dress.

By the unconscious Mind.

Look at the body and face of a man whose mind is gone. Look at the slouching, cringing body of a man who has lost his self-respect. Look at the body of a thief, a sot, or a miser. Compare the faces and expressions of a beggar, a philanthropist, a policeman, a scholar, a sailor, a lawyer, a doctor, a shopwalker, a sandwich-man, a farmer, a manufacturer, a nurse, a lady, a servant, a barmaid, a nun, an actress, an art student, and answer to yourself two questions: First, are these different expressions of body and face due essentially to physical or psychical causes? And secondly, are they consciously or unconsciously produced? The answers will leave no doubt that the mind can unconsciously display psychical conceptions by physical media.

Character in the Face.

With regard to the face, the fact that the effects of a man's occupation are stamped upon the visage is found written in a papyrus of the date of B.C. 2000.

The five most common vices that are shown upon the face are pride, sensuality, fear, cruelty, and bad temper.

The mental impress on the face is perhaps least seen in the eyes themselves, and most in the lines around the nose and mouth.

It is said that a man can successfully lie with his eyes, but not with his mouth. The face is such an index

of character that the very growth of the latter can be traced upon the former, and most of the successive lines that carve the furrowed face of age out of the smooth outline of childhood are engraved directly or indirectly by mind. There is no beautifier of the face like a beautiful spirit. The want of mind lowers all the powers of the body ; but so does an evil and debased mind, which is still more wonderful.

Dr. Thompson, surgeon to H.M. Prisons in Scotland, says, after observation for eighteen years : " I have never seen such an accumulation of morbid appearances as here. Scarcely any die of any one disease, for almost every organ of the body is more or less diseased or degenerated ".

The Body affects the Character.

On the other hand, a good character is good for health, and is associated with longevity. Intellectual occupation is frequently a factor in long life. When the average duration of life is forty, poets average fifty-seven and clergymen sixty-five. Of course, there are other factors as well.

It is very curious how we place our body in attitudes expressive of mental states. If we try to see a thing with our mind we often put an intense and strained expression into our eyes. If we are in a state of delight our eyes are fixed in ecstasy. Great grief paralyses the body. In staying with friends a person with a good ear and imitative character soon adopts unconsciously the voice and mannerisms of his host ; and not only so, but I have an authentic case where the handwriting unconsciously always resembled that of the host for the

time being. It is impossible to be seized with a vivid idea without the whole body being placed in harmony with it.

On the other hand the body affects the character. "The soul," says Theophrastus, "pays a dear rent for living in the body." Our characters are affected and modified by digestion, circulation, general health, and at certain periods of life. The effects of a feeble or crippled body on character are strongly marked; and of this Lord Byron is a well-known example. Rousseau says[1] the weaker the body is the more it *commands*. It commands in the hour when we cannot face our work, or when it makes us, in spite of our will, morbid, irritable and wrong-headed in our estimation of men and things. Also, it is the strong body that *obeys*. Hence the force of the ethical argument for physical education. Bodily health is undoubtedly a condition of the soundness of practical judgment.

If a child be bound hand and foot and brought up without any exercise, it is said that it will grow up an idiot. If a limb be lost early in life, a corresponding part of the brain remains undeveloped. No part of the body is moved without moving the brain. "Walking on the tight rope," says Sir B. W. Richardson, "is as much an intellectual exercise as conjugating a Greek verb."

Corresponding mental and physical Types.

The association of types of character with types of body has been studied, as we shall see later on, by

[1] Quoted in *The Making of Character*, M'Cunn, p. 56.

Furneaux Jordan, a well-known hospital surgeon. He was first attracted to the study by observing that the women in his accident ward, in a series of years, who were suffering from injuries inflicted by their husbands, conformed to a well-marked general physical type which he thus describes :—

"The skin is pink and white; hair and eyebrows scanty; fairly stout; markedly *shell*-shaped round backs, convex transversely and longitudinally; head and shoulders inclined forward; tongues sharp."

This type he classed as the non-passionate active temperament, and these in both men and women he further described as follows :—

Clear complexion; nails soft and weak; hair growth poor; eyebrows scanty; head projects forwards (Napoleon); round back; body more or less markedly fat.

The other type of the passionate inactive temperament have flat backs, the head held up and drawn back, skin dark or pigmented, lean body, abundant hair and good eyebrows; and such women do not apparently suffer injuries from their husbands.

Shell-backs, Scanty Hair and Crime.

One "psychological" (?) novel, at least, has been written on the strength of the above, in which it is foretold that a woman will be murdered by her husband because she has scanty hair and a round back! But until natural types of character are more clearly defined than at present, it is obviously impossible accurately to describe types of body to correspond.

We may rest, however, on the undoubted facts that the body is closely associated with mind and character;

that the character tends to be impressed on the whole body, more particularly on the face; that the size and general shape of the head has some slight connection with that of the mind; and that the nervous structure of the brain is always modified by use. With these conclusions we must at present be content.

But character is not only stamped upon such responsive materials as flesh and blood, but upon inanimate objects, as dress, furniture, etc.

Dress and Character.

Dress, indeed, is very closely connected with character. Who are these who are arrayed in white robes? —the purity of the dress is symbolical of that of the character. What an intense instinctive judgment we form of a person's (particularly a woman's) character from her dress! It is often so intense that subsequent knowledge modifies it with difficulty, and never wholly obliterates it, as in other surroundings, which we will consider in Chapter VI. In early life dress helps to form the character, in later life it expresses it.

Furniture, and other immediate environments, as we shall see, act in this double way; and a person's bedroom indicates many of the mental qualities of its occupant.

Of course this varies, some characters stamping themselves physically on their intimate surroundings much more deeply than others.

Whether, however, in any particular case it is the physical that stamps the mental, or the mental the physical, the science of character does not tell us, but the action in either case is wholly unconscious.

What is Ethology?

The science of character itself is called ethology, from ἦθος, character, and is to character what a system of ethics is to the qualities that compose it. The first attempt to embody this science in a system on a material basis was called phrenology. With it was associated, more or less loosely, physiognomy. When the former of these got somewhat discredited, other attempts were made of a half-hearted nature, and of an empirical kind, to establish some science of character. One, for instance, was based upon temperaments, and others on even more visionary and arbitrary bases.

But we should beware, however absurd to us a science based on cranial protuberances or even "temperaments" may seem, of attempting to cast ridicule upon the labours of scientific men, whose systems were quite abreast of the knowledge of their day.

The phrenology of Gall and Spurzeim, indeed, however hopeless to us its details may appear, was, after all, the only serious and exhaustive attempt that has been made to form a science of character, and it was of some undoubted value, inasmuch as it was based upon the connection, now known to be so close, of mind and brain. The germ of truth in phrenology was the idea that every psychical impulse is accompanied by some physical change; that a "psychosis" involves a "neurosis". Far from being discredited, the advance of cerebral physiology has demonstrated this in so many instances that it is now doubted by few. Character *is* thus stamped upon the body, though not in the charmingly simple manner shown by printed lables on phrenological heads.

Difficulties of Ethology

How is it then we have not advanced further in ethology, that it yet boasts no text-books or manuals? There are many reasons, for the subject is surrounded with difficulties.

Characters are probably of as many varieties as there are people in the world. At any rate, amongst civilised nations it is extremely probable there are no two persons exactly alike in character. Ethics, indeed, is regarded as a fairly well-established science, whatever views may be held as to the best system; but it consists in the generalising of abstracts, the individual application of which, to personalities, is a very different matter, and it is *this* which constitutes character.

We *have* a well-developed science of the population of the globe, varied as it is, and we call it "Ethnology": why then should we not have its sister, without the "n"? Mankind is divided into types and races, why not characters? In spite of the difficulty, it is hard to say why more has not been done. As we have shown, a vague attempt has been made to class characters by temperaments, but with very little more success than by the bumps of phrenology. Perhaps a reason given in an earlier chapter is, after all, the real cause why we still wait for a true science of character. It is the fact that only within the last few years has the vast sphere in which it resides, the unconscious mind, been studied with any care, or even admitted as a serious concept. It is evident that this region must be better known and recognised, and the real nature of the operations conducted within its limits, such as habit

and instinct, better understood before we can make much advance.

Further Data needed.

Any light on the changes in the physical brain, on the true action and modification of the neurons, on the crux of the whole question—the link between mind and matter—and the manner in which the former affects the latter, would also be of the greatest help. No doubt, if it is to wait for all this, Ethology will, for a long time, be a science of the future; but advances are now so rapid, that perhaps ere long enough will be known to provide some sort of a true rational basis for the formation of a science of character.

Phrenology.

But to return to phrenology—which is one of the many melancholy instances of the evil of generalising from insufficient data, or imperfectly understood phenomena—while we have no wish, as we have said, to cast ridicule on any earnest work, perhaps we may be permitted to give the following typical instance of the way in which the "facts" of phrenology were "proved":—

Combe says,[1] "In a child with a part of the skull removed over the phrenological site of self-esteem and love of approbation, I felt a distinct swelling up and pulsation of the 'organ' of self-esteem, and the same movements, but in a less degree, in that of love of approbation. When I began to talk to her she was shy, but as she got at her ease, the movements in self-esteem decreased and those of love of approbation increased. . . . This was repeated and the same results followed. At

[1] Quoted by A. Bain, *On The Study of Character*, p. 100. This work is practically a study of phrenology with efforts to improve it.

questions in mental arithmetic the movements ceased. Then we praised her, and the movement returned." (!)

In phrenology the "organs" were arranged under the well-known three heads of emotion, intellect and will. It is needless to give the list *in extenso*. The emotions were subdivided into those that end in feeling and those that result in action. The former were termed by Spurzeim *sentiments*, and included self-esteem, hope, wonder, wit, etc.; while the latter were termed *propensities*, such as combativeness, destructiveness, love of life, acquisitiveness, etc.

Improved by Bain.

Bain did not consider this distinction clear, but made instead two lists of sensations and emotions.

The sensations were muscular, sexual, organic and special.

The emotions were wonder, terror, timidity and courage, the tender emotions, egotism, self-esteem, self-love, love of power, irascibility, love of humanity, sympathy, and fine art emotions.

He moreover constructed as an improvement on phrenology (which undoubtedly it was) a list of the primitive faculties of mind, as follows :—

Amativeness, philoprogenitiveness, concentration, adhesiveness, combativeness, destructiveness, alimentation, love of life, secretiveness, acquisitiveness, construction.

Sentiments.—Self-esteem, love of approbation, cautiousness, benevolence, veneration, firmness, conscientiousness, hope, wonder, ideality, wit, imitation.

Intellectual.—The five special sensations, individuality,

form, size, weight, colouring, locality, number, order, eventuality, time, tune, language, comparison, causality.

These lists, bearing as they do such a stamp of empiricism in the very coining of the words, might be multiplied *ad nauseam*.

No doubt each of us could make a list of qualities we think it desirable should enter into the composition of a good character, and coin more or less hideous names of many syllables to express them ; but no such attempts can ever form the foundation of a true science.

Failure to establish Ethology.

Mill long strove to discover the science of character, but failed, and confessed it, and ended by declaring that all men began alike.

The attempt to found characters upon temperaments, as we have seen, has never been carried very far with regard to their classification ; though temperament is wrought in the very texture of our life, and is fortunately itself susceptible of indefinite modification.

Leonard Courtenay says,[1] with what reason we know not, " that the choleraic temperament is strong and quick, the melancholic strong and slow, the sanguine weak and quick, the phlegmatic weak and slow ".

Furneaux Jordan[2] makes practically four classes, two of either sex.

Jordan's Types of Character.

The *active and little passionate* female type who never rests, is ever occupied with little things, full of trials, always cleaning, fond of jumping to conclusions, full of small interests, given to change, capable, shallow but

[1] L. Courtenay, *National Review*, March, 1890, p. 31.

[2] Furneaux Jordan, *Character in Body and Parentage.*

clear, very sensitive to ridicule, fond of judging others, very self-conscious with little self-analysis, who never forgets herself for her duty, and whose general aim is good.

The *man of the same type* has these qualities more accentuated; is conservative, moral, self-reliant, assertive, unhappy in repose, and as a husband (alas!) is often a failure.

The *reflective and impassioned woman* has quiet manners, is hard to read, not restless or complaining, matures slowly, is a cruel stepmother, though often an affectionate wife; loves and hates too much, is best at home, is led by impulse rather than by thought, fond of animals, tolerant and has little self-consciousness.

The *similar type of man* is reflective, quiet, praises often and never scolds.

Such crude distinctions remind us more of a séance in palmistry than of any serious scientific work; and we should not quote the above, were it not for a curious connection that Dr. Jordan has observed between the types described, and certain physical peculiarities of which we have already spoken.

Character has also been discerned (though fortunately there has been no attempt to form a science therefrom) by palmistry, by investigating the spots on the irides by the handwriting, by the hair and nails, by the teeth and various other parts of the body. Physiognomy perhaps remains as the most scientific index of character, and it is, as we have seen, upon the face that the mind is most clearly written upon the body.

CHAPTER IV.

CHARACTER AND ETHICS.

Ethics, Morals and Character

THE system of Ethics is perhaps the nearest approach we have at present to a science of character, without actually being this in any sense; but as it is allied to it, it will be well for us now to consider the relation of ethics to character, which appears to be somewhat as follows:—

Ethics is the abstract science of those activities of the human soul (chiefly social) which we term moral, and the professor of ethics is therefore a *Scientist*. *Morals* is the applied science or art which deals with the same activities, and the teacher of morals is an *Artist*. The *character* is the product of the art of morals, embodied and realised in a living human personality.

For example, in painting there is a *science* of perspective and colours which the scientist investigates, though he may have no idea how to draw or paint.

There is an *art* of painting which the painter acquires, and which the professor of painting teaches. Lastly there is the *picture* which the artist paints.

Ethics is thus the science of morals; and the difference between this and character is that between the abstract

and the applied, between mechanics and an engine, physiology and a man.

"Ethics," says Dr. Martineau, "is the doctrine of human character." The term doctrine is a little unfortunate. Doctrine means teaching. We speak of Plato's doctrine, Ruskin's doctrine, etc. It is the exposition of a science or art by an individual teacher. Doctrine, therefore, changes in accordance with the extent of knowledge. Science is a better word, for science proper will not change, being the systematised knowledge of eternal principles and laws. On the other hand, not only doctrine, but art itself varies with the growth of knowledge and idea of beauty.

Ethics are the principles of our moral activities investigated and systematised by reason and intellect. Morals are, however, not founded upon reason or intellect, but spring from the moral sense (conscience) within, and the law of God without.

Ethics and Conscience.

The relation of the conscience or moral sense to ethics is identical with the relation of the æsthetic and artistic sense to fine arts. It is the natural inborn and intuitive perception of those eternal and natural principles which it is the business of ethics to make explicit.

Thus we have, first, the eternal principles themselves.; second, their rational and intelligent analysis—ethics; third, the intuitive perception of them—conscience; fourth, their concrete and practical exhibition—character. This is the order of merit; the real order in which we advance is: First, the moral sense; second, the character; third, the system of ethics; fourth, the discovery of the

underlying and eternal principles. Character is the product of the external influences of nature and of God. as well as of the moral sense within.

Religion and Morals.

Wundt traces three stages in the history of morals, In the first morals are entirely religious ; in the second a clear distinction is seen between religion and morals ; and in the third the two, though seen to be distinct, are united in the common object. The right is seen to be the good, and the wrong bad. This analysis is no doubt historically true in Europe, but does not represent the natural and universal development.

Every human being has a rudimentary moral sense, and the adjustment of his conduct to the moral relations which he naturally feels should exist between himself and his environment (God, Nature and his fellowmen) forms his character.

We must thus first of all assume the existence of a universal principle of moral sense. We then observe that its local development varies in different places and races, thus resembling religion. For, as religions appear, we observe how they are affected by national and racial characteristics. How the family dominates the Confucian ideal and makes for domestic virtues ; how the State dominates the Græco-Roman ideal, and makes for political virtue ; how individualism dominates the Buddhist ideal, and makes for the detachment of the individual from his environment ; how Christianity is characterised by its true balance of the claims of God and man.

The Chinaman worships his domestic ancestor ; the

Hebrews regarded Jehovah as a national God ; the idols of Greek and Rome were local and tribal ; the Buddhist is lost in his god, and god in him ; the Christian worships the God and Saviour of all men ; the morals in every case following the character of the religion and God.

Greek, Christian and Modern Ethics

We turn now from these general considerations to look specially at Greek ethics, Christian ethics and (what may be termed) Modern ethics, on each of which we will offer some very brief remarks.

Greek ethics, in the youth of the civilised world, aimed at reaching good and *present* happiness (though seen to be partly unattainable) by external action.

In the middle or Christian era happiness was more relegated to another world, and obedience to duty and Divine laws were the principles in evidence ; while now, in the present day, many philosophers base conduct on natural laws apart from dogma, and look more to the future in this world than in the next. We will very briefly glance at these three schools.

Peculiarities of the Greek School.

One of the peculiarities of the Greek ethical systems was this—that they arose out of the ashes of the Greek religious systems. They were exclusively moral philosophies—scientific and intellectual ; not moral arts—religious and emotional.

They are not therefore strictly comparable with Christianity or other religions, which are moral arts, not sciences. We may no doubt form a Christian moral science, but it ever remains subordinate to the Christian art of living ; whereas in Greece the intellectual element was dominant ; the philosophers repudiated absolutely

the pagan moral art, and made no attempt to justify it; nor did they attempt to put a more rational art or religion in its place. Consequently Greek ethics for the mass of mankind were utterly ineffectual; for mankind in general wants an art, not a philosophy.

Greek Ethics unpsychological.

All Greek ethics were unpsychological in their methods, reasoning from the universe without to the *ego* within, instead of *vice versâ;* finding the rules for governance of self in the principles seen in Nature.

One great school recognised nothing but passing sensations (Protagoras), another postulated a permanent "Ego" and a "God," and a reason founded on their existence (Zeno), while Plato and Aristotle sought to adjust both of these into one system of ethics.

All Greek schools assumed that to be capable of knowing anything one must have a share of its nature in yourself; an assumption of the most profound truth and importance, as we shall see when we come to speak of the growth of character from ideas.

Isolated maxims existed from all ages, but the real teaching of ethics, or of the science of conduct, began with the Sophists (B.C. 500), and from this period the tendency of all Greek ethical teaching was to bring every spring of action which had hitherto been instinctive within the range of conscious will, and thus within the range of morals and under the guide of moral laws instead of impulses.

Ethics of Plato and Aristotle.

To come to details, Plato gives us three elementary natural qualities or appetences: Reason (*νοῦς*), Impulse (*θυμός*) and Appetite (*ἐπιθυμια*), which in their perfect

expression formed the three virtues of wisdom, courage and self-control.

Over these three he placed "Right" (δικαιοσύνη) or Justice, in other words, conscience or the moral sense, which gave the appetences their value and directed their use.

The four cardinal virtues therefore were wisdom, courage, self-control or temperance, and justice or right.

Plato insisted that the true art of living is an act of dying to mere sense, in order more fully to exist in intimate union with goodness and beauty—a noble and profound thought in harmony with the fuller teaching of Christianity. Plato further insisted that the proper aim of man is not pleasure, but truth, beauty and right; which are to be sought for their own worth.

With Aristotle, too, pleasure is not the end of well-being, but an accident in it. The two were thus connected, not as equal objects, but as cause and effect.

After Aristotle wisdom and pleasure were divorced, each being made objects of life by the two rival schools of Stoics and Epicureans.

Curiously enough, benevolence or love to others is not recognised definitely by Plato or Aristotle, and first appears in Cicero and the later Stoics.

Both in Plato and Aristotle the political virtues are dominant; they aim at making good citizens by subordinating the lower animal principles to the reason. But the Greek idea of the state was a very narrow one, excluding women and foreigners; hence purity and benevolence have no place in their systems.

Later Greek Ethics.

It is notable how, with the decay of the Greek states, pleasure, *i.e.*, individual happiness, came to be made the end of existence. While the Greek πόλις was in its vigour such a philosophy could not have much vogue.

We may further remark generally that the Greeks looked on all the virtues as one in essence, however diverse in expression. With this the latest utterance of our philosophers agrees: "However diverse they (the virtues) may appear . . . the seeing and sympathetic eye may trace underneath all diversities one and the same moral spirit striving manifoldly to vitalise human nature".[1]

In Neo-Platonism (Plotinus, etc.), which was contemporary with early Christianity (A.D. 300), and in Philo we get the idea that good resides in the soul, and evil in the body.

The earlier Greek ethics were remarkably pure and lofty, and represent probably the greatest height the natural conscience of man can reach, apart from express revelation, when trained by philosophic thought.

We may now pass on to Christian ethics with just one illustration from the death-bed of the heathen philosopher Theophrastus (B.C. 300) of the serious way in which life was regarded. His last words were: "Few things in life are solid goods. For my own part it is too late for me to consider which way of life is the most eligible; but you, who are to survive me, cannot think too deliberately before you make your choice."

[1] Prof. M'Cunn, *The Making of Character* (1900), p. 132.

Christianity includes both the Christian religion and Christian ethics. The former has a distinct circle of ideas that are not necessarily included in any form of ethics. These doctrines are partly based on the moral sense, but transcend its sphere in every way. Christian ethics are their result, not their cause. Christian doctrines include a sense of sin (of which there is no trace in Athenian philosophy), of personal alienation from God—a scheme of redemption and holiness by the work of, and through faith in, a Person ; an inward sanctification by the Spirit of God, and eternal life with Jesus Christ our Lord. Those who would reduce Christianity to the ethics it contains will here see how much is superadded by such doctrines, and how the circle of thought indicated above must modify and react on all previous ethical theory ; so that Christian ethics become necessarily a compound of religion and ethics ; or perhaps we may say that Christian ethics is one thing and Christian religion another.

Christian Religion and Ethics.

The point is that in Christianity ethics must always be subordinate to religion—the philosophy to the life, whereas in Greece the opposite was the case—when the philosophers arose Greek nature worship was dying.

Religion is more than Ethics.

Ethics have very little effect on character. Religion has much ; it is a natural school of character. Ethics do not mould character as religion does ; they do not affect the emotions, they have no vital force, and are purely intellectual. Let it be clearly understood, however, that religion without morality is dead, but that morals apart from religion may exist.

Importance of Christian Doctrine.

No doubt it is the fact of Christianity setting up the narrow entrance to the highest types of life, of sacrifice, atonement and faith that is the great stumbling-block to those who look on ethics pure and simple as sufficient. However fully true and lofty ethics may be taught in Christianity, these are not, as we have seen, its most distinctive features, which are unique; while these have much in common with Greek ethics, and with those great eastern religions of which we have not spoken. We must insist that the foundations of our religion are those we have laid down; and it is these that are essentially "Christian". But, on the other hand, however firmly a man may have embraced these doctrines we cannot conceive him to be truly entitled to be called a Christian man if he does not in his life practise Christian ethics. Without these his life but mocks God, and brings on himself a greater condemnation.

Wundt, our best German psychologist, insists that "the merit of moral life is not primarily outward righteousness of life, but a purity of the inward motives; and Christianity ends a conflict which the religions of old were never able to terminate—a struggle which is the subject of the *Antigone* of Sophocles. Christianity gave the percept of conscience a clear superiority over outward action."

Christian Ethics psychological.

True psychological ethics are peculiar to Christianity, *i.e.*, reaching the principles of character from introspection; those of Greece proceeding, as we have seen, in the opposite way. In Christianity the mystery and

centre of interest lies in human nature, and not in the outside world.

Rightness of heart and not of mere conduct is the essential characteristic of Christian goodness.

Wundt says the deepening of ethical significance in modern use of words takes place by a shift of the emphasis from the external to the internal attributes.

Religion, however, affects conduct from without as well by three fresh concepts: First, the love and character of God; second, the eternal world; and third, new social considerations based on new views of life. From the first spread of Christianity these new principles made their force felt, but it was not until the fourth century that Christian ethics were established as a system; and, we may say, not until Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century were they fully developed by the schoolmen.

The seven deadly sins were pride, avarice, anger, gluttony, impurity, envy, vainglory. Augustine constructed seven Christian virtues by adopting the four of Plato—wisdom, temperance, virtue and justice, and adding to them faith, hope and charity. The real additions that Christian ethics made to Pagan in the list of virtues are obedience (to God), patience, benevolence, purity, humility and holiness. Obedience to God's will as positive good revealed is quite different from that yielded by Socrates to the natural and informal supposed law of "God". Benevolence and love, too, are peculiarly Christian virtues.

The inward spring the Pagan relied upon in his system

of ethics was knowledge and wisdom; in Christian ethics it is rather love and faith.

Modern Systems of Ethics.

We have now perhaps said enough to indicate what additions and alterations Christianity made to the concepts of Greek ethics. It only remains for us to see what modern forms of ethics have been devised by those who partly or wholly reject Christianity as a sufficient scheme of life.

These have, of course, a different standpoint from the Greek, though many know it not. For the light of Christianity *has* shined, and its principles and objects are common knowledge, as well amongst those who reject it as amongst those who accept it. The former, therefore, in constructing systems of ethics cannot fail to be unconsciously influenced by the new force. Benevolence, for instance, is hardly likely to be left out of any system of ethics again.

Some, indeed, would form a principle of life from which ethics itself is excluded. They use language like the following: "Why should we hamper ourselves with the outworn theologies of the past, with the uncertainties of religion or the subtleties of the moral code"? Others scorn "neighbour morality" or altruism. A man is to be sufficient to himself by his own will and powers. We are to have no fear, no worship of God or man, or even self, because man rules himself completely. Ethics, morals and duties are to be no more.[1]

Personal and universal Hedonism.

Hedonism, which says the agreeable is the good, is perhaps the boldest modern system which may be

[1] Nietzsche and others.

dignified as ethics. It has and has had well-known apostles in this country, and those who disagree with its principles (if such they can be called), and with the excesses they lead to, believe that it has done harm wherever it has been promulgated. Epicureanism, which it resembles, had itself loftier aims, and was on a totally different footing from this anachronism of the nineteenth century.

To Comte Christianity itself is the consecration of egotism. It is undoubtedly primarily individual, and exalts the personality of man; but it does not exhaust itself here; but in the Saviour's teachings especially we get the founding of a "kingdom of heaven," and in St. Paul's of a church, of which all the members care for one another.

Those who found their incentives of life in social rather than individual interests invented an improvement on mere Hedonism (which it will be observed is only personal), a Utilitarianism or Universal Hedonism which is a considerable advance on that we have condemned.

These say that the qualities of natural morality are founded on the greatest good of the greatest number, as, for instance: self-control, truthfulness, justice, kindness and morality itself.

Utilitarianism, therefore, in its highest flight is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and asserts that common welfare is morality.

The utilitarian argues it is good to be happy, that happiness is the good; the perfectionist (another variety) argues it is happy to be good, that perfect goodness is

happiness. The two are, of course, connected by the perception that by maintaining our health and promoting our happiness we may discharge a duty to ourselves and others, and thus we can purify our desires by identifying them with moral ends. Hobbes, Hartley, Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Austin and Bain are all for Utilitarian Hedonism, as opposed to intuitive morals or acting from a moral sense within.

In addition to those who connect morals with sensation, as Epicurus and Bentham, or with social welfare, as Mill and Bain, we have those who connect them with intellect, as Cudworth and Clark, and others again with the sense of beauty and fitness, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.[1]

We see from all this that the subject of modern philosophy is not the relation of the real and of the apparent so much as of the subject and the object, the *ego* and the non-*ego*. The individualist on the one hand extends self so as to embrace the universe, while the socialist on the other extends the universe so that the *ego* is a mere phenomenon in it.

Evolutionary Hedonism.

Finally, the most modern school of all, which has already made that of Mill and Bain out of date, is that of Evolutionary Ethics as propounded by Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Leslie Stephen and others.

It may fairly be called Evolutionary Hedonism tracing, as it does, the rise and progress of morals to the sense of pleasure and pain acted on dimly by animals, and gradually perfectly evolved by humanity.

[1] Martineau.

Which is best?

It may perhaps be questioned whether we have gained either in our standpoint or in truth by substituting these for Christian ethics. There are many who think we have, and to whom Christianity is already effete; but there are others who think from observation that this is not so, but that, on the contrary, there never was a time when Christian ethics had a greater power, or were more practically adopted with the best results; not, indeed, only by those who call themselves Christians, but by others, who, while repudiating the doctrines of the faith, tacitly admit the superiority of its ethics by adopting them more or less in whatever new systems they invent.

CHAPTER V.

CHARACTER AND HEREDITY.

THE Springs of Character—the subject which forms our title—will be specially considered in the two following chapters and in Chapter X.

The full Scope of Mind must be grasped.

As already indicated in Chapter I., it is impossible to understand this subject without clearly grasping that mind must not, and cannot, be limited to consciousness. It is claimed, indeed, by those who would so limit it, that "consciousness" is the one quality that is essentially psychic. But this surely is too much to claim. For instance, wherever we get purpose clearly seen, or moral principle or any spiritual quality, we feel equally certain that these are not, and cannot be, properties of matter as such, but are definitely and distinctly psychical: whether they are directly discerned by consciousness at the time, or only inferred, while themselves in unconsciousness, *does not in the least matter.* So that consciousness is not the only, and probably not the most important, property of mind.

We are obliged to state our position clearly as to this, simply because the very difficulty attaching to all discussion of character lies mainly in this one fact, that

its home is in the unconscious mind; and one of the most difficult mental feats is to bring it into consciousness, a feat, we may add, so difficult that at best it is only partially possible, with the result that our character is never fully known to ourselves, and only our Maker sees truly what we are. This we considered in Chapter II.

"Man's soul," says Emerson, "is a stream whose source is hidden. We are, indeed, more than we know, and occasionally hear ourselves utter things we know not."

If character then be hidden so deep in the night of the unconscious, what shall we say of its springs?

The Springs of Character.

We are not here speaking of the springs of conduct, or the motives of our actions; these are easier to trace, being the qualities of our characters. But the question is, What are the springs of character itself? We have shown in Chapter I. that the word "spring" has two or more meanings. It may be a source or a motor power, and we have to consider it in both aspects. As a source, there are two springs of character; while as motor power there is one—or three in all. McCosh says very well:[1] "Character depends on heredity, surroundings and will". The first two sources have been described as nature and nurture, which we will proceed to speak of as heredity and habit. The third we consider in Chapter X.

We all (except Weissman and his followers) believe in the inheritance of moral tendencies, and, in short, in

[1] McCosh, *Psychology, The Motive Powers*, p. 255.

the foundations of a character by heredity. The first great spring is, therefore, our ancestry; and it is no little advantage, in analysing character, that this should be traceable: hence the value rightly set on lineage and a good stock.

Now, grafted upon this, we get additions to our hereditary character in the shape of new principles. These at first *form no part of the character*, though we may act on them. It is only when, by force of repetition, they become habitual, instinctive, natural, unconscious, and part of ourselves, that we can truly say they form fresh springs of character.

Heredity and Character.

The foundations of character therefore lie in heredity; and all true additions are acquired by habits becoming incorporated with the character, so as to become spontaneous and proceed from unconscious sources.

We must insist on this, for so many of our actions form no part of our real character, but are the result of passing whims or conscious effort. All that comes from character necessarily has an instinctive source in the unconscious, since character itself is there, and influences and moulds the life unconsciously.

Now no action that is instinctive, or purely unconscious, can have merit attaching to it *per se*, though it may possess both wisdom and beauty.

No Merit attaches to Unconscious Action.

A character then does not owe its *moral* value in action to either of these two springs of heredity or habit, both being alike instinctive and unconscious. We must go to the third spring—the source of power and activity—like the mainspring of a watch. This spring is our

conscious will guided by our moral sense. And it is as reasonable and responsible beings that merit or demerit, therefore, attaches to all our conscious deeds, though these may spring from unconscious sources, to which, strictly speaking, no merit can attach.

Let us be sure that our meaning is clear. Responsibility and merit do not attach to what we *are* until that self is expressed in conscious action, it may be of thought or word or deed.

Of course the will and the moral sense that guides it are themselves, in a way, a part of the character they move. It is the element of conscious choice, and the exercise of the power of choice, and a free will that alone can constitute merit or responsibility. These, therefore, must be postulated if we are to be regarded as reasonable men and responsible beings.

A strong character is one with a strong mainspring or will. It is not necessarily good; that is determined by the strength of the moral sense. A weak will means a weak mainspring, but not necessarily, therefore, a bad character.

It will now be apparent how a character can be altered in expression and in merit, though much the same in its constitution, by the substitution of a new spring of will or power or direction of moral sense. "The new nature," spoken of by Christians, is not a new character. Character can never thus be changed in a moment. It is a new moral sense and a new source of will power, so that the character differs in expression and in its motor principles. In this and in all other

statements made on such subjects, however, let us ever remember that they are probably not absolutely accurate, but are merely approximate to the truth.

Character may be transmitted.

Character, therefore, depends in the first instance on heredity. "We may," says Huxley,[1] "veritably say this moral and intellectual essence of a man does pass over from one fleshly tabernacle to another. In the new-born infant the character of the stock lies latent; and the '*ego*' is a bundle of potentialities."

Dr. Hill of Cambridge says:[2] "I am glad Dr. Schofield believes in the inheritance of habit. . . . We need no longer try to settle the much-discussed question of whether acquired characters are transmissible by looking out for cases in which gross anatomical changes are inherited by children not brought up to their parents' tract, but we may assert with confidence that the central nervous system, as modified by the deliberate choice of the individual, tends to be transmitted to his offspring."

The main stream of character is due to the formation of brain and nerve, as well as mind, from heredity. In one sense a new-born child has not so much as yet character, but disposition. True character comes later on, but disposition and individuality are already its possession from heredity.

"Inheritance," says Furneaux Jordan, "mainly determines whether a man shall be capable or incapable, brave or cowardly, trustful or suspicious, prudent or reckless,

[1] Huxley, Romanes Lecture, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 15.

[2] Dr. Alex. Hill, *Inquiry into the Formation of Habit in Man*, p. 24, Victoria Institute.

voluble or taciturn." Circumstances come into play rather in details and smaller matters. We may say heredity supplies the framework or skeleton that gives the main outlines, subsequent habits add the flesh, etc., while the conscious will animates the whole into responsible action.

There are one or two points about ancestry that may be touched on here.

Direct and indirect Heredity and Atavism.

Hereditary qualities may descend directly, as from father to son; or indirectly, as from father to daughter; or by atavism, as from grandfather to grandson; or be transmitted collaterally, as from aunt to nephew. At first sight it might be thought that the children of the same two parents must all have pretty nearly the same characters at the start, and it is from this error that so many children are badly brought up, by adopting the same *régime* with all. In the first place the children are not merely the offspring of two, but of six at least (for we must always consider the four grandparents as influencing the child), and, more broadly still, of the stock as well as of the parentage from which he is descended.

The six Parents.

In the second place these six "parents" may be mixed in the child in very varying proportions. One that is nearly all maternal grandmother, with a little of the father added, will probably be utterly different from his brother, who is a compound of both paternal grandparents with a strong dash of his mother.

Parentage imposes certain definite limitations. Carlyle always maintained that two fools never can and never will produce a wise child; and I think, if in

addition the four grandparents are fools, the statement will always hold good.

Furneaux Jordan declares it never happens that a child takes after one parent physically and after the other in character. We may, indeed, generally assume that marked physical likeness goes with mental resemblance.

Ancestry again is responsible for the "old-fashioned" air of most of our children, who only catch up the A.D. in which they are living by adding to their hereditary equipment by habit. We are really only "up-to-date" as a rule in the middle third of our lives, and even this is often a great effort. Here and there a child is born distinctly in advance of his time, but these are rare exceptions.

When a child is born he is the product, mind and body, of the forces of heredity. Not only his body, but his mind is deeply impressed with the characters of his parentage. His mind is no *tabula rasa*, but is already thickly sown with seeds, some of which are definite qualities, but the greater part at first merely tendencies.

We inherit Tendencies.

We are no longer believed as a rule to inherit positive virtues or vices any more than actual bodily diseases, but rather tendencies to such.

"It was formerly thought," says Holman,[1] "that well-marked peculiarities, physical or mental, in the parent were handed on to the child. But this theory is now regarded as untenable, and it is held there is nothing more than a tendency to develop such qualities.'

[1] Prof. Holman, *Introduction to Education*, p. 450.

This is not wholly true, but like all else is to be taken as approximately so.

For instance, two faculties at least are seen in every child (with the rarest exception) from its earliest years, which seem to be largely the foundations of the subsequent emotions and reason. They are love and the sense of justice. All children "love," and all children have an instinctive sense of "justice".

Love and Light in the Infant Soul.

Surely there is nothing strained, when we see these two characteristics mirrored in the young child's soul, in discerning the reflection of the Almighty, who is love and who is light (or justice). Here the child reproduces as two principles in its unconscious mind the fulfilling of the whole law: and the stamp or character of the great Creator is clearly to be discerned in these qualities in the new-born babe.

The germs of morality are innate in all, and this inherent love of justice is nothing less than the dawning of the moral sense. The mere discerning of justice might be intellectual only, but the love of it clearly brings in the moral element.

Of children a little older Galton says:[1] "The most prominent characters in children are energy, sociability, love of praise, truthfulness, thoroughness, refinement".

From our personal knowledge of children, some of these would appear to be rather the result of education than to be inherent. We must ever remember the special qualities that reside in the child's unconscious mind are simply tendencies and qualities of heredity, and it is only

[1] F. Galton, *Enquiries into the Human Faculty*, p. 58.

as the result of (unconscious) education that these become definite parts of a formed character.

Tendencies may become Virtues or Vices.

With regard to tendencies, it is mainly this education that determines whether they shall develop into vices or virtues, but we have no time at present to pursue this fascinating subject further. A most beautiful sketch of hereditary nobility of character, as thus developed, is seen in Cëdric Errol, Lord Fauntleroy, Mrs. Burnett's charming creation; and even more instructive as a study in heredity is her own autobiography in *The One I Knew Best of All.*

Discerning clearly then that every inherited instinct or tendency may be developed into a virtue or degraded into a vice, we see the folly of the advice of trusting to the child's instinct. It must be watched, not trusted.

Prof. M'Cunn says:[1] "When a child has an overmastering instinct of acquisitiveness, who will prophesy the sequel—thrift or avarice? When he has an unmistakable hunger for praise, is it to end in vainglory or a just 'love of the love of other people,' of which love is its counterfeit? And is there not for every instinct a like parting of the ways?"

Marked individuality is seen in children in their various likes and dislikes. Some children, for instance, naturally hate snakes, others love them, and others again are indifferent to them.

Individuality of character in early life is the impress of strongly-marked heredity; in late life, of a strong will.

[1] Prof. M'Cunn, *The Making of Character*, p. 29.

Hereditary qualities may be deeply stamped or only faintly impressed; in the latter case they are later in development, and lie hidden in early life.

Geniuses are the result of some happy combination of parentage with some leading quality stamped with extraordinary power.

We recognise this in our expressions. We speak of a "born" orator or actor, meaning one whose powers are due to his unconscious mind and not to his conscious education.

Mozart says: "If you think how you are to write (music) you will never write anything worth hearing. I write because I cannot help it!" And this is everywhere the language of genius.

Methods of early Training

And now one word as to the training of these heredity principles. The best, the most efficacious training of character is that which is addressed to the unconscious mind, that which is carried on unconsciously; when silently through all the avenues leading to the brain within the organ of mind is developed, and the mind itself unfolds until it blossoms into consciousness and self-consciousness: the teacher, the instructor, being the voice of Nature, or rather the voice of God. "It is good," says Geo. Macdonald, in *Robert Falconer*, "that children of faculty absorb Nature. Children of faculty as distinguished from capacity should not have many books. They should be exposed to, and left to absorb all the influences of Nature."

"In those early impressions, of which no one seems to be conscious, least of all the child, and which gather

up power as the rolling avalanche, the elements are collected for the future emotions, moods, etc., that make up a greater part of the history of the individual." [1]

Every circumstance, indeed, through a whole life has some influence on character.

Evils of artificial Education.

And then, upon the too brief idyllic period of childhood, conscious education and arbitrary commands break in; often, alas! unwisely given by thoughtless and careless parents; with the result that the Divine instincts of the soul are dwarfed, cabined and confined by short-sighted rules and maxims; the child's mind is gradually lowered and disillusioned till it reaches the current level of its A.D., and becomes hard-headed and practical.

As little as possible is left to spontaneity in this utilitarian age; everything has an "end," and the whole round of life is hedged in on every side by artificial barriers. Even the artless games of childhood become merely mechanical means for physical recuperation or mental relaxation. "Must we always," asks one rather pathetically, "be doing our duty? May we not sometimes take a holiday from being positively good? May we ever play for the sake of mere enjoyment, and not for recreation or the 'good it will do'?"

One great point in favour of unconscious education is that it never interferes with the happiness of child-life but increases it; and this is not such a small matter as it seems. Conscious education is needed, but, unwisely conducted, it is often a very painful process.

We must ever recognise the two divisions of mind,

[1] Dr. L. Waldstein, *The Sub-Conscious Self*, p. 47.

and remember that the springs (sources), the foundations, roots and principles of character lie deep in the unconscious; the flowers and fruits and actions being seen in the conscious. During the whole period of infancy and childhood, whether we know it or not, the education that is of most value to us is that which is received and stored by the unconscious mind; and it is this education on which the future character so largely depends, for through it the tendencies of heredity can be directed and modified. Herbert Spencer says: "A man is more like the company he keeps than that from which he is descended". In short, unconscious education is more powerful than heredity; conscious education is not.

All early Education is Unconscious

No doubt fundamental changes of hereditary qualities are very rare. They may follow severe, and sometimes unsuspected, head injuries and other great shocks.

Characters appear to change often when they are only developed. The slow development of hereditary tendencies often looks very like a radical change of character.

Sometimes heredity gets undue credit for qualities of character. "What is often called heredity is simply the expression of a sub-conscious self, *the beginning of which* can be traced to early childhood, when the actions of the parents and their example are sub-consciously perceived, and, by their conscious repetition, form fundamental impressions."[1]

Some "Hereditary" Qualities really due to early Environment.

"Much is often put to the credit of 'original sin,'

[1] Dr. L. Waldstein, *The Sub-Conscious Self*, p. 19.

inherited by the child, that is really the avoidable result of vicious banes and bad examples in early childhood."[1] Nature is often thus credited with the results of nurture.

As we have said, in the hereditary qualities we do not so much get positive good and evil as tendencies (often, it is true, with a distinct bias), but which can be traced in one direction or the other.

"Virtue," says Leslie Stephen,[2] "is rather the organising of the instincts than their extirpation." There are, indeed, few tendencies that are in themselves so positively and irredeemably evil as to require actual extirpation. There may be, and often are, characteristics of this nature, but they were "not hereditary in their present form. Some bad education has developed into evil what might have been a quality for good."

We will pass on to the great supplementary spring of character that is found in the force of habit.

[1] Prof. M'Cunn, *Making of Character*, p. 9.

[2] Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 302.

CHAPTER VI.

CHARACTER AND HABIT.

Effects of Habit on Character.

WE now turn to the important relations between habit and character, and we find that they are twofold. In the first place the original tendencies of heredity, of which we have just spoken, can be modified for good or evil; and in the second, new principles of character can be added by the force of habit. "Sow an act, reap a habit; sow a habit, reap a character; sow a character, reap a destiny." We may well and truly, therefore, regard habit as the supplementary spring or source of character.

Now, habit in thought is as well and truly formed as habit in action.

Consciousness necessarily attends at first every act of reason; but when the act has been repeated a thousand times and becomes instinctive, it is performed unconsciously, and a habit is the result.

There are one or two interesting points in the formation of a habit. In the first place the action must never be varied. Attention in the formation of a habit also seems greatly to deepen its impression on the brain, and make it much more easy to establish; and we must

remember it is much easier to form habits we like than those we do not.

There are many psychologists who, resolutely denying unconscious mind action, relegate all processes of thought, which by continuance have become habitual, to material agencies; and deny altogether their mental character, simply because they are unconscious. This is well answered by Bastian:[1] "That which is realisable now may after a time cease to be so; and shall we cease to call a given nerve action (or rather its results) psychical, when by frequent repetition it has become so habitual that it no longer arouses consciousness?"

Stout says:[2] "Where the habit is sufficiently formed to subserve its purpose, consciousness retires from the scene, like an artist whose task is done".

To this M'Cunn adds:[3] "This doesn't, however, imply that the habit has become wholly a thing of physical automatism. It would be a lame conclusion to prolonged moral effort that a habit became a mere thing of nerves and muscles. The fact is that the psychical roots of the habit are not cut, but only buried."

Value of Habit in Childhood.

All the minor moralities of life may thus be made easy and habitual to the child. He may form the habits of being courteous, prompt, punctual, neat, considerate; and practise these virtues without conscious effort. We thus can modify and add to the hereditary disposition of the child, until it becomes the character of the man.

[1] C. Bastian, *Brain as an Organ of Mind*, p. 523.

[2] *Analytical Psychology*, G. F. Stout, vol. i., p. 265.

[3] *The Making of Character*, M'Cunn, p. 43.

The first act is from motives in an undetermined character. The second act has the motive for it strengthened by being a repetition, until at length the motive becomes unconscious, and forms a permanent factor in the character. Up to a certain point our character is formed *for* us by heredity, beyond this it is formed *by* us through habit.

Character is thus, as we have seen, mainly the sum total of habit; and as the Alps are the sedimentary deposits of the silent seas of the past, so character is formed from the sedimentary deposits of thousands of acts and experiences in the unconscious past. These acts and repetitions arise, as we shall see, from our surroundings and our ideals. Still we must remember that bundles of habits are not in themselves character; for this organic unity and co-ordination is required. We must well understand that until the principle underlying an act has by repetition become instinctive, and thus unconscious, it cannot be truly said to form a part of our character. Care in Latin pronunciation will not produce care in cycling in a careless character, until, by repetition, carefulness itself has become instinctive. Then it appears in all pursuits and forms a part of character. In short, there comes a period when I no longer possess a certain virtue, but it possesses me. When this is so, it is my assured property; and I can pass on to attain higher forms of virtue, and it is thus I grow into ὁ σώφρων—the perfectly tempered man who is the product of organised habit.

Habit is a Spring of Character.

The fixity of a virtuous disposition which is the

height of moral character is the result of habit, and "the habitually honest man does what is right, not consciously because he 'ought,' but with simple satisfaction; and is ill at ease till it is done".[1]

Morality should thus early in life be made a firm habit, for indefinite instincts soon cease in all circumstances to be reliable guides, and require raising (where of value) into definite habits. We must remember, however, that "the establishment of organised habit is never of itself enough to ensure the growth of an enlightened moral conscientiousness";[2] for growth, more than habit, is needed. And here we may remark, as M'Cunn has pointed out, that while moral habits can be as freely and surely formed as physical habits, this must be effected by the repetition of psychical states and not by reproducing the merely physical acts. The outward action alone will never form a moral virtue, nor can virtuous habits themselves be merely mechanical.

The connection of ethics with action and not with theory is physiologically invaluable, as all acts tend to consolidate ethics into character; and it is moreover an immense gain to be able to relegate the lower actions to habit, so as to be free to develop the higher instincts. The real value of the automatic is that it liberates the mind from lesser things for fresh conscious processes of a more important nature.

There is, however, another side of habit that we must look at to arrive at the balance of truth.

[1] Herbert Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, sec. 7, p. 46.

[2] Dr. Royce of Harvard, U.S.A.

The sense of duty or "ought" diminishes as morality is practised. The first performance of a duty is directly because of "ought"—the moral sense. After a while it becomes habitual, and very likely a pleasure, and at last it is performed unconsciously, wholly or in part. Take, for instance, the repetition of a set form of prayer or saying grace at meals.

Moral Value does not attach to Unconscious Acts.

Now, it is obvious that no real moral value attaches to an action or even a motive which is *wholly* unconscious. As therefore moral acts become apparently mechanical habits, they lose the moral value that attached to them. We thus see again that character as a whole lies in the unconscious, and that any merit attaching to it arises from the exercise of the conscious will that calls it into activity. We will look at this subject further in Chapter X.

Dangers of Habits.

Again, habits may become chains of slavery and barriers to progress.

The way stationary lives avoid progressing is by doing nothing whatever outside a fixed circle of habit that has become almost instinctive. We all have a tendency to become "recurring decimals"; for progress means effort, whereas habit means ease.

No character can be automatic where there is any progress. And habits need not be bad to be hindrances. Moral habits of a narrow order may establish great barriers to after progress. It is a great danger, therefore, for a mind to become automatic at a low level.

In our manufacturing cities we are said to make

everything but men; that is, we make lives full of bundles of habits at a low level, and as near machines as human beings can become.

On the other hand, habits are difficult to stop when once they have been formed. The persistent pursuit of an object always involves the danger of not being able to leave off the habit of pursuit when the object is gained, as, for instance, in the pursuit of riches.

Of course a bad habit is a terrible thing when fixed, and the moral consciousness is soon blunted to right and wrong; so that a man may get such a habit of lying or swearing as to lose all sense of evil.

Every act of sin makes the second act appear less sinful and easier to commit. Habit is thus a fearful power when enlisted on the side of wrong.

Habit lessens pleasure or pain, and when fixed almost abolishes it.

We lose pleasure in games and pursuits as soon as they become fixed habits, as with professionals; and a continual sufferer soon complains less as the pain becomes deadened by continuance.

Habit may induce error, as at the beginning of a new year, when for some time the old year continues to be written; or when dressing for dinner the watch is wound up as if going to bed.

From all these instances we see that habits are such great powers that a most watchful eye should be kept over their acquisition, at first by the parent and later by the individual himself.

How Habits are Acquired.

We now turn to consider the two means by which

habits are easily and naturally acquired; and the first is by our environment or our surroundings.

As long ago as B.C. 450 Hippocrates believed in the influence of environment in determining character; so that we are speaking here of no new idea.

Life is indeed the school of character, because life to each man means that with which he comes in contact—his surroundings between which and himself there is incessant action and reaction.

A child cannot fail to bear the stamp of the atmosphere its mind has unconsciously breathed for the first few years of its life.

"Life and health are largely acted on (unconsciously) by agents immaterial and psychical. They are the essential parts of the education from which springs the character, etc." [1]

Value of Environment

"Nothing exerts so great an influence on the psychical organism as the moral atmosphere breathed by it. The composition of that atmosphere is therefore of fundamental importance; and this education is Nature's education." [2]

In a certain environment all the weeds of character flourish, another develops all the flowers. If we cannot change our environment when it is injurious, we must definitely resist it, if we are to be saved from bad habits.

We can make our environment as well as letting it make us. Our rooms, and particularly those we occupy most, represent the characteristics of their occupants.

[1] Dr. J. Pollock, *Book of Health*, p. 520.

[2] W. B. Carpenter, *Mental Physiology*, 4th edition, p. 353.

Some, however, construct their environment out of all sorts of odds and ends they can find, like a caddis worm, or a bird when building its nest; while others find suitable environments that fit them, ready made, like a hermit crab. A strong character shapes its own environment, a weaker one is formed by it. It is in early life and in poverty that our environments are mostly made *for* us; in adult and easy lives they are mostly made *by* us; and in either case there can be no doubt of the value to physical and mental health of being in perfect harmony with our surroundings.

The family is Nature's great moral school; and real character is mostly formed at home. The relationship of husband and wife is a powerful former of character, especially in the early years of married life. Parents, not only mothers, but fathers also, have immense influence on the characters of their children.

Contrast between Family Life and Institutions.

Herbart says:[1] "If the life of a family is permeated by a noble piety, a sincere religious faith will take root in the heart of the children. To the child the family should be the symbol of the order in the world; from the parents one should derive the characteristics of the Deity. The child's ideas of the Heavenly Father are moulded unconsciously by the earthly one. The mother's tender care, the father's kind seriousness, the relationship of the family, must exist in all purity and worthiness before the child's ingenuous eyes, because he judges only what he observes; because what he sees is

[1] F. Herbart, *Science of Education*, 2nd edit., p. 71.

to him the only thing possible, the pattern for his imitation."

Other environments are those of school, companions and friends, locality, country, profession, etc.

We may note here the enormous and well-known effects that institutions, reformatories, homes (so-called), etc., have on the character, and especially amongst the young. We have elsewhere spoken of the effects of the dietaries at these places; but apart from this, the influence of the life, the routine, the companionships, the sense of being a unit rather than a loved personality, have all the depressing effects on character that shade has on a growing plant. All movements in favour of remodelling homes for children on the basis of small homes, and thus reproducing natural family life, are of the greatest value in improving the character.

A solitary life, such as the monastic, is not good for the development of character, as it merely tends to emphasise the stronger features, whether of vice or virtue, but does not lead to growth.

Effects of Professional Life on Character.

The force of the professions on character is most marked. The finished product differs *in toto* from the raw material. Take six brothers and let one enter the navy at twelve, another the army at eighteen, another the law at twenty, and another medicine at seventeen, another a merchant's office, and let the sixth loaf about at home, and then carefully analyse all their characters at thirty-five.

You will find the sea stamped on the first, seen not alone in his tanned cheek and somewhat rolling gait,

but morally through and through, down to the very depths of his unconscious being. In fact he himself is largely unconscious of how much he shows it. You see it in his frank eye, in his nautical language, in his freedom of speech, in his code of morality, in his virtues and in his vices, in what may be called the very shape of his thoughts.

The army man again will be quite a different product. He will be stiffer and less easy and more precise. His bearing (we hope) will show his drill ; but it is not his body alone, but his character, his very being, that has been drilled. That, indeed, is the essential difference between the regular and the volunteer. Both have got drilled bodies ; but the drill has reached the character in the former, while the latter is still a civilian at heart.

The barrister, with the intellectual and casuistic training he has received, will doubtless look down on his two brothers from his forensic height, and will show how his profession has touched his character, *but to a decidedly less extent* than the other two, the environment not having been so constant or so characteristic. The doctor will be more changed in character from the habit of looking at people from the inside, and the constant balancing of cause and effect. His responsibilities and the continual need of a good manner will also have left indelible marks. The medical profession is instructive to study because men can enter it at any age, and it is easy to see that where medicine has been taken up late in life (after thirty) the character itself is much less affected. The man is not an engrained doctor

like the man who began at seventeen. The merchant will perhaps be least altered in himself, the atmosphere he has breathed being less specialised; and the loafer will have steadily deteriorated, most of his hereditary potentialities being by now enlisted on the side of evil. So great is the power of our callings on our characters!

Effects of a Working-man's Life on Character.

Having seen the effect on character of a definite training for a definite profession, let us take the unconscious training of character in an ordinary working-man —say, for example, the difference between a gardener with wages of 18s. a week and a coal miner with wages of 36s. The two occupations contrast as follows: The first is safe, the second dangerous; the first is in the light and open air, the second in darkness and confined space; the first life is equable but poorly paid, the second presents violent contrasts but is highly paid; the first man is ever with Nature and studies all her harmonious and natural progression and alterations, the second is with Nature, but cannot see her or her operations, and regards her rather as a dangerous foe to be mastered. If two brothers take up these two occupations for twenty years, their characters will probably be formed somewhat on the following lines: The gardener will be slow, patient, genial and gentle, like the Nature with whom he is ever in contact. He will be careful, because poor; he will read little, because he reads Nature's book all day; he will be equable and comparatively free from excesses, because his life is free from contrasts and dangers. The miner, on the other hand, will have an uneven character, will be reckless,

prone to excesses in pleasure, passion, sport, etc., because his occupation and his life present the most violent contrasts and expose him to great dangers. He will be extravagant also, because he is well paid; he reads more and is more discontented; his home is more luxurious, as he loves to emphasise the contrast between it and his work; at times, therefore, he may develop a passion for flowers, exceeding any gardener, because of his gloomy toil. His character is stronger and more forcible and wilful from the rugged and dangerous difficulties he has daily to overcome.[1]

Effects of Character on Character.

Let us now see how one character affects another; for above all we are ever influencing one another, and our greatest influence is that we exercise unconsciously. *Our minds cast shadows* just like our bodies, and daily and hourly those shadows are falling upon others for good or for evil. This one fact alone proclaims the overwhelming importance of character in social life. The reason we feel one man's presence and not another's is indeed as simple and unerring as the law of gravity. A presence is felt in exact proportion to the strength of its character.

"O Iole, how did you know Hercules was a god?" "Because I was content the moment my eyes fell on him —he conquered whether he stood or walked or sat."

Character is like those bodies we call ferments, which

[1] At a mining village Justice Grantham has lately spoken of, where the scenery is lovely, near Conisbro' Castle, the wages are high and the hours short, but the men lead lives of shameful degradation, drinking, gambling and neglecting their children. The material prosperity and the moral savagery shatter every theory of the elevation of the people based on mere material good.

have the power of inducing changes in other bodies without undergoing any change themselves. Ptyalin, for instance, the ferment in the saliva, changes any amount of starch into sugar without undergoing any change itself; and so certain characters have such power that in their presence all the starch in a man disappears, and sugar takes its place. And, again, just as ferments are of two sorts, those that build up and those that decompose, so one character strengthens while another weakens and disintegrates every other with which it comes into contact. Some men are like spiritual ozone: one breathes a new life in their presence. Others, on the contrary, are like germ-laden sewer gas: not only noisome, but infectious. In short, like produces like. Men of good principles produce others, and men of evil likewise. Each multiplies after its own likeness.

"Men of character," says Emerson, "are the conscience of the society to which they belong. And to produce all this effect no word need be spoken, no deed done—the presence often suffices."

"In silent company with another," says Maeterlink,[1] "the character is often deeply formed. The truth," he adds, "cannot often be uttered in words, but it can be learnt in silence."

Ideals and Character.

Having thus considered a little the power of surroundings, and of the influence we have over one another, let us look at another way of forming good habits, and that is by following ideals.

[1] Maeterlink, trans. by A. Sutro, *The Treasure of the Humble.*

Character is never most benefited by introspection and searching for springs of conduct in our unconscious mind that were meant to be left unseen; but rather by objective methods: just as facility in playing the violin is not gained by a study of the muscles concerned, but by practising music. This is the value of ideals, which form at the same time an object in life and a standard for moral sense. The word "ought" supposes an ideal standard.

Nil admirari, or the despising of all ideals, is indeed a doctrine of devils.

A chief factor in the development of character is the power of forming and following ideals, rather than the impulse to be or the effort of becoming better.

It is the imitation, conscious or unconscious, of one's ideal that becomes a habit, and thus forms and reforms and transforms the character. The generality of ideals is seen in such common phrases as "The dream of my life," "The expression of one's ideal," etc.

An anonymous writer in *Macmillan*, 1882, in "Studies in Psychology," notices that "after being raised to a higher rank (to a baronetcy or peerage) the whole behaviour subtilely and unconsciously changes in accordance with it". This is also the case in a minor degree with lesser standards of fashion; and as in the social world, so in the moral.

The Moral Sense towards Ideals.

The moral sense cannot act without some sort of standard; and, indeed, an ideal is needed for the very existence of morality; the best character being that where all the energies are directed towards the highest ideals.

One's character becomes similar to those whom we love, admire and respect, simply because in trying to be like them we unconsciously form habits to resemble them.

Our instincts and character are moulded by ideals, but not by passing pleasures; indeed, our will seems fulfilled in an ideal in a way it never is by pleasure. This ideal may not be a matter of conscious choice, but may grow up with us from obscure origin.

The measure of a man is truly the measure of his vision, that is, of the ideal before his eye.

"To have the eye evil," says Ruskin, "is more than being blind; just as the whole body being full of darkness is darkness in me, and is more than my being in darkness." Such is the case where corrupt ideals fill the vision.

A lost Ideal is Disastrous.

Loss of faith in ideals is also destructive of character and stops its growth; moreover, an ideal not followed is soon lost.

The substitution of an inferior ideal for a superior is the greatest moral calamity a man can suffer. We must never lower our standards in order more easily to reach them; and, indeed, an impossible ideal or standard is always the most elevating to the character. The impossibility of reaching it preserves humility, while at the same time it ensures constant progress.

Without an ideal a man may exist, but cannot be said to live.

The majority of men have an ideal self they try to realise. Harmony between this ideal self and the real

self brings peace of mind, while discord brings distress and remorse.

This ideal self is a compound of the ideals before the man. Its main feature is formed by the principal object for which he lives, but in minor matters standards of perfection are also set up in deportment, dress, personal habits, etc. Thus the coster may live for an ideal waistcoat or a barrow drawn by a donkey, a flower girl for a Sunday hat with real ostrich feathers, and so on.

Scale of Ideals.

The general ideals before men are as various as their personality. At the bottom come those rare cases where the ideal is absolutely evil—where it is said: "Evil be thou my good". Some have questioned whether such characters exist, but of this we fear there is no doubt.

Then come those with morbid ideals. As a medical man I know what it is to have even disease made an ideal.

Then we enter the large class with very low aims, such as those to whom money, riches, sensual pleasures and pleasure generally are the end of life.

Of all such aims the end is fixed. There are two paths for every man to choose: the path of duty or of pleasure, of self-denial or of self-gratification, of self-control or licence; and the one is the path of life and the other the path of death. It is very curious, moreover, to notice that when we pursue pleasure we feel and know that we are slaves, but when we pursue loftier ideals we feel free.

Negative Ideals.

Going a little higher, we get those whose ideal may be said to be a negative one. Their object is "To do no

harm," or "To pay their way," that is, keep out of debt, and with this their lives are fulfilled.

Another aim is magnitude, or, as we say now, "breaking the record". The ideal is to be the largest grocer or biggest draper, or the richest landowner. Akin to this class, though distinctly higher in moral aim, are those who would be best rather than biggest; quality being valued rather than quantity. The ideal may be to become the top of a school class, the highest in rank, the best cricketer or golf player, the first in his profession, and so on.

Higher still, and the first where self in some shape or form ceases to be the direct object, is the class whose ideal consists in providing well for their families, in social aims, in utilitarianism, in the greatest good for the greatest number, it being remembered that "social" includes both duty in social morality and personal duty, while the greatest good of the greatest number includes personal good, family good, social good and universal good. Social Ideals.

Above these again are those who pursue abstract virtues, and amongst them were the higher Greek philosophers. To these the ideal may be duty or patriotism, or honour or virtue, or temperance or justice, or character itself as the end of life, or wisdom or truth. With regard to these two latter, it has been well said that "while the aim of education is wisdom, that of the wise man is truth". Highest of all we think are those most wholly altruistic, whose ideal is self-sacrifice for the happiness of others, and above all the pleasing of God and the imitation of Christ. We think that, whether a man be a Christian or Christian Ideals.

not, he will agree that the highest ideal before a creature is to do the will of his Creator.

We can have noble and lofty ideals apart from Christianity: but there can be no doubt we have the highest with it. We will add one word as to the connection of happiness and pleasure with ideals. Seneca said: "We do not love virtue because it gives us pleasure; but it gives us pleasure because we love it". The εὐδαιμονια of Aristotle—the end of being—is by no means mere happiness. To pursue happiness as such is almost invariably to defeat one's object. Perfection, not happiness, is the end of life. Nevertheless it may be said goodness and happiness go hand in hand. Happiness indeed is largely found in the means used to attain the end in view. For instance, if the object be to provide food for the table, the sport itself affords more pleasure than the food. Just, then, as goodness and happiness go together, so in the highest morality goodness and wisdom are not divorced; the highest morals go with the highest intellects—but the morals must come first.

Summary. We have thus seen in the brief survey of the two sources of character we have traced in these two chapters that the fundamental spring is undoubtedly heredity; but that in it we get rather the material of which character is made than the character itself, and that for the forming and moulding of these tendencies, as well as for the introduction of fresh instinctive principles, habit is needed. We have considered the mighty force at our disposal in this great principle; and have seen

further that moral habits, voluntarily adopted at first, become also fixed, a very part of ourselves, as they become instinctive in the unconscious mind. We have also pointed out that the environment around us and the ideal before us, are the two means by which habits of thought and conduct are fostered, to a large extent unconsciously. We may consider then that thus far we have been occupied with the formation of character. Our next duty will be to consider its growth.

CHAPTER VII.

CHARACTER AND GROWTH.

Growth and Development.

In the body we distinguish clearly between growth and development, or increase in quantity and quality. The former continues for a definite period, terminating about the twenty-first year, and after then no growth takes place. But development still goes on rapidly, and may continue (in the brain, at any rate) down to a very late period in life.

Growth depends, of course, on food and exercise, but they are not its sole cause, for we continue to eat and walk after twenty-one, but no longer grow. Growth is due to an inherent power in the body, which is a part of the mystery of life itself.

Development is not a power or force in the body like growth, but is purely the result of use and exercise. "Who by reason of *use* have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil."[1] An arm is developed by playing a violin; a brain by the study of Greek, both brain (cerebellum) and body by bicycle-riding, and so on.

We do not see at present that we are in a position

[1] Heb. v. 14.

to draw a clear distinction between growth and development in character. It will be best therefore to understand growth in this case to include development, if indeed it does not wholly consist of it. The difficulty is immense in examining a character to decide what elements are entirely new, being incorporated by habit, and which consist of hereditary potentialities properly developed. Nor indeed is the matter from one point of view of supreme importance: suffice it to know that we have these two springs. We will therefore turn now to consider by what means character is developed or "grows".

We may remark, first, that with development in character always goes repression. The restraining is as needed as the fostering. The one without the other fails to a great extent in its object. Growth of character in humanity owes its almost infinite possibilities to the apparent limitless capacity man possesses in contradistinction to the rest of the animal kingdom, combined with the power of modification that attaches to a character whose greatest factor is reason, as contrasted with mental powers chiefly guided by instinct.

Stationary Characters.

But, in spite of this, some people (as we have seen in Chapter VI.) apparently neither grow nor develop. They eat, drink and sleep, absolutely free from the stimulus of progressive desires—not only consciously, but in fact.

It seems incredible that any can realise they are leading lives at such a low level and be satisfied with them. We may rest assured no life at a high level is non-progressive. "Is it possible," says Shakespeare of

a fool (Parolles), "that he should *know* that (*i.e.*, 'what') he is, and *be* that (*i.e.*, 'what') he is?"

A thoroughly self-indulged childhood with every want forestalled, at a low animal level, is often a death-blow to progress, and the foundation of a bad character.

No character can be good that is not ever improving; and this involves effort, for mental struggle is the first law of progress. Where intellect is deficient, therefore, progress is necessarily at an end. Maudsley observes: "Most madmen have few ideas; most have simple feelings, and the coarsest desires and ways".

How does Character grow?

How, then, does character grow, and how does it develop? Character grows like the body, mainly by food and exercise. Its food is the ideas presented to the mind, its exercise lies in directing life through the various circumstances around.

Character is also developed by life generally, by actions, by principles, by objects, by changes, by other characters, by education direct and indirect, or conscious and unconscious, and by many other means.

The watchword of character is St. Augustine's famous ladder, "I am—I know—I can—I ought—I will"; here we get successively self-consciousness, intellect, free will, moral sense and purpose; a beautiful and natural succession. Progressive movement of mind is as essential to healthy mental life as it is to physical, and this movement should be upward—*altiora peto:* though we are inclined to think that any movement is better than none at all.

In stagnant minds, as in stagnant water, everything is

familiar, and everything is known, for we are stationary; in a moving mind, as in a moving river, much is ever new and much is forgotten (the things that are behind), for we are ever advancing. Consistency also is not a quality of progressive characters. If it be made an end, there is an end of all progress, for consistency of action is impossible, as higher and ever higher standards of life rise up before us. There are of course two consistencies: there is the consistency of my actions with my character, which is of value; and there is the consistency of my present character or actions with my past, and it is this that we speak of as a bar to progress.

> Rejoice that man is hurled
> From change to change unceasingly,
> His soul's wings never furled.

Truly wise we cannot be, unless our wisdom is constantly developing from childhood to death.

The earlier in life the main principles of character are developed and fixed, the more are they likely to resist the stress and strain of later years. The last principle implanted is ever the first to go. "Nascent" virtues, therefore, recently acquired, should be guarded against undue temptation.

Rates of Character Growth.

A character, of course, like a body, may not grow regularly. It may, as we have seen, never grow from childhood; it may cease at any time, and recommence again with some new idea or ideal after years; or it may retrogress, and be ruined or atrophied.

The growth of character, as a rule, is most rapid in early years: it is most rapid amidst adverse and chang-

ing surroundings: it is most rapid when in absorbing pursuit of some striking and loved ideal: it is rapid when intellect, emotion, moral sense and will are all pulling in one direction; though sometimes more rapid still when emotion pulls the other way, and requires to be overcome. Changing surroundings, personal and social, changing standards in morals and religion, and changing objects and pursuits, all affect character for better or worse. With all characters, as with the vegetable world, there is a spring-time of growth, a summer of flowering, and an autumn of fruitfulness.

Character, under certain circumstances, may deteriorate as rapidly as it may grow. It deteriorates most rapidly when the conscious will, as well as unconscious forces, are enlisted on the side of evil, and the moral sense is effectually deadened.

Here we may point out a danger; and that is, that neither character itself, nor its growth, should ever be the actual aim of life. Indeed, the aim should never be subjective good, though that is the sure result when the aim is objective good. Character grows most rapidly when least occupied with itself. If our objects are right, and our ideals the best, there should be no needless anxiety about growth: that will take care of itself. In this book, however, we have to examine much that should not constantly occupy our minds. Many of the finest characters have never given a thought to character, or been conscious they have grown at all. It is not the tall youth, but the short one, that is ever thinking about growth. But this, alas! does not make him taller.

Good growth, of course, cannot take place from a poor stock; and between the lowest torpid natures at one end, and the high and responsive natures at the other, there lie endless varieties. Natural growth of character must be limited by the heredity and stock; and education is often blamed for producing defects which, after all, it only reveals. Herbert Spencer observes: "By no political alchemy can we get golden conduct out of leaden instincts. But the instincts can be changed, fresh grafts can be introduced as we have seen upon the stock, the whole tree can be trained in a new direction, and golden conduct made to flow from a golden character."

Details of Growth.

Let us now consider some details as to growth. The growing itself is the point of moral value, the *becoming;* when we have "become," and continue to "be" because we "are," merit as such ceases, though there may be everything to admire. We need not pause to prove this, for we have already touched on the necessary connection of moral value with voluntary action.

The more habitual our virtues the less conscious are we of them, until, when they really become a part of our character, they almost sink out of sight.

We have already pointed out that it is better to grow by doing good than to make cultivation of character a direct object. At the same time we should cultivate honest dealing with ourselves, and a certain amount of introspection is needed to avoid self-deception. Criticism should be based on the desire to discover truth, and an earnest care to be consistent in thought and fact. A sound self-critic is sure to progress.

Besides, therefore, the emotions and will and intellect being drawn out by objective ideals, and by active life in the pursuit of good, it is well that the attention be also kept on the repression of evil in self.

Sacrifice is an essential in progress. To gain life we must lose it, to live we must die. Self-surrender in obedience, and for others' good, is a chief means by which development of character is accomplished.

Self-denial is a fundamental characteristic, and yet may not in itself be for good—a money-seeker has incessantly to practise it—all depends on why it is practised. Courage, in the same way, may be used for evil as well as good.

Without these two characteristics, however, self-denial and courage, the character will not progress much for either good or evil.

Divine Discontent.

Godliness with contentment is great gain, but the contentment meant is rather "with such things as we have" than "with such characters as we are"; and it is doubtful how far "contentment," *per se*, is to be cultivated as a virtue. Truly, it brings peace, but with it stagnation, and there is a healthy discontent that is a necessary factor in all progress. The one who moves is ever seeking, and is never anchored to what he has found. He is not yet satisfied, and in the deepest sense he is not yet content. He has not yet attained, he is not yet what he would be. So far from staying morally where he is placed, he is ever moving from it; he does not complain of his condition, but soon leaves it behind. He does not think of his progress, but progresses. He

is possessed by humility, and thinks others better than himself. It is the loftiness of his ideal that both inspires and subdues him. He is not a talker, but a doer of the word; a silent pilgrim "to the better land". Meanwhile his motto is: "Say little, serve all, pass on"

> And so I live, you see,
> Go through the world, try, prove, reject,
> Prefer, still struggling to effect
> My warfare; happy that I can
> Be crossed and thwarted as a man.
> Not left in God's contempt apart;
> With ghastly smooth life—dead at heart.
>
> ———
>
> Then welcome each rebuff
> That turns earth's smoothness rough,
> Each sting that bids—nor sit, nor stand, but go!
> Be our joys three parts pain!
> Strive, and hold cheap the strain;
> Learn, nor account the pang;
> Dare, never grudge the throe![1]

We will now consider growth by food and exercise, or by ideas and circumstances. Growth by Food and Exercise.

The first great means of growth is by the entrance of ideas into the mind. These may be introduced consciously or unconsciously. Ideas consciously presented in the form of precepts are of little use to men of independent mind, though of greater value to dependent spirits. The little influence that the best advice often has is well described by M'Cunn:[2] "There is a risk that every one incurs who betakes himself to the man of precepts. Nor does anything more certainly arrest the influence of good 'advice'

[1] R. Browning, "Easter Day" and "Rabbi Ben Ezra".

[2] Prof. M'Cunn, *The Making of Character*, p. 14.

than the suspicion that it has been made up as a general prescription. It is but human that the passionate egotism of personal trial should revolt against this exasperating procurability of commonplaces." The latter method is the least understood, and we will say a word or two about it. Ideas are presented unconsciously by suggestion; and for this hypnotism is *not* needed, the process may be quite natural. What is an unconscious idea? *It is a living mental seed, that, planted in the unconscious mind, flowers in consciousness.* It is initial ideas that "strike" us the hardest and affect us most, and that is why all beginnings are so important. "*Enter not* into temptation," derives additional force when we regard the first idea as the spark that fires the train.[1]

Apperception.

With regard to the power of apperception or suggestion in linking trains of ideas together, thoughts swarm in our minds as bees round a hive, and when the queen thought comes forth they all rush around it. Maeterlink beautifully says:[2] "Tracing the process of suggestion in the brain, on the quality and number and power of our clear ideas do the quality and number and power depend of those that are vague? And hidden away in the midst of these vague ones may well lurk the definite truths we seek. Let us not keep them waiting too long; and, indeed, a beautiful crystal idea we waken within us shall not fail in its time to arouse a beautiful vague idea; which, lasting, growing old, and having itself become clear (for is not perfect clearness most often

[1] C. Mason, *Home Education.*

[2] Maeterlink, *Wisdom and Destiny*, p. 80.

the sign of decrepitude in the idea?), shall also go forth and disturb from its slumbers another obscure idea, but loftier, lovelier far than it had been itself, in its sleep; and thus it may be, treading gently one after the other, and never disheartened, in the midst of those silent vaults—some day, by mere chance (?)—a small hand, scarce visible yet, may touch a great truth."

"It is the duty of parents," as C. Mason tells us,[1] "to sustain the child's inner life with ideas, as they sustain his body with food. The initial idea begets subsequent ideas; children must therefore get right primary ideas on the greater relations and duties of life. The destiny of a life may be shaped in the nursery, by the reverent naming of the Divine name, by the light scoff at holy things, by the right idea of duty a child gets who is made to finish his task, or by the hardness of heart acquired through hearing the faults of others spoken of lightly." Value of Ideas

We have little idea how character develops by the pressure of moral opinions and current thoughts. One single hint or new idea may actually influence an entire character.

The reception of new ideas not only adds to the stock, but modifies the old. Ideas are living principles that act and react like chemicals on each other, producing fresh compounds in the mind. But their force does not end in thought: it is reproduced in action. Ideas of conduct tend to reproduce themselves in conduct. "Sow

[1] C. Mason, *Home Education.*

a thought, reap an act; sow an act, reap a habit; sow a habit, reap a character; sow a character, reap a destiny."

Value of Fiction.

Ideas, again, resemble chemicals in another respect. In common life they are generally so mixed and compounded as seldom to be seen in their pure state, in which their powers and qualities are most apparent. It is in this respect that good fiction has its value on the character. "When a chemist," says M'Cunn, "wishes to show us what an acid or an alkali is, he exhibits it and its behaviour under the enlightening artificial conditions of experiment. By a similar artifice, imagination in its laboratory of fiction reveals to us what the soul of man is by showing how it thinks, feels, wills, acts under the carefully devised conditions of fictitious circumstances. Floods of light have been in this way let in on moral truth. Hence the wisdom of the remark that illusion is not delusion."

Ideas often thus reach the mind, when illuminated by the electric light of fiction, that would pass unheeded in the ordinary daylight of common life.

Ideas as the Food of Character.

When an idea enters the mind it grows secretly and silently. It does not at once become a part of the character.

An idea never adds a new principle to the character, or permanently changes an old one when merely adopted by reason; nor when acted on by the feelings; nor when carried out by the will. I may see it right to give a tithe, after the idea has entered from some powerful sermon, but I do not thereby become generous. Not until giving has so become a habit as to be prompted

instinctively and unconsciously can generosity be said to form a part of my character. And, curiously enough it is then that merit ceases to attach to the principle, though still accompanying the act, if done consciously.

Nothing learnt or taught, therefore, forms a part of the character till it sinks from the conscious into the unconscious.

Ideas may, however, be presented to, and yet not be assimilated by, the mind.

The tendency is for the mind to grasp new ideas, and then, if it can, it allies them to something it already possesses. Now, unassimilated ideas produce mental dyspepsia. The difficulty or ease of assimilation depends on two factors: the powers of mental digestion and the character of the idea. Conservative characters find it hard to assimilate new ideas, unless the connection with some part of their own creed is very apparent.

Indigestible Ideas.

Characters that have been brought up in grooves find positive pain in endeavouring to digest some new ideas. The difficulty may lie, as we have said, in the character or in the idea. Ideas, like food, either are heterologous or homologous, that is, they are either unlike the mental tissues in their composition, or they are like them. If the former, they are not really foods, but poisons. Nothing can nourish the mind or body but principles similar to those it already contains. I cannot repair a bicycle wheel with wooden spokes, or a linen shirt with flannel. It is so with ideas, they are either utterly foreign to anything in the mind, in which case they cannot be assimilated, and often do the mind great injury by

acting as poison; or they are like some thought already there, and thus become food.

The teaching of strange ideas is thus called heterodoxy, and the teaching of digestible ones might well be called "homodoxy" instead of orthodoxy.

One man's food is thus another man's poison, on account of the difference of character and education, ideas nutritious to one being found noxious to another.

It is this fact that explains the pernicious effect of advanced ideas on simple minds.

A clever man let loose to force his ideas on untrained peasants will produce the severest attack of mental dyspepsia, and the suffering will be great.

I know one noble-minded lady, full of fine ideas, who mated with a peasant with the view of raising his class. The man got softening of the brain soon after, and it is by no means improbable the disease was hastened, if not caused, by his frantic efforts to digest the new mental food provided for him.

Ideas must be Homologous.

In growth of character we endeavour to attach new ideas to hereditary instincts. Of course we do not know all the constituents either of mind or body; and it may be a new idea will discover in the mind some hidden affinity, of which we ourselves were not aware till it was brought to light.

"I should not know I wanted to covet," said St. Paul, "unless the law had told me I was not to covet;" and so we often say now of a child: "Do not put such an idea into his head".

The commandments themselves were vain if we had

not a conscience to respond to them. "Thou shalt not" has no meaning unless there is an inner voice saying "Thou oughtest not".

We are often very susceptible to the opinion of others, and weaker characters are largely formed by the ideas that spring from this source. Schopenhauer traces some bad characters to the effect of the single idea of regarding the world as "not myself," and all good as centring in the unextended *ego*. Good ideas are the most powerful prophylactic against evil. M'Cunn observes: "The best moral antidote lies not in warnings, however particular, but in that positive nurture of character which is the real source of strength in the hour of temptation".

The value of good ideas is perhaps most clearly indicated in the well-known exhortation: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things".[1]

Circumstances as Exercise.

In addition to ideas as food, we require circumstances for exercise in order to grow. Circumstances really include all through which we pass in life.

Take two brothers, and let one be brought up, say, as an officer. Let him lead a leisurely, well-ordered life; let him be well washed, well dressed, well fed and well cared for till he is thirty-five. Let the other brother live in a single room, with his wife and three children, and

[1] St. Paul, Phil. iv. 8.

follow some dirty, depressing trade, till he is also thirty-five; and then notice how far circumstances can modify character. The circumstances of health also affect the whole character immensely.

Circumstances change Character.

After a time the same circumstances, continued, fail to affect character, having exhausted their power. It is as novelties that circumstances effect the greatest changes. The depth of the impression is in proportion to the amount of the novelty. A tour round the world does more for character than a tour round England. Sometimes a change of circumstances brings out character in the most amazing way. An idle loafer at home, the despair of all his friends, is given a colonial appointment or made a consul on some frontier, and soon the world is ringing with the splendid capacity he develops. At other times the reverse is seen, and a good but not a strong character is spoiled in mid life by reverses it is not strong enough to bear. Still, even in the presence of circumstances, we are no mere masses of clay to be formed by them as they will.

"It is a grand error," says John Stuart Mill,[1] "to believe our character is formed *for* us rather than *by* us. It is formed by circumstances, but the desire to mould it in any way is one of these circumstances." Moreover, circumstances themselves are often the result of our own characters, and cause and effect are reversed.

"Man," says Carlyle, "is the architect of circumstances. He is indeed often the creator, rather than the creature, of circumstances."

[1] J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. ii., p. 426.

Shocks and great catastrophes can change the expression of character completely; but sudden changes, from their comparative rarity, are, after all, not those which chiefly affect us. "For the most part our character is formed, not by catastrophes, but by the stealthy and ceaseless deposit of circumstances, by the circumambient moral atmosphere, from which we cannot for a moment escape."[1]

Again, the same circumstances affect people in different ways. Loss of money may make one character, while easy circumstances may make another.

Value of adverse Circumstances.

There is one special set of circumstances, however, on which we must lay stress, so potent are they for good. We allude to what are commonly called the evils of life: such as adversity, failure, loss of health or money, disappointment, evil, opposition of all kinds, war and all sorts of trials. Character, it is true, is formed both by friends and enemies, by success and failure, by prosperity and adversity, by following good and resisting evil; but it is the second part of each clause that calls forth the nobler qualities and produces the higher results.

Strong characters and Christian characters are nearly always benefited by trials, though when poverty or hardship becomes the rule of life it loses its good effect. Many of the poor would develop better in a sun-bath of prosperity. Most men thus reach their highest development through failure or trial: the prison made Bunyan;

[1] Prof. Caird, *University Sermons*, p. 296.

the gout did much for C. H. Spurgeon; as a frail body and an agonising disease did for Gordon.

Where the character is sufficiently noble and strong for these severe lessons, and is not overwhelmed by them, they soon land the pupil in the top class.

> And what is our failure here but a triumph's evidence
> For the fulness of the days? Have we withered or agonised?
> Why else was the pause prolonged, but that singing might issue thence?
> Why rushed the discord in, but that harmony should be prized?
> Sorrow is hard to bear, and doubt is slow to clear.
> Each sufferer says his say, his scheme of the weal and woe,
> But God has a few of us whom He whispers in the ear—
> The rest may reason, and welcome; 'tis we musicians know![1]

The first lesson of history is the good that can come out of evil. The Thirty Years' War made Germany, and the Boer War has made the Empire. Resistance, dangers, reverses are a powerful education. Our initial misfortunes and the slow discipline of the war in South Africa have done much for our national character. The glory of character is that in confronting antagonisms it can draw from them new nobilities of principle. "No man," says Jeremy Taylor, "is more miserable than he that hath no adversity." A perpetual calm will never make a sailor. Self-denial is always good for the character, for it is the path of life. Adversities not only help character, but they reveal its hidden qualities; they show the difference between the Paris diamond and the African, the pinchbeck and solid gold. They reveal—

[1] R. Browning, "Abt Vogler".

One who never turned his back, but marched straight forward,
Never doubted clouds would break;
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better, sleep to wake.[1]

Sorrows reach us through our Thoughts.

"It often requires," says Maeterlink, "a great sorrow spent together in silence to reveal a man whom we have seen for years, but *never before known*." "Nothing befals us," says Maeterlink,[2] "that is not of the nature of ourselves," and to each of these severe lessons there must be something in the character to respond, something they touch, or else the pupil does not profit. It all goes over his head, or sours his temper with the long words he cannot make out. It might almost be said that there happens to men only that they desire. We have little power over external events, but much as to how far they shall become parts of ourselves. Not a single sorrow exists that can touch us save through our own thoughts. These form, as it were, an atmosphere through which every external event must pass, and which determines its character and effect on us. The same event to one man is an evil he deplores, and to another a blessing in which he rejoices, solely on account of the different minds through which it passes. A mind can thus be formed to which "all things work together for good". One of the characteristics derived from such circumstances is fixedness. Steadiness of purpose is always well marked under great pain or pressure. To keep head against a rapid stream is different from paddling in a pond.

[1] R. Browning.

[2] Maeterlink, *Wisdom and Destiny* (A. Sutro), p. 31.

But there is another teacher of a milder mood through whom we could, if we would, learn most of adversity's lessons. Death, grief, trouble teach much; but they who love much may know the secrets these teach through this alone.

Trials and distresses are often needed to teach us sympathy; but love could (I think) instruct us without their aid.

> For life, with all it yields of joy and woe
> And hope and fear—(believe this aged friend)
> Is just our chance o' the prize of learning love,
> How love might be, hath been, indeed, and is;
>
> ---
>
> So take and use thy work!
> Amend what flaws may lurk,
> What strain o' the stuff, what warpings past the aim!
> My times be in Thy hand!
> Perfect the cup as planned!
> Let age approve of youth, and death complete the same![1]

We have thus considered the two great means of growth, by food and exercise, ideas and circumstances—and especially circumstances that seem against us!—both of these being in the main educators of the unconscious mind.

We may now look a little more generally at the education of the mind, both unconscious and conscious, as a means of growth.

Education of the Mind.

The end of all education most worthy of the name is character, and for this natural means are more effectual than artificial and forced methods. With education in the narrow sense of information, rather than formation, the reverse is true. Natural means are useless, and artificial and forced methods are the beginning and end of the system of all crammers—who, after all, are a most

[1] R. Browning, "A Death on the Desert" and "Rabbi bin Ezra".

useful body of men under the present senseless *régime* of supplying all our public services and most professions. Among the principal general instructors that educate us unconsciously and exact no fees are the following: the external world, from the stars in the heavens to the daisies at our feet, change and novelty, monotony ("blessed be drudgery"), relationships of life, responsibilities of life, friendship and love, religion, besides those we have already spoken of—ideas, circumstances generally, and adversity.

The use of others as a looking-glass for ourselves is often a potent educator and revealer of character.

Evil characteristics, seen objectively, disgust us, though unnoticed or condoned when subjective; hence we often correct ourselves by the follies of others.

The opinions of others we have already seen, have much effect on weak characters.

Now opinion is cruel, and truth is merciful; opinion is worth little, truth is priceless; and yet probably more are moved in this world by opinion than by truth, because opinions are to weak characters what truth is to strong, and Carlyle (who ought to know) says that "most men are fools."

Amongst the great unconscious educators our readers have been waiting to hear named are doubtless the celebrated twins—Science and Art—which are so much alike that they can be hardly told apart, though when together the difference is clearly discerned.

Science and Art as Educators.

Science is said to rouse and advance people; art soothes and does not advance them, although many have

the greatest faith in it as a civilising agent. Art, indeed, has little or nothing to do with goodness and morals, and often flourishes in a decadent empire, and with the worst vices, though no doubt Ruskin rightly teaches us such art is not the highest art.

Modern progress has a powerful effect on character, and we are all now busy "teaching our grandmothers," who lived in the dull twilight of "the early Victorian era" —the fashionable name just now for all that period which is old enough to be despised, and not old enough to be worshipped.

Wireless telegraphy, telephony, cycling, the Röntgen rays, the imperial penny post, motor cars, bank holidays, Cook's excursions, and perhaps still more, "educational" travel and polytechnic tours, Board schools, and a thousand other novelties all have a powerful effect as unconscious educators of character.

The new Woman.

In women the effect has been so radical as to produce what is described, by those who have had opportunities of observing it carefully—an entirely fresh species—under the simple title of "the new woman" —a much shorter and more intelligible name than would be given to a new plant or animal. Modern circumstances are almost entirely responsible for this creation, in whom it is said that the inward graces of the mind more than compensate for the occasional lack of external attractions. This may be so, but we sometimes say with a sigh, "The old is better". The varieties of the genus vary; some, indeed, as "the new wife," should be approached with caution and respect, and

are not everywhere received with enthusiasm, differing thus greatly from "the new nurse," who comes as a boon and a blessing to men to replace the early Victorian variety—Mrs. Gamp. Considering the force of modern life on character we are still waiting hopefully for the production of "the new man" ("the new boy" has already arrived as a harbinger), "the new tradesman," "the new domestic servant," and some others we will not name.

Food has a powerful influence on character. I have studied this to some slight extent by observing orphan and other schools, where in some cases children are brought up mainly on farinaceous food, and in others on a well mixed diet; and I am inclined to think that in the former the character is slower, more even and placid, in the latter quicker and more fiery. Certainly physically the former are stouter, slower runners, and are generally less active than the latter class.

Dress is not only significant of character, but, like so many things, acts in a double way, and reacts on character. People do try to live up to their "blue China," whether under this head they mean dress, or deportment, or artistic surroundings.

Conscious Education of Character.

Turning to conscious education generally, "we are finding that success is to be achieved only by making our measures subservient to that spontaneous unfolding (unconscious education) which all minds go through in their progress to maturity."[1]

Wise teachers thus, instead of overcoming evil by as-

[1] Herbert Spencer, *Education*, pp. 58, 59.

sociating it with punishment, seek to draw out character by active pursuits that enlist the mental faculties in some good purpose, and the evil is forgotten. In short, in this, as in all else, objective methods are better than subjective. Development and skill in all arts and pursuits are not gained by subjective effort, but objective. The best way of direct education of character, with a view to growth, is to put ourselves under the power of good influences, ideals and habits; character cannot actually be directly educated, but we can direct the forces that act upon it.

Introspection fostered by direct education often entirely defeats its objects. La Bruyère has shown that many men submit with pleasure to have their small faults pointed out, tacitly assuming they are credited with the greater virtues. If rebuked for silence, they assume it is because they think so much; if they are useless with their hands, it is because they are so strong in their minds; if dirty and untidy, it is because they are so occupied with much greater matters.

Sometimes education applied homœopathically seems the most powerful—so contrary is man. Thus we are told that to form the love of a thing we must get saturated with its opposite, while an evil is best got rid of by pursuing and practising it incessantly. We fear many under this system are killed before they are cured.

Summary. To sum up: the result of true education of character is its steady growth.

The *emotions* are steadied, because, after passing through many and varied circumstances, by the remem-

brance of past impressions we learn the true average and value of events as they come; we also learn at the same time humility and suspense of judgment.

With regard to *intellect*, "To be able," says Swedenborg, "to discern that what is true is true, and that what is false is false: this is the mark and character of intelligence"; while the *will* becomes the expression of the enlarged and enlightened moral sense within, and thus emotions, intellect and will combine to prove the growth of a higher personality.

CHAPTER VIII.

ANALYSIS OF CHARACTER.

Unconsciousness, Consciousness and Self-consciousness.

PERHAPS in looking at character now a little more closely it will be well first of all to consider something more of its relations with unconsciousness, consciousness and self-consciousness.

The order in point of time in which these appear in the child are as given above.

As far as we can tell, when a child is born, though it undoubtedly possesses stores of psychic qualities, it is wholly unconscious of them, and even sense impressions at first rouse but the feeblest ideas: it has eyes, but does not see; ears, but does not hear.

Consciousness, however, soon dawns, the bulk of the child's psychic life remaining, however, unconscious and instinctive. Later on self-consciousness supervenes. The child at first makes no distinction between self and not self. It examines its limbs as strange phenomena. When the conception of "*ego*" dawns a new era begins, and henceforth the division of "self" and "not self" exists, dividing the world into that within and that without. Consciousness grows naturally with exercise, and is not subject like self-consciousness to artificial development.

Self-consciousness perhaps culminates with the completed physique at and after puberty. We have ventured, as will have been observed in earlier chapters, to speak distinctly and definitely of an unconscious mind; not thereby meaning for a moment a separate mind, but rather that part that lies in unconsciousness.[1]

This is a necessary position if we are to understand character at all, for, as a whole, it lies habitually in unconsciousness; and it is this, as we have observed, that makes the difficulty of its analysis.

The Qualities of the Conscious and the Unconscious.

Let us consider for a moment the conscious and the unconscious.

While the states of the former are ever changing, the latter is a permanent possession. This is so true that if the state of consciousness remains fixed, it soon ceases to be consciousness. If I gaze at the same object long enough I cease to see it consciously, or if I repeat the same sentence often enough I cease to do so with conscious intelligence. Both conscious and unconscious are, however, capable of education, no education of the former becoming permanent till stored in the latter.

The unconscious is the home of character and all hereditary qualities, of instincts and motives, of conscience or the moral sense, of intuitive perception—such as axioms.

It is dogmatic, absolute, persistent, all-pervading, unswerving and consistent in its action.

We do not use it; it uses us, and we are so far its

[1] For the fuller development of this subject see *The Unconscious Mind*, A. T. Schofield.

slaves ; as indeed is obvious, since it forms the greater part of ourselves. We cannot take up the unconscious mind as a tool as we do consciousness, but we can let it speak to us, or we can prevent it. We have no absolute need to act on instinct, and for a time the conscious will can inhibit the action or expression of the unconscious mind. Yet in the long run the latter will out, for we cannot be always on the watch, and a man shows himself to be what he is sooner or later.

The unconscious Mind betrays itself.

We have given some interesting illustrations of the way in which the unconscious asserts itself in *The Unconscious Mind*, to which we have referred. Those given by Cardinal Newman (p. 100) and by Hartmann (p. 101) are familiar. One of the most interesting is where it is shown that the unconscious comes to the front in spite of every effort at repression by the conscious. Instances are given on pages 73 and 75 of psychologists who with their conscious intellects reject with all the vigour possible the idea of unconscious psychical processes, and yet in the same work they freely admit them, and in one case even assert them. The only explanation possible is that the truth of unconscious mental processes being known unconsciously to them, though refused by conscious intellect, betrayed itself in words, and thus gave them away.

This need not be thought an extraordinary or far-fetched explanation. Many a girl shows she is in love unconsciously in action, when she would vigorously and truthfully, as far as her consciousness goes, deny it.

The unconscious mind progresses by conscious and

unconscious education, the latter being the more powerful of the two. In the unconscious mind you get an ease and accuracy unknown in the efforts of the conscious, but it is like that of a machine; and in many ways the work done by the conscious is of more value than that done by the unconscious; as a hand-made article, though the stitches are not so regular, is of more value than one that is machine-made. If in the conscious mind you do not have the same ease and perfection, you have thought and purpose.

Value of Consciousness and Self-consciousness.

Now in the conscious mind we get constant change, we get intelligent action, we get moral value, we get freedom of thought and of will, we get responsibility, we are free ourselves, or at any rate feel so. We have power to acquire knowledge at will, we have the distinctive stamp of humanity, and we know pleasure and pain and all sensations.

If the will be good, the life is noble in proportion as it is lived consciously. It will surprise some who have not studied the subject to know what a great proportion of life is lived, if not unconsciously, at any rate in sub-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is a further development of mere consciousness. It is a new power that enables us to see and alter character by introspection. It can adjust the balance between instinct and reason. It is a faculty that is needed, but which must be cultivated sparingly. Like salt, we could not do without it, but it will not support life. Its absence is a great loss to character: its presence in moderation gives dignity and self-respect,

and indirectly respect of others. In excess it leads to all sorts of morbid actions. Introspection may destroy all usefulness of character if carried far.

"There is no value," says Dr. S. Bryant,[1] "in inward scrutiny that searches for roots of evil that don't put forth leaf or branch."

Conflict between Reason and Instinct.

Now, although character as such resides in the unconscious, its active expression is in consciousness.

Character has been described as "organised (unconscious) habit in recurring situations, and as the result of conscious reflection at exceptional times". The working of consciousness and unconsciousness, with their two qualities of reason and instinct, is of great moment to the character.

The union and harmony of the two give unity to the *ego*, and peace instead of war between the rational and instinctive selves. This is not, however, always possible. It is often the case that reason suggests one course and instinct another. If the question is a moral one the moral sense must be the umpire. If not, the question must be referred to a triumvirate of intellect, emotion and moral sense, or mind feelings and conscience, and both sides must bring up their arguments. The mind is thus often turned into a court of law, with pleaders of no small ability on both sides; and finally I myself, a compound of reason, feeling and moral sense, decide for or against.

Where this state of things is perpetually recurring

[1] Dr. S. Bryant, *Mind*, 1897, p. 86.

it is disastrous, and shows the reason and the instincts must have been trained in two very different schools.

Again wisdom and reason are not the same. To be reasonable is not the same as being wise. Wisdom is never attained by mere reason. Reason knows the Infinite objectively, wisdom subjectively. The ideas of reason are clear, those of wisdom often obscure and unconscious.

Reason should never interfere with instinct needlessly. Rochefoucauld says that "nothing so much prevents our being natural as the desire to appear so"; in other words, naturalness, an unconscious quality, cannot be shown consciously.

Responsibility.

With regard to responsibility, every man is responsible for what he does wittingly, that is, consciously. But then the question is how far is he responsible for what he *is?* That is, how far does responsibility or merit attach to the possession, apart from the expression, of character? Some answer that a man is not intellectually responsible, but morally; but this is not an absolute or a very clear distinction.

We should judge (under correction) that responsibility attaches to that part of the character that we have become, or that we have added to the original stock. That while we cannot be responsible for what was originally imparted to us, we can be for that we have added or permitted to be added to it, even apart from its expression in action. The subject is abstruse and speculative, and we will not pursue it further. It is

a question in which the old schoolmen and casuists have revelled with eager delight.

With regard to the expression of character by will action we must not say much here, as it forms the subject of Chapter X. But we may just point out that the value and responsibility attaching ever to the will is simply because it is the active *ego*, or the *ego* in action. It is free, and yet it acts according to the unconscious swaying of the character and the moral sense and hidden motives.

"My son, give Me thy heart" means "Give God the seat of thy motives". Whoever has this has captured the will; and though it may appear free and feel free, it is controlled by the One who possesses the heart. "Out of the heart are the issues of life," because thence the will is controlled, and the will determines the conduct, and the conduct the life; so all is gained when the citadel is the unconscious mind, the motive is surrendered.

Ballast is as essential to character as to a ship, or as a tail to a kite; and by ballast we mean that restraint that reason places on instinct. It is a faculty that may be acquired. Without it the man is "unstable as water, and cannot excel".

The Components of Character.

We will now pass on, after these general remarks, to consider the analysis of character into its component parts as attempted by one or two able men. We have already in Chapter III. referred to such analysis as definitely connected moral qualities with "organs" in the brain, and then gave Bain's corrected list of these.

Dr. Edridge Green[1] suggests the following as a list of the components of character :—

Faculties.—Acquisitiveness, Perseverance, Destructiveness, Courage, Cautiousness, Secretiveness, Approbativeness, Firmness, Self-esteem.

Social Qualities. — Amativeness, Parental Love, Sociality.

Moral Qualities.—Love of Truth, Spirituality, Hope, Veneration, Benevolence.

We give the list without further comment.

Samuel Bailey[2] says the elements of personal character are :—

1. The predominance of certain feelings over others less marked, united in infinitely varying proportions.

2. Being able to perform certain intellectual operations better than others, as reasoning or remembering.

3. An aptitude with regard to special matters.

4. Strength or weakness of will.

5. Physical endowments.

This list is an agreeable substitute of general characteristics from the many-syllabled qualities common to other lists ; but to us we cannot say that it carries conviction or bears the stamp of a complete analysis.

Dr. Martineau's List of primary Principles.

Another, and to our mind much more able, list is given by the late Dr. Martineau.

" Principles of character are," he says, " divisible into two classes—primary and secondary."

[1] Edridge Green, *Memory*, p. 67.

[2] See Sully, *The Human Mind*, vol. ii., p. 265.

Primary principles of character are natural and instinctive.

Secondary principles are those that are superadded by consciousness and self-consciousness as means to recognised ends.

The list of the primary is as follows :—

1. Propensities *(natural forces)*.—Food, Sex, Exercise.

2. Passions *(natural capacity of suffering and repulsion)*.—Antipathy, Fear, Anger.

3. Affections *(attractions)*.—Parental, Social, Compassionate.

4. Sentiments.—Wonder, Admiration, Reverence.

All those primary qualities are distinguishable, and each yields (in action) some sort of satisfaction which in itself may become an end—*i.e.*, an aim to produce certain states of emotion. These are the secondary principles, founded upon the primary, and they are here given in their moral order :—

Secondary Principles.

Malice, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness, springing from the three primary passions.

These three alone of all the secondary principles have no place in the moral order of springs of character, as they are alone utterly bad, being corruptions of the passions which were given us for our protection into attractions for our pleasure in that which is evil.

1. Love of Pleasure.
2. „ Food and Sex.
3. „ Exercise.
4. „ Money.

All springing from primary propensities.

5. Sentimentality (from the affections).

6. Antipathy, Fear, Anger, as secondary qualities.

7. Love of Power.

8. Self-culture, Æstheticism, Religious Feeling.

9. Wonder and Admiration.

Both 8 and 9 form primary sentiments.

10. Parental and Social Affections, as secondary qualities.

11. Sympathy.

12. Reverence, as secondary quality.

For our own part we think that but little is gained by a general analysis that is wide enough to embrace all characters. We hope in the next chapter to enter upon a consideration of the qualities of character, and with this rather than with a complete and orderly analysis we must at present rest satisfied.

Character in the two Sexes.

The two sexes present some differences of character and mental qualities generally that are fairly constant and general. We may note a few:—

Intuition, instinct and tact are far greater with women than with men. These are qualities of the unconscious mind. The result suddenly appears in consciousness, the antecedent steps lying buried in the unconscious. A woman will know instinctively the right course to adopt, while quite unable to say why, while a man is laboriously trying to reason out the "pros" and "cons". The instinct, moreover, when not perverted, is generally a true guide, and can attain results with a celerity and certainty of unconscious mind action that far outstrips

the steps of reason. It is the high development of this great gift that makes women often such helpful counsellors in cases of difficulty; and it is on account of their right estimation of its superior value that women are often so impatient of argument. Even when women take the trouble to reason a matter out, they will often reject the conclusions they arrive at in favour of a solution suggested intuitively. This is one of the differences in the mental characteristics of the sexes, and the whole character is swayed by it. Men have also the faculty, and more largely than they think, but they do not trust it or use it nearly so much. Instinct and intuition must of course carefully be distinguished from impulse, and especially as women are so often called "creatures of impulse". Intuition may often counsel an action the direct reverse of what an impulse would suggest.

Special Points in Women.

Women again are keener at perception; their rapidity in this is remarkable. Houdin has known ladies, passing each other at full speed in carriages, who could analyse each other's dress, bonnets, shoes, etc., as to fashion, colour and quality, and even detect the difference between hand and machine made lace.

A slight difference in dress or appearance is far more readily detected by a woman than by a man.

Women are much quicker in thought. They can use their brains more rapidly within the accustomed range. Beyond it, on the other hand, they are slower.

Women are easier to educate and train than men, They are quicker as well as more diligent.

They are more sociable and domestic. Man may be

more clubable, but there is very little sociability at clubs. Society itself is made and ruled and maintained by women, not men. Sociability is quite different from powers of combination for specific purposes.

Women are said, on what ground we know not, to be more prominent in politics than religion, and J. S. Mill, at any rate, considered women better fitted for politics than men!

Women undoubtedly excel in fiction, although the greatest novels (in the sense of power and originality) are written by men. They also excel in acting. The predominance of the emotions and imagination in the female sex accounts for this.

Natural social instincts we have already seen characterise women. Moral instincts are also stronger in them, and the whole range of what may be called the passion virtues. Women are much more flexible than men, though when rigid they are more rigid. A woman has greater adaptability in new surroundings and circumstances, and can ascend or descend the social scale with greater ease and more perfect steps.

Women are, as we have said, more dependent and more patient than men.

In work, women are better than men in patient continuance, and in mechanical work at low pressure. At the Post Office women do light work better than men. Women can express their thoughts better and are better letter writers than men. Mechanical inventions are made best by men and used best by women. Women are more conventional than men, and are readier to accept arti-

ficial standards of conduct, in dress, or right and wrong, than men.

Special Points in Men.

Besides those spheres where man's strength and his dominant position, so long maintained, give him unquestioned pre-eminence, there are some things in which men excel the cause of which is less obvious. In art of all sorts, for instance, in religion as leaders and writers, in poetry, the highest type of genius seems to be confined to men, and this not on account of better education and surroundings, for it is a purely natural product of the unconscious mind; and though its powers are consciously exercised, their source is hidden from their possessor. Men are essentially more selfish and egotistic than women. This indeed is well marked throughout life. A man far more constantly talks about himself than a woman, though capable at times of sublime unselfishness. Man is undoubtedly naturally more self-centred than woman.

He is also capable of combining for a common object for pleasure or business far better than woman. This is, indeed, one of the chief hindrances to advance in the female labour markets.

He is more violent in the expression of his emotion, and yet less emotional on the whole. He is more variable,—more brilliant in many cases, more worthless in others. He is more capable of original work and better able to work at high pressure. His greater strength, of course, enables him to do the more

Further Contrasts.

arduous work of the world. Women are, on the whole, more impressed by facts than laws, by the

particular than the general, by the concrete rather than by the abstract.

Some time ago fifty students of both sexes, an equal number of each, were to write out the first hundred words that came into their heads, making 5,000 words in all.

Of these 5,000, 3,000 were found to be in pairs, showing that the thoughts of the sexes were more alike than different. Out of the remainder it was found that the men used more different words of a mere abstract nature and largely connected with the animal kingdom, while the words thought of by the women were mainly concerning dress and food. The thoughts of the men evidently ran on the remote and abstract; that of the women on their environment and the concrete.

Amongst seven stories, six by boys whose ages ranged from four to seven, and one by a girl of five, it was found, while the boys' stories were marked by action, slaughter, repetition and want of coherence, that of the girl was orderly, quieter in tone, with well arranged sequence, and, above all, gentle and showing the love of home life.

Men are more mobile and progressive, women more stable and conservative. Women are more plastic within fixed limits, men more in wider limits. If men, however, have greater originality, women have more common sense.

Common sense, by the way, is not a reasoned quality, but rather a quality of the unconscious mind exercised intuitively. The unconscious psychic powers generally are larger factors in the life of women than of men.

Men think more, women feel more. Man specialises arts, crafts, and professions, being more original. The fine division of labour is said to be a male characteristic. Looked at very broadly, passivity characterises women most, activity men.

Religious Character of Woman.

Pursuing the subject yet further to religion, it is clear that naturally a woman is more religious than a man. She is more superstitious, and forms by far the majority of those who are swayed by successive forms of imposition that have deluded the credulous. But this is a different matter, and arises from a different cause from her pre-eminence in true religion. At the bottom we find a reason in the altruistic nature of woman as compared with man, arising in a larger measure from her maternal cares, and the God-given love and patience needed to rear a family. This predisposes her to accept and understand a Bible whose whole story is that of unselfish love to the helpless and the lost.

Another reason is that the affections are more developed in her, and love is more her life. This love rightly directed towards God is the fulfilling of the whole law, and the Bible again is the story of its divine expression towards man.

It is not a little remarkable to note in the Gospel story that while the enemies of Christ were ever men, women were always His friends ; and one feels instinctively how much more they cared for Him than often His own disciples.

Such is an imperfect outline of some of the different characteristics of men and women that are more or less

obvious. Many of our readers may not even agree as to all of these; but we think the majority will be regarded as correct. We will now return to our general analysis.

States of mind is another name for fixed tendencies or characteristics, and are totally denied as antecedent to conduct by some psychologists, more especially those naturally who object to all unconscious mental processes. States of Mind.

States of mind produce other states of mind or of body. One thought leads to another by what is called apperception. The powers of association in apperception are great enrichers of character. The whole process is unconscious, but affects the entire life. The words home, mother, nursery, childhood, God, mean in after life pretty much what was impressed unconsciously in suggestive ideas in childhood. One of the greatest blessings of a good character is the character of the apperceptions acquired. The secret of a good memory is by using the power of apperception in the relation of ideas, and not by mere repetition.

Sometimes apperception leads us astray, as when a town child, seeing a pot of maiden-hair fern, called it a pot of green feathers.

Apperception requires time to perfect. In the conscious mind there may be two or three clear ideas (it cannot hold above six at a time), while in the unconscious mind may lie a number of associated ideas (as in an ante-chamber) ready to be ushered into consciousness. The more intensity in the ideas and the more time given them, the more associations unite with them. We have Apperception.

given a beautiful description of this process by Maeterlink in the preceding chapter.

Age affects character. The old and experienced are more steady than the young, and the temperament, moral and physical, is less easily altered. Character, when consolidated and formed, becomes an organic entity. The many qualities that enter into it are like the chemical elements in a compound, they form inseparable parts of the whole. This we will speak of later more in detail.

The mind when formed is no mere bundle of associations, but reaches Mr. Stout's state of "noetic synthesis" or has this organic character.

An organised mind is not controlled by impulse and association, but groups all new facts in accordance with settled plans and interests.

Turning now to varieties of character, we may begin at the bottom with those that, as we say, have no character, *i.e.*, are of such a weak and superficial nature as to be incapable of being inspired with ideals, so that nothing is very clearly impressed or expressed in their life.

Ruskin fears this condition is creeping upon our nation. He says:[1] "I felt with amazement we are all plunged into a languid dream. Our hearts fat, and our eyes heavy, and our ears closed, lest we should see with our eyes, and understand with our hearts, and be healed.' That "life itself should have no motive, here is a mystery

[1] *J. Ruskin's Works*, vol. i., p. 134.

indeed". And yet elsewhere he draws a more hopeful picture of our countrymen. "The modern English mind has this much in common with the Greek, that it intensely desires all things: the utmost completion or perfection compatible with their nature." [1]

Next above these of no class we get men of intermittent inspiration, who occasionally reveal signs of character, but are still too vague to classify.

Mixtures and Compounds.

At the other extreme we get the genius, which is as much beyond classification as these are below it. The more ordinary characters have been grouped in various ways. Adopting the language of chemistry we may divide them into mixtures and compounds. A mixture is where two or more ingredients are mixed in various proportions, and still retain their original qualities; in a compound the ingredients chemically unite so as to form a fresh body. Air is a well-known *mixture* of the two gases, oxygen and nitrogen, in varying proportions, and either can be separated from the other. Water is a *compound* of the two gases, oxygen and hydrogen, which are so chemically united as to lose their identity and form a liquid. In a "mixed" character you get the Jekyll-Hyde type, that is a man who is different characters at different times, according to which ingredient or side of the mixture is uppermost or active at the time. This type is common and well known, and the various and ever contradictory sides of character displayed by the same individual are often startling.

[1] J. Ruskin, *Stones of Venice*, vol. ii., chap. vi., pp. 11, 12.

A "compound" character is of a much higher type; in it the different ingredients have had sufficient likeness or have been so carefully blended that a stable combination is the result, and the action of the person is uniform, and you always "know where to find him". You can rely on his acting in such and such a manner. You are not startled and sometimes shocked at finding Mr. Hyde at home when you call on Dr. Jekyll.

It is interesting to see that often the fires of adversity and trouble and sorrow have the power to fuse mere mixtures into combinations, and produce out of a fickle and uncertain mixture a stable and harmonious compound. I think this is one of the commonest ways in which adversity "improves" people. It is not only that the "dross" is burnt away, but that the qualities that remain learn to act together in the stress of war in a way they never could in the piping times of peace.

Various Groupings.

Compound characters themselves may be divided into (1) the well-balanced—qualities blended more or less evenly; (2) the single-minded—qualities blended, leaving one conspicuous trait that characterises the whole. Again we may say that all men are either (1) lovers of freedom or idealists, *i.e.*, with a mental or psychical bias; or (2) lovers of pleasure or sensationalists, *i.e.*, with a materially physical or sensuous bias. The former are, as a rule, the more, and the latter the less moral, and are respectively altruistic and egotistic. The latter generally predominate, inasmuch as characters are, as a rule, compounded of self-regard, tempered with benevo-

lence, whereas they should be love tempered with self-regard.

Another classification we may name falls under three heads. These are the blind, the seeing, and the seeing and doing. Perhaps the best threefold grouping is those characters where will predominates, where emotion rules, and where intellect guides. The first are energetic, but not distinctively sympathetic or wise. The second are inactive, but credulous and sanguine. The third are thoughtful, abstracted and clever, leading a reticent life with little emotion. Sometimes we get a rare combination in right proportions of all three. Such a character may not be outwardly attractive, but its inward worth can never be concealed.

Emerson says: "He who aims high must dread an easy home and a popular manner. Heaven sometimes hedges a rare character about with ungainliness, as the burr protects the chestnut." On the other hand, superficial characters are often the most attractive. The qualities that are the most showy are often on the surface, and of little intrinsic worth. The scientific man is the practical embodiment of an intellectual nature, while the artist (in music or painting) represents the one whose feelings are in advance of his thoughts, and who has quick mental emotions.

Memory and Character.

Memory varies immensely in people, and, in children especially, has no doubt some connection with the character.

A so-called good or naughty little child may depend for its character rather on its memory than its morals.

Some forget pain so readily that they do the same thing at night for which they were punished in the morning. Others remember both commands and penalties so well that they never commit the same fault twice. The former class are ever sinning and repenting.

The motor force that expresses character is the motive. Motives are what move the will, and thus show character in conduct. The motive is the moral element in voluntary action, and its determining cause.

Some characters are so characterless that they appear purposeless, and no motive of action can be traced. There is more hope even of a man with a bad purpose than of one with none at all; with the latter, as we say, there is nothing to work on. Some men are like floating straws carried haphazard on the current of life, sad or bright according to what chances to befal them. Others there are who influence and brighten all that touches them with the fixed purpose of their inward life. Maeterlink compares[1] the two lives to a mountain stream and a canal—the one turned aside by every obstacle, delayed, winding, useless, though perhaps picturesque; the other controlled by wisdom, of great use, and overcoming all obstacles in its straight course.

Motives should not be artificial, but should be natural, and in any case express the self—

> "To thine own self be true,
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man."

The springs of action do not often divide into good and

[1] Maeterlink, *Wisdom and Destiny* (A. Sutro), p. 26.

bad, but into better and worse. Few actions are the result of a single motive, but each is rather the resultant of several, being characterised by the strongest.

A right motive by no means implies a wise act. We are all familiar with foolish people who "mean well," and whose motives are beyond criticism.

Principles determine the right of the act or character —consequences determine the wisdom of the act o conduct.

In speaking of good and bad, we only, as we have so often said, attach moral value to the voluntary acts. Moral and immoral only relate to conscious purpose, hence it is not strictly accurate to speak of moral instincts, for these are unconscious. The same instincts swayed by new motives of action may become moral or immoral accordingly.

It is, however, difficult to analyse motives, or even to classify them.

The moment we try to bring a spring or a motive into consciousness it shrinks in size and importance. It is always greater than can be expressed in words. A man makes his motives, not motives the man, though they reveal him—self is not caused, but causal.

Egotistic, Altruistic and Religious Motives.

Motives may be classed as selfish or egotistic, unselfish or altruistic, and religious. Huxley, in his famous Romanes lectures at Oxford, laid down that, whereas the first was the law of all physical progress, the second is the law of all psychic advance ; in other words, the body advances by looking after Number One, the soul by caring for others. From this Leslie Stephen, in his

Science of Ethics, entirely dissents, tracing both to egotistic motives. The third and highest class of motive, when pure and true, is the noblest source of action.

Motives might also be classed as intellectual and emotional. Prudence, or the interested motive of good conduct, is a type of one ; sympathy, or the disinterested motive of good conduct, a type of the other.

Duty as a motive simply means obedience to the moral sense within, whether the duty be to self, or to others, or to God.

Pleasure and Pain.

So far we have considered character analytically, and glanced at its varieties and its motives, and we will now close with a few words on pleasure and pain, as motives and objects, before passing on to consider the qualities of character.

Pleasure is said to be an exaltation and stimulation of emotion—pain a depressor.

Increased capacity for pleasure means also increased capacity for pain, although an emotional temperament feels pleasure more than pain. So universal are the effects of pleasure and pain that it seems evident they probably rest upon some common physical basis.

With regard to their position as influencing character Bentham says : " Nature has placed mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, Pain and Pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." But then we must remember Bentham was a great sensationalist, a modern Epicurean in principle, though certainly not in practice.

A system, however, that makes pleasure itself, individual or universal, the end of life is not truly moral. "Even expediency," says Coleridge, "is the anarchy of morality."

A moral character does not pursue pleasure, but takes it as it comes, and in the most natural way possible.

Fortunately it is true that, though pleasure should not be an object, it is often associated with virtue, and wrong-doing with pain. Taking pleasure in a virtue does not lessen its value, but enhances it with the perfect man, to whom perfect right is perfect happiness.

There is no doubt that in the unconscious mind there is ever a strong instinct to seek pleasure and avoid pain, but we are here speaking of conscious aims and objects

Varying Sources of Pleasure and Pain.

Now, pleasures and pains are by no means fixed entities, but depend themselves entirely on the character of the individual, no two agreeing on the list of the two. Publicity is a source of the greatest pleasure to one man, agony to another. A good dinner is a keen pleasure to some, a source of weariness to others. There is no doubt the loftier the character the higher are what are classed as pleasures, and *vice versâ*.

It is also true that the greater the wealth and the easier the circumstances the less pleasure is found in them. The pursuit of any single pleasure invariably ends in disappointment. Perhaps a healthy frugal life, in medium circumstances, with a good character and high aims, on the whole ensures the greatest pleasures.

Neither poverty nor riches seem to go with much enjoyment, as the wise man found out long ago.

Goethe, with all his prosperity and riches, states that he had not five weeks of genuine pleasure in his whole life; and the Caliph Abdalrahman said that in fifty years he had had only fourteen days of pure happiness.

The character of a man may be fairly judged by his pleasures, which always harmonize with it. The mor unselfish a nature is the greater is its capacity for pleasure.

As we have seen, where an ideal at which the life is aimed is really loved and followed with the affections as well as the intellect and will, intense pleasure is the result of its pursuit. Indeed, life itself becomes one long pleasure, where the highest aims are followed with a whole heart.

In this analysis of character we do well to remember the words of Aristotle:[1] "We do not engage in these inquiries merely to know what virtue is, but to become good men".

[1] Aristotle's *Ethics*, chap. xi., 2, p. 1. (See also Epictetus, *Ench.*, 51.)

CHAPTER IX.

THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER.

WE will devote this chapter to a consideration of the various ingredients or characteristics of character. The value of character, curiously enough, does not depend entirely on what qualities are contained in it, but also upon the proportions in which they enter into it, in order to compose the "noetic synthesis" of the whole. Hydrogen and oxygen will never make water unless there are exactly two parts of hydrogen to one of oxygen. It is this question of the infinitely varying proportions of the various elements that go to make up an ordinary character that renders the analysis of the most complicated organic compounds mere child's play in comparison to the analysis of the most commonplace character.

The Value consists of Proportions of Ingredients.

It is quite impossible for any mental chemist to say of what elements, and in what proportions, any given character is compounded; and a brief and serious consideration of these difficulties will, I think, lead any one to understand that it is impossible at present to found a true science of character, or to make any ultimate analysis of it.

In connection with the great fact of the value of proportions, we find that it is generally vaguely recognised

Well-balanced Characters.

in our current expressions: such as "a well-balanced character," "a one-sided character," or "a level-headed man". Cranks and eccentrics and "hobbyists" and faddists may all have good characters, but they are essentially ill-proportioned, and therefore of little value.

The first meaning of δικαιοσύνη as understood by Plato is not justice, but the equal balance of the different factors of character.

Rationality and sanity depend on all-round views—on seeing things from a general standpoint (which is of course the combination of various standpoints), and not being wholly absorbed by a single aspect.

Such rational characters affirm much and deny little, knowing that we are generally right in what we affirm and wrong in what we deny. Truth is so many-sided that they who have seen what different aspects it may wear from various points of view know the force of this. But they who have only one standpoint, and observe that a certain object appears round, are not content with saying it is round, but must deny that it is square, and quarrel with any who assert this. One can always rightly affirm the truth of what one sees and knows, but to deny there can be anything else is to say one knows the thing or matter completely and perfectly. The fact is that on earth we cannot *comprehend* truth. At most we *apprehend* in part and know in part. Truth, like light, is one, and is white; but passing through the prism of the finite, truth becomes split up, like light, into many coloured rays—violet, indigo, blue, red, etc. The man who discovers the red ray is so fascinated with its

Truth is greater than we are.

beauty that he constitutes himself its champion, and declares that red is truth, and truth is red and nothing but red; and he becomes a bitter antagonist of another seer, equally limited in thought, whose path, having been illumined by a green ray, proclaims henceforth that truth is green and nothing but green. It is sad to think that these two doughty champions, both valiant fighters for different aspects of the one truth, may not become reconciled until the diverging rays become again absorbed in infinity, and the light that is above the brightness of the sun reveals to their astonished gaze that truth itself is neither red nor green, but white. The man who takes the widest views is always the one who makes the most moderate statements, and the strongest characters are generally the simplest in speech; the feeble endeavouring to conceal their weakness by the strength, and, sometimes, profanity of their language. This is one reason why weak young men are so given to swearing and superlatives.

Harmony and Common Sense.

Emerson says, referring to the balance of common sense: "There is a certain wisdom of humanity common to all men". The "sweet reasonableness" of Matthew Arnold still better describes the quality we are dwelling on. "Let your moderation be known unto all men" perfectly expresses the idea of a well-balanced character in New Testament language. It is the curbing of instinct by wisdom that governs destiny. Just as a circle is the most perfect figure in geometry, so is a character perfect in proportion as it is circular in form. All square characters have angles, and all lopsided characters are

uneven. A good man is a symmetrical man, whose powers are all harmonious. The more you strike him, the fuller the chord you get out of him; and there are no discords. It is the presence of this harmony that distinguishes the "man of character" from the "man of qualities" only. It is this harmony that the Greek philosophers ever regarded as the essence of virtue. Turning to the character of our Saviour as the most perfect representation of the highest ideal, we find that in the striking symbolism of the Old Testament it is represented by "fine flour mingled with oil," which apparently would convey the idea of perfect uniform excellence and evenness, no single grain being larger than another, pervaded throughout by the Holy Spirit, of which oil is the well-known figure.

Overgrown powers on any one side of the character dwarf and starve the others; as Lord Bacon, for example, with his hypertrophied intellect and his atrophied moral nature. If we take a circle to represent perfection in character, we may be sure that if we see a bulging on one side, that is, predominance of some characteristic, there must be a corresponding flattening or deficiency on another side. We all have the defects of our virtues in this sense.

Antiphonal Virtues.

A man cannot be *specially* strong all round. There is even the positive and negative side both to virtues and vices. A drunkard is not only a drinker to excess (positive vice), but he is not a temperate man (negative vice). A philanthropic man not only does not hate his neighbour (negative virtue), but loves him (positive virtue).

We can thus express any vice or virtue either in its own positive terms, or in negative terms of its opposite: for all have opposites. The practical remark we wish to make on this is that to eradicate or overcome a vice it is not enough, according to the Divine Code, and according to the highest ethics, to practise its opposite negative virtue. Every vice has its antiphonal virtue, which should be positively practised. As in war, an attack should not be met with a mere defence (negative), but with a counter attack (positive). In hatred it is not enough not to hate, we should love; he that steals is not only to steal no more, but to give to him that needeth; corrupt communications are not only to cease out of the mouth, but that which is good is to proceed from it; we are not only not to be drunk with wine, but are to be filled with the Spirit. Evil habits are best overcome, not by mere resistance, but by the vigorous formation of the opposite virtuous habits.

The Relative and the Absolute.

Again, this balance of which we have spoken involves, at any rate in humanity, a relative value to each quality rather that an absolute.

The absolute is the infinite; all with us is relative. We can seldom indeed absolutely affirm or deny the right or wrong of our actions. In most cases it is a balance, and an adjustment and relative values; and in the presence of a better and a worse, the better must ever be the right to us. In practice the answer to the question, Which is right and which is wrong? may be "Either," "Both," or "Neither".

The result practically is that a mixed character which

has pairs of tendencies directly opposed to each other must have a fixed predominance of one of each pair to produce consistency of conduct. Those who have them in such equipoise as to act on each alternately are ever unstable and the sport of circumstance.

To have Jekyll and Hyde alternately inhabiting the one man is monstrous, though not uncommon. The one or the other should rule and keep its opposite in abeyance; where this is not done conduct appears opposed to character, and two sorts of conduct are ever due, of course, to a double character.

Value of Selfishness

We will now consider the question of self and selfishness in the balance of character. "Faith in self," says Dr. S. Bryant,[1] "and self-confidence is the salt of character." Self-interest is not selfishness. *Selfishness is self-gratification at the avoidable expense of others.*

"Each mind," says James,[2] "must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist."

Love of self is assumed in the New Testament. It is found in the golden rule "to do unto others as we would they should do to us," and also in a remarkable passage in Ephesians, v. 28.

True self-love is as far from egotism as from altruism. There is no real antagonism, in one sense, between egotism and altruism. The latter is merely the extending of the thought of self so as to embrace wife, children, friends and country, and, in Christianity, one's enemies. The

[1] Dr. S. Bryant, *Studies in Character*, p. 9.

[2] W. James, *Psychology*, p. 194.

enlarging of self thus forms altruism, until it may embrace humanity; and one may thus continue to satisfy egotism with what is regarded as absolute unselfishness. On the other hand, egotism, wrongly used, may prove a swamp in which the higher qualities are all lost. Love may be narrowed into mere self-love; justice may be perverted into insistence on one's own rights alone. "The faculty of tender emotion," says Bain, "may all be centred in self." Egotism may avail itself of the principal function of our generosity.

Exaggerated Virtues.

Self-conceit and self-consciousness are forms of egotism, and are merely potential virtues spoiled through exaggeration. The virtue they distort is self-respect. These two particular characteristics are common faults with young men when passing through the first of their three phases. The first phase is the wearing of magnifying glasses, when everything, including the value of themselves, is magnified. The next is the wearing of "diminishing" glasses, when everything is played out and worthless, and *nil admirari* is the attitude; and the third is when glasses are put aside, and, for the first time, life and all things are seen as they are.

Another balance we must strike is between the intellectual and the emotional. We are accustomed to think much more of the heart than the head, because of the supposed warmth of the former, and the coldness of the latter. But if emotions are deeper, intellect is higher, and the mountain is necessarily colder than the valley. Intellect and morals may, and often do go together, as we have seen; and, on the other hand, a warm heart is

by no means a synonym for a good character. To exalt either at the expense of the other is to lose in character; nevertheless it is by virtue of our reason that we are distinctively human, while it is our instincts and emotions that link us with the lower creation. It is in this sense that consciousness, in the light of which reason is exercised, is nobler than unconsciousness, from the depths of which our instincts spring.

Even here, however, we must guard our statements; for, on the other hand, there is a subtle connection, of which we shall speak in Chapter XII., between the instinctive moral sense within and the Creator, that makes it speak from a higher level, and with greater authority than even the voice of reason.

Value of Humour.

That character is best and most perfect when a good intelligence is joined to a warm heart, and the stream of emotion is controlled by wisdom. It is this I think that makes humour such a "saving grace". A character with no sense of humour is essentially deficient. It is a peculiarly rational quality, and is generally present in a well-balanced mind. It is due to the co-existence of two points of view at the same time, whose incongruity causes the humour. Dr. Jackson thinks it is by the concurrent action of both sides of the brain. It is said to be the combined action of enthusiasm and rationality—in other words, the emotions and the intellect, the unity of the two currents causing the ripples of laughter.

Truthfulness.

Turning now for a moment to another quality of character—truthfulness—we find a subject full of complexity. It is most difficult to speak of truth considered

as a balance and a compromise; we shall touch on it as a virtue a little later on.

We must always be as truthful as possible; even if we are not to be truthful at *all* costs. At any rate we are never to compromise truth from self-interest. Motives are, however, hard to analyse. We cannot define moral motives with precision, nor press them absolutely; they must be followed and practised in the light of common sense.

A certain compromise of truth is involved in answering "yes" or "no" to doubtful questions about matters which are partially right. So long as the answer given is understood by the hearer to be only true within limitation no harm is done; and this is the case where one person of average intelligence speaks to another.

To speak the truth three things are required: one's words and actions must represent one's thoughts; they must represent the facts, and they must convey the right meaning to the hearers. When the Chinese are told the blessed dead are clothed in white, and are placed at God's right hand, that does not convey the truth to the hearer, though it does to the speaker; for to the Chinese white is the colour of mourning and the symbol of death, and the right hand is not the place of honour.

If a real deliberate suppression of full truth be ever required by higher interests, pain at the needed compromise must and should be felt by a truthful character. Such occasions will occur. Of course, what we call truth is, after all, generally relative with us and seldom absolute, unless dealing with what are called "axioms" or "truisms".

Self-respect and self-esteem, as we have seen, are good qualities, but not self-righteousness, self-congratulation, self-depreciation, or self-approbation.

With self-respect should go self-doubt, self-criticism, and humility. These are the proper complements, and preserve the balance.

Motives of Character.

Motives and appetences may, as we have seen, combine or conflict. It is best, of course, when they combine; it is more common for them to conflict; for, disguise it as we will, we are all potential Jekyll and Hydes: the doctrine of two natures is not only found in Scripture. Many men are two entirely different beings when drunk and sober; many lunatics who have lost the combining power of common sense display two characters so different that one cannot believe them to be the same people. Stevenson's romance wakes an echo in the mind of every reader. We have in each "an old man" who "is not subject to the law of God, neither, indeed, can be"; an old heathen epicurean, a traitor ever ready to respond to temptation and evil suggestions; while, on the other hand, we all have a God-given moral sense, and those who are Christians have in addition a new motive of life and new principle so great that it is characterised as a new birth, a new beginning. The conflict is described by St. Paul in the most graphic way, which could well furnish a text for Stevenson's lay sermon.

Conflict of Natures.

"I know that in me, that is, in my flesh (my carnal disposition unguided by moral sense), dwelleth no good. . . . For the good that I (the higher nature) would, I

(the active will or *ego*) do not, but the evil which I (the higher nature) would not, that I (the lower nature) do. Now, if I (the lower nature) do that I (the higher nature) would not it is no more I (the *ego*, the true self) that do it, but sin (the lower carnal self, here deemed to be self) that dwelleth in me."[1]

That is, my higher self, my new self, the self empowered and enlightened by God's Spirit, and by the moral sense, is now to me the true *ego;* and any actions that are done without its consent are not my actions, but the actions of a lower principle; which, though I have had it all my life, I now refuse to recognise as a part of my personality; but regard it as a foreign body that gives me great trouble, and that I would fain get rid of.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the lower nature, psychologically and positively, forms a part of the character; and the only practical way, and the way laid down by St. Paul,[2] to prevent its activity is never to let the conduct be guided by or be the expression of these lower principles, so that they are "as dead," *i.e.*, in operation, and by degrees become atrophied by want of use. There is no doubt that a persistent virtuous life does weaken the hold of the lower appetites and passions.

The qualities of a sound character generally are as follows:— Qualities of sound Character.

1. Intellectual activity.
2. ,, docility and humility.
3. Reverence for truth.
4. The *will* to know, or energetic pursuit of truth.

[1] St. Paul, Rom., chap. vii., ver. 18-20. [2] St. Paul, Rom. vi.

With regard to good qualities we must remember we have besetting virtues that may need repressing as well as besetting sins. Candour, benevolence, humility and love itself often require moderation in their exercise.

Vicious instincts themselves may not be the perversion or disorder of a good character, but the expression of the normal, healthy (bad) character of the man, just as different breeds of animals (*e.g.*, dogs) have different instincts, but all equally natural. Reason alone, the distinctive quality of our humanity, gives the power to lead consciously evil lives, in which case it is necessarily divorced from morality.

Criminals have often abnormally clever reasoning powers, but all work for evil, because the moral sense is deficient, the instincts vicious, self-control weak, and self-indulgence strong.

Analysis of Qualities.

We will not dwell further on generalities, but proceed to enumerate in detail some of the leading qualities of which character is compounded. We fear it will be little more than a barren list, as a discursive treatise on the virtues and vices of mankind would be both wearisome and useless ; indeed we have some hesitation in inserting this list at all. However, as we have already given some lists, made by recognised authorities, we may perhaps now enumerate some of the commoner qualities that make up human nature.

We will class them in the natural order. First into the two great orders of GOOD and BAD. Each of these falls into the divisions Personal and Relative. The Good Personal qualities make two sub-divisions,

Moral and Non-moral (as distinguished from immoral), and the Moral falls into two sections of Positive and Negative. The Relative, both in good and bad qualities, may be in connection with others or with God. The whole scheme therefore stands thus :—

I. GOOD—A. Personal { *a.* Moral { *α.* Positive—16 examples. *β.* Negative—10 examples. *b.* Non-moral—20 examples.
B. Relative { *a.* To others—31 examples. *b.* To God—7 examples.
II. BAD—A. Personal—30 examples.
B. Relative—27 examples.

I. Qualities of Character—GOOD.

A. Personal.

a. Moral.—*a.* Positive.—**Purity, Hope, Good Temper, Self-respect, Prudence** (this is the contracted form of providence, and means foresight), **Wisdom, Self-development, Perseverance, Firmness, Rectitude, Self-esteem, Peace, Humility, Sense of Beauty, Admiration, Cheerfulness.** This last is not only a source of great enjoyment, but a great safeguard. It wears well and rests the mind.

List of Personal Qualities

β. Negative.—**Self-denial, Self-preservation, Caution, Secretion, Carefulness, Temperance, Reserve, Self-restraint, Sobriety, Self-control.**

With regard to this last we must say one word. Self-control, self-denial, and self-restraint may be described as the re-action of moral ideas and ideals upon impulses and instincts. Self-control always refers mainly to control over the lower self. Man alone can control his instincts and cultivate his own powers.

The lack of self-control leads to defective qualities, which, if allowed, spoil the whole character and mar the life; unchecked irritability of temper thus spoiled Burke. Systematic self-control soon makes one master of one's self.

b. Non-moral (as distinguished from immoral).—**Confidence, Simplicity, Common-sense, Energy, Diligence, Industry, Amativeness, Fear, Wonder, Wit, Humour, Matter-of-factness, Enthusiasm, Romance** (these two are invaluable ingredients in the character of childhood and youth, both lessening with advancing years), **Imitation, Timidity, Imagination** (this is automatic and is unconscious memory chiefly; it is the free play of thought deriving its ideas from the stores of the unconscious mind), **Love of Power, Knowledge, Intelligence** (the essentials of which are *discrimination*, *retention* and *identification*). Intellectual culture, it must be noted, has little to do with the moral character.

B. Relative.

List of Relative Qualities.

a. To Others (my neighbour).—**Love** (the greatest of all), **Lovingkindness, Righteousness, Gentleness, Sympathy, Compassion** (these two are not the same: the former is an hereditary natural quality largely dependent on the power of imagination), **Sincerity, Patriotism, Generosity, Benevolence, Hospitality, Unselfishness, Altruism, Self-sacrifice** (this virtue, the expression of altruism, is strongly developed in some altruistic natures and curiously absent in others), **Long-suffering, Patience, Uprightness, Straightforwardness, Meekness** (this may

be natural, or acquired as the result of a deeper knowledge of one's self, or objectively by contrast with greater men or with God), **Honesty** (perfect intellectual honesty is one of the rarest of mental characteristics), **Charity** (or almsgiving), **Indignation, Anger, Justice** (charity is less than justice; both should go together—fellow-feeling with fellow-seeing), **Courtesy, Deference** (the compliments of self-respect), **Goodness of heart** ("an innate quality of mind" (A. Bain). Real goodness consists in feeling a personal gain in the realisation of any good, anywhere, to any one), **Truth** (Truth, it may be noted, is rather a controller of action than a spring of it), **Love of Approbation, Friendliness** (sociability), **Love of Children.**

b. To God.—**Reverence, Faith, Spirituality, Love to God, Obedience, Devotion, Conscientiousness.**

II. Qualities of Character—BAD.

A. Personal.

List of Bad Qualities.

Vanity, Pride (vanity craves for the esteem of others, pride relies on its own), **Love of Pleasure, Selfishness, Sensuality, Carelessness, Foolishness, Impurity, Self-indulgence, Cowardice, Senselessness, "Visionariness," Discordancy, Impatience, Egotism, Bad Temper, Miserliness, Unstableness, Recklessness, Apathy, Self-conceit, Self-righteousness, Ennui or Want of Interest, Imprudence, Impulsiveness, Despondency, Laziness, Fickleness, Waywardness, Stupidity.**

B. Relative.

Malice, Vindictiveness, Dishonesty, Suspicion, Hate, Rage, Lying, Quarrelling, Thieving, Killing, Cruelty, Brutality, Slandering, Backbiting, Injustice, Rudeness, Deceitfulness, Irreverence, Callousness, Hardheartedness, Shiftlessness, Faithlessness, Irritability, Treachery, Impudence, Arrogance, Affectation (which Locke calls the lighting of a candle to our defects).

The List is of no special Value.

We attach, as we have said, no special value to this list. It is not scientific or exhaustive, and probably no two will agree that every quality is placed under its right head. Its survey, and the consideration that probably not one-fourth of the qualities of character find a place in it at all, may enable one to understand the complexity of a compound into which any of these elements (or simple compounds) may enter in endlessly varying proportions. And even then we have not reached the expression of character. For this we must set over this compound a moral sense compounded of endless moral principles acting according to a standard that varies from year to year, and sometimes from day to day, according to the various lights by which it acts.

And yet all this is not, as might be thought, a description of chaos, but of character!

CHAPTER X.

CHARACTER AND THE WILL.

IT may be remembered that we devoted Chapters V. and VI. to investigating the two springs whence character flows, and we mentioned the use of the word "spring" in another sense, not as a source, but a force, the consideration of which we would reserve for this chapter. The mainspring of the expression of character is the will. The Mainspring of Character.

We shall consider first of all the freedom of the will, which includes the whole question of moral responsibility; and then its effect on character. Its relation to morality will come next, and finally its expression in action.

All our readers must be aware of the endless discussions that have raged about the question whether the will be free or not, resembling in their persistent character the eternal disputes in theology as to whether man is responsible or God sovereign. The answer in each case is that "both are true". Here is an instance of the value of affirmations over denials. Assert the will is free and man responsible; but don't deny it may be controlled and God sovereign. Or we may change the assertion with equal truth, but must never deny what appears to be the incompatible opposite, for we are small and our Is the Will free?

mental capacity limited, but truth and God are great and infinite.

Yes and No.

The will is free. There can be no morality without freedom of will, because there can be no responsibility. Nothing less is required and nothing more is needed than our own personal freedom and responsibility in order to build up personal character.

Free will and Divine foreknowledge cannot clash, though to human logic apparently incompatible, for they are two parallel lines that never meet.

The freedom of will, moreover, is always consistent with the Divine foreknowledge of action; and if of Divine, then of any other knowledge as well. Because a certain action can be predicted it does not prove it is not a free action.

To be morally and practically free one must be able easily to resist all instinctive and unconscious impulses.

We may be free, and yet it may be quite certain what use we shall make of our freedom. There can, of course, be no movement of will without a sufficient exciting cause, but we may know perfectly well in what direction this exciting cause will act.

While, therefore, we are literally and absolutely free in theory, there are laws of character as irresistible as the law of gravitation. And in this lies the importance of character—that while I am free to form it, to re-form it, and to transform it as I like, and have abundant power available to do so, when I have formed it, I have freely imposed conditions myself on my own free will.

Though a man may be free to go wrong, in fixed

characters it is practically impossible in certain directions. Of course, this remark is equally true with regard to right doing, though in neither case is the force of character absolute.

John Stuart Mill observes[1]: "A man feels morally free who knows he is master of his habits or temptations. To be completely free we must have succeeded in the effort. Hence, none but one of perfect virtue is completely free"—and yet, as we have seen, such an one is, to a great extent, under the power of virtue instead of vice. When we cease to be slaves of sin, we are described as slaves of God, and yet, at the same time, we are morally free.

Virtue is Freedom, Vice enslaves.

Virtue often has a tremendous conflict to attain this freedom, or this possession of the *ego*. The Homeric conflict is described in full by St. Paul, whose profound introspection exceeds that of most men, as we have seen in Chapter IX. (*vide* Rom. vii.). Freedom is certainly linked in that passage, and throughout St. Paul's writings, with virtue. "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free".[2] And Christ Himself attached freedom to truth: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."[3]

The conscious will should rule, and rule in accordance with the moral sense; but sometimes the instincts of character, and what may be called the unconscious will, prevails over the conscious will; and "the firmest resolve," says Maudsley, "or purpose sometimes vanishes

[1] J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. ii., p. 477.

[2] St. Paul, Gal. v. i. [3] St. John viii. 32.

issueless when it comes to the brink of an act, while the true (*i.e.*, unconscious) will, which determines perhaps a different act, springs up suddenly out of the depths of the unconscious nature, surprising and overcoming the conscious ".[1]

If the conscious will be allied with the character, of course there is no difficulty.

As a rule, I do what I would, though at all times it is impossible to trace all the springs that move me: so unconscious are they; yet, however many there may be, I feel the will is free, that I need not have so acted unless "I chose," and that I am, therefore, a responsible being before God and man.

Will controls and expresses Character.

The will, as we have seen, is, in a sense, determined by the character, but inasmuch as the expression of the character in action is at the control of the will, the will also forms the character by repeated action. We cannot will to be different, any more than we can will to play the violin; but we can will to do certain actions that make us different by repetition, so as to attain one result, and modify the character. The effect of action is even more subjective than objective—inward more than outward. The outward effect may be good or bad; the effect of the action on our character depends on the motive that caused it. Each action performed under the influence of motives is my own, the character being more definitely formed with each voluntary act.

"Character," says Novalis, "is a completely formed will."

[1] Maudsley, *Physiology of Mind*, p. 417.

But the will must be strong and resolute, and often in the desperate conflict with inertia and positive evil needs all the aid it can get from the higher side of character, and from the enlightened moral sense, energised by the Divine Spirit. Many amiable, good characters are marred for want of will. We see plainly they might be so much better, do so much more good, with more will and purpose than they do.

Effort and overcoming are essential factors in all strong characters, and determined wills are their mainsprings. Prof. James[1] earnestly insists upon our never suffering a single emotion to evaporate without its yielding some practical service. Freedom is not standing still; it is the power to *become;* it is advance.

We are really as capable of moulding our characters *if we will,* by force and exercise of will, as of having them made for us by others unconsciously.

Source of Purpose and Decision.

A habit of willing is called a purpose. It is only when our purposes have become independent of pain or pleasure or internal sudden impulses that we are said to have a settled or confirmed character. A whole-hearted purpose to be true to one's best instincts ever leads onward. A great deal of moral power is gained by accustoming our will to act with decision the moment the right path is clear. This decision, and the habitual discipline of a strong will, are essential to a good character. "In the supremacy of self-control consists one of the perfections of the ideal man. Not to be impulsive—

[1] Prof. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., p. 125.

not to be spurred hither and thither by each desire—but to be self-restrained, self-balanced, governed by the just decision of the feelings in council assembled . . . that it is which moral education strives to produce."[1]

> Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control—
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
> Yet not for power; that of itself would come unsought,
> But to live by rule, acting each rule by law,
> And because right is right to follow right,
> Were wisdom in the score of consequence.[2]

At a large girls' college in the States girls deserving of it are put on the roll of the "Self-governed," and are then permitted to do as they please.

> The bravest trophy ever man obtained
> Is that which in himself himself hath gained.[3]

The Will and Morality.

We will now consider the relation of the will to morality. We have seen that the will must be free in order that moral responsibility can exist. A person, to be moral, must be capable of being immoral; a free will implies choice. For moral action there must be consciousness. Instincts *as such*, strictly speaking, are not in themselves moral; what we mean by the words moral instincts are instincts which form the basis of moral action. It is clear, therefore, that moral responsibility does not attach to the original character, save when it becomes the cause of action in consciousness. I am responsible, morally, for all my acts, though they may be done in opposition to my better self, and in this sense I can say it was not I who did them.

[1] Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics*, p. 185.

[2] Lord Tennyson, *Œnone*. [3] Earl of Stirling.

We are not what we do, but what we approve of. Nevertheless, we are responsible for what we do. A responsible man is one, therefore, whose conscious will endorses the actions that may spring from unconscious motives. We are responsible for all actions, however much they may be predetermined by character. Punishment for and suffering for sin is thus really in the interests of humanity, and of the whole race. If fools and sinners did not suffer for folly and sin, the world would soon consist of nothing else.

Action of Will shows Morality.

We see from all this what moral importance attaches to the action of the will. All moral training is essentially a training of the will; moral health implies a vigorous will. The two evils as to will are feebleness or indolence and the corruption of will by self-indulgence. The first moment, therefore, that moral sense is developed, the conflict begins between two springs of action, a higher and a lower; and the first index of moral character is the choice between them. It is useless, therefore, to think a man is good because the analysis of his motives and character shows it. No man is known to be good until he has exhibited his worth in voluntary action. Morality and the exercise of the will are inseparable.

We must now consider what constitutes right conduct, without trenching too much on the domain of conscience and Christianity, which form the subjects of Chapters XII. and XIII.

Let us hear what Plato has to say on this.[1] "Right

[1] Plato, *Rep.*, 443, C—B.

(*i.e.*, conscience) concerns itself with the inward springs which are man's true self and life. When he has turned to account his three principles (wisdom, courage, and self-control) like the three notes of a scale (with any intermediate notes), then he may be and become, no longer manifold in character, but one compact and balanced nature. He is at last prepared so to act and call that conduct right and good which concurs with this character, and that knowledge which directs it—wisdom : and on the other hand, that conduct wrong which may misrepresent it, and that judgment ignorance which directs such conduct."

What is right Action?

Every action is right which in the presence of a lower motive follows a higher. "I do that I would not" is seldom literally true when we are conscious of our actions. We must abet to some extent every action we are aware of.

Now a right action may not be positively right and yet relatively so. The generous man may have to close his hand, the merciful man to harden his heart, the truthful man to veil facts ; but if done with sorrow, the action is right, and no harm ensues to character.

Good conduct should be righteous and right ; but between the two the former prevails. An action is good not in itself, or in its results, but in its motive. The motive may be known or unknown. It is better when known. It is well to know always why we act, or at any rate the leading motive. Where instinct pulls one way and reason another, we must ever remember that the defeat of reason by instinct is to a certain extent de-

moralising, even when the latter is better, while, on the other hand, the defeat of instinct by reason is good and common; the resisting of temptation is generally a conflict of the latter sort. Many think that if they act according to the moral sense it is necessarily right. Not so; it is right with relation to this, but may be wrong with reference to God and man; as when St. Paul, with a good conscience, sent Christian men and women to prison To do what we think right may be all we are capable of at the moment; but we should not rest till we are assured that what we believe to be right actually is so, and therefore that what we do *is* right.

We *are* more than what we *do*.

So much stress has been laid in this chapter on the moral worth attaching to action, that it may seem as if what we do is worth more than what we are. That is of course ridiculous; for the former is ever based on the latter, and is its expression. The only reason why it is of such value is because this expression depends on the will that causes the action; and this will being free, moral responsibility attaches to it in a special way; and thus the morality which we may say was passive and potential in character, becomes active and embodied in conduct. We therefore will now proceed to consider conduct generally.

CHAPTER XI.

CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.

Actions express Character.

IN the former chapter we were occupied with the motive power on which our moral responsibility rests. Now we have before us the expressed results of that power in what we call conduct, by which a man is legitimately judged of his fellows. "By their fruits ye shall know them"; and this because these are the best expression of the character of the tree. In winter many trees are indistinguishable by the trunk and branches alone; in spring the leaves, and, later on, the flowers, show definite qualities; but, after all, it is the fruit that proclaims what the tree really is without doubt.

Now character is not a product of reason or consciousness, but lies in the unconscious mind; and as far as our actions are unconscious, they express it perfectly: but reason and conscious will can interfere and alter this expression, unlike the case of the tree whose fruits are wholly unconsciously produced.

Therefore our conduct is not so true an expression of our real character as is the fruit of the tree. But we must touch on this again a little later.

Ribot says:[1] "Character is the only immediate cause of voluntary action. Motives are mediate causes, but the latter are conscious, or liable to become so; the former is absolutely unconscious." This remark, we think, must not be examined too critically, but it is true in the main. Motives frequently baffle scrutiny, as we have already seen. How often do we think we have consciously weighed all our desires on a point, and yet at last we act from some other reason which has lain in unconsciousness all the time?

Motives of Conduct.

"It would go hard with mankind, indeed, if they must act wittingly before they acted at all."[2] "Men, without knowing why, follow a course for which good reasons exist—nay, more, the practical instincts of mankind often work beneficially in actual contradiction to their professed doctrines."[3] They are, in short, better than their creeds; for common sense, one of the four internal senses of the Aristotelians, is the judgment or voice of the unconscious mind.

Conduct, indeed, is finally determined rather by feeling than reason; and as a matter of fact, conduct is best when the reflective and the impulsive are well balanced.

Acting on principle, as distinguished from expediency, means acting from a moral motive, rather than from the expected result of the action. Of course there are many actions, perhaps the bulk, that cannot be classified under either head.

[1] Ribot's *German Psychology*, p. 245.

[2] Maudsley, *Physiology of Mind*, p. 13. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Noetic Synthesis.

Consistent and inconsistent conduct refer us to the character which they do or do not express. The more educated and trained a mind, the more it selects its conduct and speech according to a settled character and train of thought, *i.e.*, it is always relevant. This settled character is called by Stout "noetic synthesis". A yokel telling a story has no such guide, but wanders among associations, and loses his thread; so also the aged, and where the mind is weak. The talk of an uneducated man springs from chance associations and apperception; that of an educated man, as well as his conduct, is controlled by "noetic synthesis" (a truly fascinating term).

Thought, speech, conduct, therefore, as far as they spring from the last idea or accident, arise from mere association; as far as they are purposeful and consistent, they are due to "noetic synthesis" or character.

Acts that are not the result of character have comparatively little influence; for it is rightly felt that action should be the outcome of the personality. The effect of any action is measured by the depth of feeling from which it proceeds. But we must remember that character itself is, or ought to be, growing, the "noetic synthesis" enlarging and consolidating. Our actions are the result of our character, just as character is the result of heredity and education. But we are free to improve character. Quite so; we are free to do so, but our doing so depends upon the will. The desire must be there, and for this often an external influence—the

Breath of God, the Holy Spirit—is needed to put life into the dry bones of a purposeless character.

What is Conduct?

By conduct we mean our words and acts and general deportment. As expressors of character we have also our thoughts, but these reveal character only to ourselves. Others can only arrive at our thoughts through the conduct. Just as in a watch, any one may see the face and observe the hands move round, and judge of its value by the accurate time it keeps, yet no one but the owner ever opens the case; so with ourselves, any one may judge of our value by our conduct and the way in which we keep God's time of day in this world, but only ourselves, the owners, can open the case and there see the mainspring (the will) that sets the works (the character) in motion, controlled by the balance wheel (the moral sense).

Conduct is generally called forth by circumstances. Indeed, it is the product of circumstances and character. It may thus be represented as a reflex action:—



Varieties of Conduct.

Conduct is of practical value to the mind. If the ideas of reason are to become any part of our character they must be lived and acted on as they come to light. "The limbs of the mind," says Ruskin, "must all be exercised." Conduct, of course, varies at different ages. At first it is largely the result of the natural instincts modified by hereditary instinct, and is wholly uncon-

scious. When it becomes conscious, then the child is "old enough to be good," that is, old enough to control impulse and instinct by reason. Thereafter throughout life conduct is the reasonable expression of character until, in old age, the reason is less active, and the conduct becomes the expression of confirmed habits.

Human life is three-fourths conduct, and this should be, as we have seen, the expression of the character.

Correspondence of Conduct and Character.

For we should not depend on the belief or even on the *fact* of our character being good, but should express the same in our conduct. Many think the great point is to be right within and leave the outside to take care of itself, and are thus careless about their actions. This is as wrong as if we said we know the watch has good works, and do not, therefore, care what time it tells. On the contrary, we should see that our conduct is up to our standard of life, even in the small matters of dress, cleanliness, deportment and manners. Many minds are so great that they neglect these small matters; smaller minds are absorbed with them, while other minds again are so petty that they depend on being thought great because they neglect them. The first is bad, the second worse, the third worst. In this and other ways some people's conduct reveals their characters; that of others partly conceals them. In all we say or do we should express our formed selves (our "noetic synthesis"). Unassimilated principles, that as yet do not form part of ourselves, lie silent till absorbed. In great things our character will show itself without effort, without our knowledge or will.

When conscious action is of the same character as the unconscious, it shows that our conscious mind and unconscious correspond; when our conscious actions are easier, better, and more refined than our unconscious, it shows that our conscious mind is better educated than the unconscious; in short, that education has done more for us than heredity. When our unconscious actions are easier, better, and more refined than our conscious, it shows the reverse, that however defective has been our conscious education, our unconscious mind is educated and our heredity good. We are all well acquainted with these different characters, the best, of course, being when both have reached the same standard, and the unity of the man is proclaimed.

Education of the Conscious and Unconscious.

Our friends, of course, do not analyse the grounds of their knowledge of us, and yet they know. We are all discerners of spirits by our own unconscious minds reading the minds of others, though consciously we know not how it is done.

If the conduct is very much better than the character the difference is probably consciously assumed for a purpose; but a slight difference is legitimate, and may exist unconsciously. It arises as follows: If a character is growing the conduct will soon be slightly better than the character, because it represents what we would be, rather than what we are: it is the growing point. If, on the other hand, we are degenerating, the conduct will again be a little better than what we are. Because, although growth is an aim, degeneracy is never a positive object or source of conduct. Degeneracy is in spite of

our wishes rather than because of them, and conduct lingers behind, and still keeps up outwardly a standard long since departed from inwardly.

Lastly, conduct tends most exactly to represent character when that character is stationary and fixed.

Action may be prompt or slow. The strongest characters are slow in action, but unswerving. The ideal character combines, unconsciously, prompt habitual action in familiar circumstances, with slowness and wariness in unusual circumstances.

Public and private conduct vary immensely ; the true character is almost invariably more exactly expressed by the latter.

Character more than Conduct.

After all, however, the character is more than its expression, however perfect this may be, just as the works are more than the hands of a watch ; nor, indeed, is action the only way in which character is expressed. It is exhaled from us every moment. It declares itself unconsciously, not by acts only, but when sitting or sleeping. It is shown in silence itself. We cannot find the full worth of Washington, of Chatham, of Sidney, of Essex, of Schiller, or of Gordon in their deeds, or even in their words. Their characters were greater than either. Character not only affects conduct, but conduct affects character ; in all these matters there can be no action without reaction. We are never exactly the same after our deeds as we were before them.

The true development of mind lies in right doing and true knowing, with attention paid to ends and objects, and not to the growing and changing self. Our moral

character is thus the outcome not only of external influences, but of our own conduct.

With regard to the connection of morality and conduct we have already spoken at length in the last chapter.

Morality is said to be the science and art of conduct; certainly the value of morality is in its practice, just as the end of knowledge is conduct. Conduct when it is good brings happiness and peace to the person. It is the flower and fruit of the inner life. The leaves of profession may make a goodly show, but the fig tree must be cursed if it bear nothing but them; the flowers and the fruit alone display the full character of the stock, and in bearing these the tree alone fulfils its destiny.

The object for which we are sent into this world is to bring glory to God, not by our characters alone, but by the conduct which expresses them for good or evil.

Still, as of old,
Man by himself is priced;
For thirty pieces Judas sold
Himself—not Christ.

CHAPTER XII.

CHARACTER AND CONSCIENCE.

The Moral Element in Character.

WE have in this chapter to consider one of the most powerful factors in the production of character; inasmuch as when we speak of character, however broadly, the moral element in it is always most prominently before our minds, and therefore the moral sense or conscience has more to do with it than any other of the abstract or special senses. Conscience is ever active in the formation of character for good or evil, for it is quite an error to suppose that its influence is always on the side of right. No doubt normally it is so, but we find at times that it is practically enlisted on the side of cruel wrong and injustice.

It will be noted that in the present day some of the best psychologies may be searched in vain for the word "conscience," to which there appears to be an increasing distaste; the tendency of modern thought being wholly in favour of natural development as contrasted with supernatural endowment and special organs. Instead, therefore, of regarding conscience as a unique endowment standing by itself under the title of the moral sense, an attempt has been made to range it with other abstract senses, such as the logical faculty and æsthetics.

Conscience or Moral Sense.

In our desire to simplify the obscure and bring life's mysteries within the range of the human intellect, we may, however, and frequently do, go too far.

When, for instance, life is ranged with other natural forces, such as light, heat, electricity, we feel at once that what we apparently gain in simplicity, we lose in truth ; for while there is much in the action of vital force that is on a par with the natural forces, life is still an inscrutable mystery, and possesses powers (especially psychic) to which there is no equivalent in heat, light, or even electricity.

In somewhat the same way, though, as we shall see, conscience *is* an abstract sense, there is undoubtedly that about it which rightly prevents us from placing it on an equality alongside of other abstract senses ; and the word conscience is a convenient word to retain to mark this difference. It would indeed also be convenient if the other senses had a single word to describe their use in the same way. We will therefore retain the word, though it is discarded by so many.

Value of Words in common Use.

Words are often found in common parlance that are completely ignored by scientists ; words which enshrine ideas as old as the race, but which, because these ideas are obscure and possibly run counter to those current in science at the time, are useless to those who would limit their vocabulary to what they understand. Amongst these may be included such words as life, mind, conscience, and to many "God".

We, however, consider the retention of these and many other well-known words and phrases of some

importance, as a testimony to the existence of realities and truths as yet beyond scientific analysis, as well as being of great practical convenience. (Some phrases are retained for convenience only: an example, for instance, is that truly misleading phrase "the sun sets," for which a brief scientific substitute has been sought in vain).

The Idea of a Conscience.

The idea of a conscience is to be found in all religions, and is of great antiquity. In Egypt, for instance, we find that the oath of the ancient priesthood ran :—

"I have never defiled my conscience for fear, or for favour of my superiors."

The Greek word for conscience (*συνείδησις*), which was afterwards used so largely in Christian writings, first occurs in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus,[1] shortly before the Christian era. "Best of all," he says, "is never willingly to lie or defile one's conscience."

The Greek-thinking writers in the New Testament largely use this word. Amongst Hebrew writers, as in the Prophets, many equivalents are used—the "word of the Lord" being often used in this sense. The descriptions of its actions are very vivid and frequent in the Bible.

Comparison of the three Conceptions of Conscience.

It may be convenient here briefly to compare the three conceptions of conscience amongst Hebrew, Greek and Christian writers, as they differ essentially in character.

In Greek writings the conscience is entirely subjective: it is ourselves at our best. In the Old Testament

[1] Dion. Halicarn., vi., 825-15.

it is objective: the result of the voice of God; while in Christianity it partakes of both characters.

The Christian conception is more personal and important than the Greek, while less so than the Hebrew.

To the Greek conscience is our better self; to the Hebrew, God acting in us; to the Christian, the voice of God in us.

The Greek was an independent agent, conforming himself at his own will to the God in Nature.

The Hebrew was acted upon, moved and guided by Jehovah's voice and law.

The Christian is God's son; free (like the Greek), but energised and guided by God's Spirit in him, thus bringing him into harmony with God without.

The Christian conception apart from its religious value is the most practical and best adapted to the development of character

But it is time to ask: What is this conscience—so universally admitted, so universally moulding and forming men's lives, and constituting the one moral natural force in life?

The answers, as may be expected, are various and confusing. We will give a few replies before attempting to give one more answer to the perplexing question.

What is Conscience?

Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Spinoza and Kant consider the power in conscience to be the enlightened *reason*. Epicurus, Hobbes, Bentham and Bain consider its power to be the instinct of *individual* self-preservation. Comte, Schopenhauer, Clifford, Smith, Hume, Hutche-

son, Lewes, as well as Leslie Stephen, consider it to be the instinct of *social* (self) preservation. Leslie Stephen says:[1] "Conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to obey the primary conditions of its welfare". G. H. Lewes says: "The social factor is the real cause of the elevation of the animal into the human, the sensible into the ideal world, knowledge into science, emotion into the sensational, appetite into morality".

None of these theories appear sufficient to account for the voice of conscience.

Its actions and impulses are often against reason and are certainly neither suggested nor guided by the intellect while its decisions in abstract questions of right and wrong place it quite beyond any social or individual considerations. We cannot say of reason as of morality, that its treasures, often hidden "from the wise and prudent, are revealed to babes". Such words, however absurd about learning or about science, are nevertheless true about this wonderful moral instinct.

"Conscience," says Dr. Fowler,[2] "is the aggregate of our moral opinions, reinforced by the moral sanction of self-approbation or self-disapprobation which is habitually attached to them."

"The conscience," observes Prof. Starcke,[3] "is placed in the midst of our feelings and volitions, *not simply as*

[1] L. Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 351.

[2] Dr. T. Fowler, *Progressive Morality*, p. 30.

[3] Prof. C. N. Starcke, *International Journal of Ethics* (Copenhagen), vol. ii., p. 347.

their product (the italics are ours), but as a person ruling them."

Professor Shairp says: "Conscience is the absolute in the soul"—a fine remark.

The Old Testament says, in the words of Solomon:[1] "The spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord, searching all the innermost parts of the belly". The Bible View of Conscience.

The New Testament by St. Paul says:[2] "The Gentiles . . . are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing them witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."

Conscience is universal, although its action differs widely according to its standard. Conscience is Universal.

Bishop Butler says:[3] "There is a conscience in every man which distinguishes between principles of heart as well as external actions, and *without being consulted* (the italics are ours), magisterially asserts itself and approves or condemns the man accordingly".

The Bible throughout declares that all have an inward power to discern moral truths.

"Even of your own selves judge ye not what is right." The "light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world" includes the conscience, though it may mean more.

There is a moral sense, a sense of duty, in all men. It is even to be seen in Tennyson's "Northern Farmer," who is represented as dead to any higher thoughts; for even he "stubb'd Tharnaby waiste".

[1] Prov. xx. 27. [2] St. Paul, Rom. ii. 14-15.

[3] Bishop Butler, *Sermon on Human Nature*, p. 403.

Nowhere is conscience or the moral sense denied ; its evidence is too strong in every human heart.

Darwin says : " Of all the differences between men and the lower animals the conscience is the most important ". Conscience is indeed essential to humanity. " There have been no beings," says Dr. Robertson,[1] " absolutely human and sane in whom conscience is totally inactive."

The three abstract Senses.

But conscience is not altogether an unique function, and we will proceed to compare and also to contrast it with other abstract senses of which we have spoken, and of which it forms one—such as the æsthetic and the logical senses ; indeed, the three may well be grouped together.

These three abstract senses are part of the natural equipment of every rational man. We have our ordinary senses—sight, hearing, etc.—by which we recognise physical phenomena ; and then, over and above these, differing from them *in toto*, and with no special organs for their use as far as physiology at present knows, we have these comparative or synthetic (hence συνείδησις for conscience), a comparing together of faculties which deal with the relations of things.

The *æsthetic* sense deals with the relations between physical sights and sounds, lines, colours, harmonies, etc. ; the *logical* sense with rational and intellectual relations ; the *moral* sense with relations between God and man, and man and his neighbour.

[1] Dr. Robertson, *Conscience*, p. 6.

The æsthetic sense is said to be the most physical; the conscience to be connected with the heart, as logic is with the head. The three are to a certain extent interdependent.

The æsthetic sense may not ignore moral and logical relations, otherwise its judgments and results are bad and mad.

The logical may not ignore the æsthetic or moral, or it becomes unattractive and unscrupulous. The moral faculty, if cut off from the other two, becomes repulsive and irrational (morbid conscience, etc.).

Right and wrong, to a certain extent, are terms that may be applied to all three, and each abstract sense has the power of letting us know when we offend against its standard and laws. Each faculty is imperative, and pronounces judgments without necessarily giving reasons for them. A bad argument is abhorrent to the logical faculty, a discord to the æsthetic, as an immoral act is to the moral sense. The pain felt is not necessarily in proportion to the actual wrong done. Many a one will tell a lie without pain who will suffer agonies in the æsthetic sense if a dress be ill cut, or in the moral sense if detected in some petty meanness, or in saying something out of place at the time. The pain felt, as we shall see, is in relation to the standard of perfection in the light of which the abstract sense acts.

Right and Wrong in Relation to them.

In each case we are conscious of a fact of *relation* (not a sensible or physical fact), which is as self-evident to the possessor of the faculty, and as clearly seen, as a visible percept. If we deny it we deny ourselves.

Our ordinary (special) senses are receptive, not creative or authoritative. The æsthetic, logical and moral senses are creative and authoritative; they say not only what the relations are, but what they ought to be; therefore we feel we are doing wrong if we use a bad argument, create discord in colours, sounds, etc., or practise immoral acts.

All these three abstract senses can be educated and trained as every other sense can; or they can be neglected, abused or degraded.

A fine school of painting raises the æsthetic sense and makes a great painter, as bad teaching degrades it. So with schools of morals. Conscience can be made more sensitive and delicate and true, or deadened and warped.

If conscience were in the fullest sense the direct voice of God, this were impossible; though the voice might be stifled, it could not then be made to speak falsely.

Inscrutable Origin of the three Senses.

These three senses are alike in another respect—in that their origin is at present entirely inscrutable. Why should one thing be beautiful to one and not to another? The æsthetic sense is the most arbitrary of the three; and while colour in flowers is of great value in the insect world and amongst birds, we can scarcely think that any but man truly possesses the æsthetic sense.

The logical sense that makes axioms, etc., possible is a reasoning faculty whose origin is equally inscrutable.

Conscience, the moral sense, with its still more authoritative voice and its power of inflicting tortures

that can neither be endured nor escaped, also defies scientific investigation. Many have affected to regard it as the result of natural development through animals of simple instincts, material morality following, and succeeded by mental morality; but we doubt if they themselves are satisfied with the attempt, which, like many similar ones, is ingenious rather than convincing. Conscience in its origin is as inscrutable as life. For both a Creator must be postulated. Spontaneous generation is as great and mischievous a fiction in morals as in biology.

The simplest, most scientific, and, we believe, the truest account of the three, and especially of the moral sense, is that they are given by God as special endowments of man as distinguished from the rest of creation. There can be little doubt that it is largely in the possession of these three abstract senses that man is made in the likeness of God. They are undoubtedly, speaking generally, the (subjective) light of men. "The life was the light of men."[1] That is to say, life common to all organic creation in man alone was of the nature of a light (of reason, of sense of beauty, of morality) by which he could see God.

So far we have compared conscience with two other allied abstract senses; we will now contrast it with them in some important points.

Difference between Conscience and the other abstract Senses.

There can be no doubt that it is through the moral sense within us that we are most truly brought into relation

[1] St. John i. 4.

with God. The æsthetic and logical senses generally raise no issues of spiritual importance; and though they help to form character, have little relation with it looked at morally, in the sense in which the word is generally used.

The æsthetic and logical senses do not go further than man and man's approval; the moral sense looks to God.

A conscientious man may be described as a moral artist; but his work is of direct value not only to man but God, and is not only for time but eternity. This relation with the Infinite (whereas the others are connected with the finite) explains at once the gulf that separates the moral from the other abstract senses. Morals, moreover, differ from art in that, while in the latter "the end justifies the means," in the former it does not.

We do not here claim for a moment for conscience that it is the voice of God. It is a gift of God, and it brings us into relationship with God. It is not merely a sense of good and evil, but it is a strong instinct to accept the good and refuse the evil. It possesses an authority beyond appeal in common with the logical and æsthetic faculties, all of which have their home and origin in the unconscious mind; but it goes beyond the other two in the penalties it inflicts upon the disobedient. Innumerable suicides testify to the unendurable agonies of remorse inflicted by an outraged conscience, which have no parallel in the action of the other senses.

"Two things," observes Kant, "fill our minds with

increasing wonder and reverence—the starry heavens above, and the moral law within."

Conscience thus possesses us far more than we possess it. It furnishes moral axioms on which arguments can be based amongst men. It pronounces judgments according to the standard before it, which are binding, however, only on the individual; so that in this sense each man is a law unto himself, as he acts according to his conscience; much evil always ensuing when he seeks to impose this law upon others. Conscience is first seen with the recognition of the *ego;* in short, with the rise of self-consciousness, for conscience is moral consciousness. The infant at first is guided by instinct; to this, as reason dawns, is added precept; and further on, when self-consciousness begins, the *ego* begins to sit in judgment on itself, and moral consciousness becomes active. Before a child says "I" it has not a distinct moral sense. Then with the "I" comes at once the "ought," for "I" and "ought" are Siamese twins that cannot be separated without the death of both. This power of an objective *ego* in sitting in judgment upon a subjective one is exclusively human.

Conscience is Moral Consciousness.

Whence comes this mysterious "I ought" which ennobles men and raises them from the brutes that perish —obedience to which determines the rise and fall of nations?

Surely we must agree that either directly or indirectly it is a crowning gift to humanity from the Great Creator.

As we have seen, the home and spring of all the abstract senses lie deep in the unconscious, though con-

science is ever exercised in the fullest consciousness. No consciousness is perhaps more vivid, that is not aroused by our physical senses, than the sense of right and wrong produced by conscience.

Conscience and Cognition, Emotion and Volition.

We will now see how far conscience is connected with the three parts of the mind: cognition or the intellect, emotion or the feelings, and volition or the will.

1. In cognition we get the intelligence of the moral action.

2. In emotion the feeling of its value.

3. In volition the will in carrying it out.

Now, the first part, the discerning or intelligence of good and evil, is the essence of the moral sense; and mark, this knowledge is wholly involuntary, and can no more be controlled by the will than the beating of the heart; as is the case with all faculties that spring from the unconscious mind.

The other abstract senses of æsthetics and logic are the same, but the special senses are not. We are not obliged to see or hear, but we cannot help admiration, reason, and knowing good and evil. With conscience also there is invariably a measure of the second part—emotion. We feel what is right and its value, and if obedient we feel at peace; if not, we feel remorse—from our conscience. Conscience includes not only knowing, but feeling of the most acute kind. But here it stops: the third part, willing or volition, is no part of conscience proper. We are forced to know, but not to do. If we were, *moral value would cease.* Nothing that we do in-

voluntarily, that is unconsciously or by force, can have real moral value attaching to it. That is why true moral action must ever be conducted in consciousness. Willing or carrying out the decrees of the moral sense is the action of the *ego*, and is determined not by conscience but character.

With regard to the first two, greatest stress in conscience is laid on cognition by Socrates, Spinoza, Fichte and Hegel, and on emotion by Schiller, Herbart and J. Edwards. Conscientious people make most of emotion, unconscientious people of cognition.

Conscience is not the Voice of God.

Conscience is, as we have seen, a natural endowment as inscrutable in its origin as our other abstract senses, but differing from them inasmuch as being a discerner of moral questions it brings us into direct relation with the spiritual world, with God Himself (though it cannot be said to be in itself His voice) and with eternal issues. Moreover—and it is this that is most germane to our subject—it exercises by far the most powerful influence on the formation and ennobling of character.

Conscience may be Educated.

It is, as we have said, natural; but it may be, and is in nearly every man, more or less educated. This education may be natural, or partly or wholly artificial. The former simply strengthens and develops its powers on its original lines, the latter distorts its faculties often to the extent of calling wrong right and right wrong. We will consider (1) the natural conscience, (2) the naturally educated conscience and (3) the artificial conscience as explained above.

1. Conspicuous in the natural conscience is the fact

that its verdicts are based upon love and justice, and never upon either alone. Be humane, it says, but be consistent. It condemns caprice, and it condemns selfishness. The moral ideal is to be humane and reasonable at once. Now this is most remarkable, because it has been already noticed that the most constant moral qualities seen in the infant are love and a sense of justice. God is love and its Source; God is light, and the Source of all righteousness and justice. And the little child reproduces in its unconscious mind these two great principles, from which all good comes—the fulfilling of the whole law. And it is on these two Divine principles that the natural conscience is founded.

Conscience differs according to its Standards.

The natural conscience is perfect in action, but when educated the value of its verdicts depends on the perfection of its standards. Moreover, in our complex affairs almost every moral judgment is between a better and a worse, and there are all gradations, both in character and in ethics, till we reach Divine perfection. Truth for instance, as we have seen, is more often relative than absolute. John Stuart Mill holds that only in England is truthfulness a part of the average man's moral ideal.

The power of the natural conscience is immense. It is often thought that the remorse it produces is the result of education. It is not always so.

Conscience in Childhood.

Mrs. F. Hodgson Burnett[1] in her autobiography tells us of the awful effect of conscience (in very early years and under no special training) when she bought a

[1] F. H. Burnett, *The One I Knew Best of All.*

gingerbread for a halfpenny *on credit*, unknown to her mother. She spent agonies and sleepless nights in consequence, and yet her mother was most kind, gentle and easy-going, and she knew she would not be punished.

The natural conscience at different ages varies immensely; being generally most acute before puberty, and gradually deadening in old age. That of children as we have just seen, is very strong in its sense of sin, and is also severe in its penalties. This has been proved by Professor Earl Barnes from the result of questions put to some 20,000 school children in England and America. One question was: "If a mother gave her child some paints and then left the room, and the little child painted all the chairs blue, what should the mother do to her when she returned?" The answers given showed that the younger the school children, the heavier the penalties they wished inflicted. In the lowest standards nothing less than corporal punishment satisfies the offended conscience. As the children rose in the school so was the penalty modified, until in the highest standard punishment disappeared, and the answer to the question was merely that the child should be remonstrated with, and shown its error.

The extreme severity of the younger children's sentence may be partly due to the innate cruelty in childhood, as well as to an exaggerated idea of the young artist's sin.

Conscience in Men and Women.

There is a difference in the sexes as to conscience. Its range is greater in the woman than the man, though more easily disregarded. Men are, in a sense, more

conscientious, that is, though their conscience does not speak so often, they heed it more when it does speak. We have said that the standard by which it speaks is not the same in both sexes; for while the rightness of the end is more prominent before a woman than the justice of the means, in the man there is more particularity about the means than about the end. To attain a truly desirable and legitimate end a woman may use means that might at times offend the conscience of a man; but, on the other hand, a man is often less pure in his aims and more selfish, and yet at the same time more scrupulous about the means used, which must not offend his conscience. We would not state this too dogmatically, for indeed the whole issue may be contested by many. Most will, however, agree on the two main points—that the standard in conscience in the sexes is not exactly alike, being higher for women than men, and that women are less scrupulous in obeying its voice than men.

The moral faculty is naturally stable, but of course varies with its standards when educated. Hence it varies in action greatly in individuals, the collective average being much more trustworthy, showing the common natural moral basis that exists.

Education of Conscience may be good or evil.

2 and 3. Turning to the education of conscience, this is surely both racial and individual. Moral ideas, as we know them to-day in common speech, are the product of a long course of development; though the natural foundations are never lost sight of.

Not only the right and natural education of conscience is racial, but also the artificial and false as well.

We believe that history as clearly shows that cruel perversions of the moral sense have been transmitted for generations, as that in Christendom conscience has continuously developed in sensitiveness and its standards of right and wrong. The artificial conscience is indeed a baneful product. By the term we do not of course mean that a conscience is artificially produced, but that the moral sense is so perverted by wrong training as to be made to respond to false standards. These generally pose as true, often as Divine, and the difficulty of distinguishing the counterfeit from the real is a great source of distress to conscientious people, and a great cause of evil in the world.

Artificial and natural Consciences.

The artificial conscience is obviously never natural; but it may, as we have said, be passed on from parent to child, though of course it is almost impossible to distinguish such cases from very early unconscious impressions. Nevertheless, as other mental acquirements are undoubtedly handed on, an artificial conscience may be among the number.

Both the artificial and natural education of consciences may be conducted consciously or (mainly) unconsciously, and both may be carried on together; in which case it is most difficult to decide what is natural and what artificial in the moral sense, what is Divine and what human.

Rarity of a purely natural Conscience.

As a matter of fact a purely natural conscience, or even an acquired one wholly on natural lines, is so rare a product as almost to be unknown, at any rate in anything approaching civilised life. The tendency to

form an artificial conscience, or to adulterate the pure conscience with artificial elements, is overwhelming: the one runs imperceptibly into the other.

Observe, for instance, the seriousness and gravity that is the natural standard of moral behaviour in the presence of solemn or Divine things. To this is rapidly added by the Puritan the immorality of gladness or pleasure as such; so that the simplest and most innocent amusements produce an uneasy conscience, simply because its standard has become artificial.

Evils of an artificial Conscience.

The conscience of a child is most easily affected; indeed a child seems to crave for artificial standards. These may be supplied by mere suggestion or by artificial parental rules (necessary perhaps) or by the customs and practices of the nursery. Suffice it to say that the moral sense is so vigorous in the child that it almost seems to crave occasions to exercise its activity. One of the most important points to observe in the education of children is to avoid setting up or suggesting artificial standards of right and wrong. An artificial conscience thus created in a child and obeyed for a few years may be a great bar to its happiness in after life; for, curiously enough, the moral sense is so imperative that it keenly resents being slighted, and the consequences are almost as morally disastrous, though of course the sin is not the same, when the standard is artificial as when it is natural.

The social artificial standards by which consciences are ruled are themselves the sum of the individual standards that are found in society; and they are ever

changing. A person may do a thing with a good conscience one year, and with a bad one the next.

For instance, in this closing year of the nineteenth century pleasure generally is considered less sinful than formerly, while excess at table decidedly more so.

In the East a woman has a bad conscience who shows her face, in the West if she shows her limbs.

With regard to conscience there is in weak natures a great love of submitting it to the moral standards of others. It is so much easier to adopt a ready-made standard than to make one or discern one for oneself.

In a general way, of course, the standards of the social circles in which we move must be accepted and conformed to, and no one is justified, unless these flagrantly contravene the natural laws of morality, in setting up a counter standard of his own. But we are speaking of cases where one individual leans on another; and perhaps still more of those cases where a person seeks, not only to live by another's standard, but by another's moral sense. If another thinks any particular course wrong his weak nature proceeds to direct his conduct accordingly, though he himself does not see the wrong. This can only be described as parasitic morality, and is the death-blow to an independent healthy moral life. These moral parasites abound, and nowhere more than in the religious world; singular to say people are by no means content to walk by the light God and His word may have afforded them, but are eternally supplementing these, to their own moral degradation, with the light vouchsafed to others, and by the codes (largely artificial)

Parasitic Morality.

of those whom they think more holy than themselves. It is worthy of notice in this connection that in St. Matthew xxiii. 8-10 there is a special warning against this tendency (pointing not obscurely to the Roman confessional). "Call no man your spiritual director" (*καθηγητής*).

No doubt others may have standards in advance of one's own; but one's progress, however, does not consist in adopting theirs; but in looking at the grounds upon which it rests, and, if one be convinced of their superiority, adopting the new standard, not in the least because it is followed by others, but because one's moral sense approves its excellence, and it thus becomes one's own.

False religious Standards.

False religious standards make the most dangerous artificial consciences, and history shows the base part they have played from St. Paul to the present day. The "good conscience" of which he speaks was a good artificial one; for nothing but the traditions of the scribes and Pharisees justified him in hauling men and women to prison who followed Christ.

Above all we must seek never to impose our own standards of morals upon others. We can appeal to theirs, and try and find them out, but to impose ours on them is to take away their moral freedom.

"To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin." But if he does not know it? My moral sense must be limited by my standard, and if I act by other people's moral sense, no moral value attaches to my act.

States of Conscience

Conscience, of course, like the other abstract senses, is found in every variety of condition. It may be bad or good, dead, callous, sluggish, hardened, seared, dormant, morbid, active, sensitive, hypersensitive, uneasy, accusing, excusing, condemning, blunted, peaceful, pacified, purified, defiled, approving, upbraiding, remorseful, and so on.

A conscience at *rest* is when it is not in exercise on any question, but is in a condition instantly to respond; a *dormant* conscience is one not only at rest, but asleep, and needs rousing; a *sluggish* conscience is one which, when roused, acts slowly; a *blunted* conscience has had its edge taken off by familiarity with allowed evil; a *hardened* conscience was once sensitive, but has become unresponsive owing to constant neglect of its suggestions; a *callous* conscience is a confirmed case of hardening; a *seared* conscience is one where the hardening is due to some striking and fearful neglect of some solemn warning; a *dead* conscience is one that is no longer responsive to any call.

A *peaceful* conscience is one that finds no occasion to disapprove of actions void of offence before God and man; an *uneasy* conscience is one that is not decided on the moral right or wrong of an action; an *active* conscience explains itself, as do the *accusing*, *excusing*, *condemning* and *approving* consciences.

A *sensitive* conscience is one in a bright light, to which it instantly responds; a *hypersensitive* is an exaggerated form of this; a *morbid* conscience is one where this has become a confirmed condition; a *pacified* con-

science is one when the will has given in to its mandates; an *upbraiding* conscience is where such is not the case; a *remorseful* conscience is one that gives its owner no rest in its persistent upbraidings; a *defiled* conscience is one which has been compelled to compromise with sin; a *purified* conscience is where the return to a right condition has been effected; a *bad* conscience is one under the active sense of the transgression of moral law; a *good* conscience may be the passive or active sense of obedience to the law which forms its standard.

A morbid conscience is terrible, and is common in overstrained nervous temperaments, in those religions where introspection is excessive, and in the very early stages of religious and other mania. I have seen a patient walk up to my house, and stop and stoop down in the carriage drive; and on my asking him the reason, he explained he had kicked one of the pebbles out of its place, which he had no right to do, and could not go on till he had restored it to its position.

Evils of a bad Conscience.

The most painful condition is a remorseful conscience, and often surpasses any physical agony. It tortures like the rack; and has driven hundreds to suicide, and thousands to repentance, reform and restitution.

The most hopeless condition is the deadened or dead conscience.

The accelerating rate with which moral light not obeyed may recede, the moral sense become deadened, and sin cease to be sinful is positively startling. This rapid darkening and eclipse of the moral sun produces a deeper awe than the blackness of the sin itself.

When a man has extinguished the moral sense he has silenced the voice of God within him.

"No worse idea of evil spirits," says Dr. Martineau, "can be formed than this, that they relentlessly exercise the resources of an intellectual nature for their own ends, without any hindrance from moral distinctions, or owning any law but that of self-will."

Conscience not in itself a Guide.

In saying all this we must preserve the balance of truth by pointing out that though conscience, in a sense, is our guide, the value of its guidance depends entirely on the standard we set up before it, in addition to that to which it naturally responds.

Conscience guides me, but what guides conscience? is now our inquiry; and it will be seen when we reach the heart of the question, that inasmuch as the *ego* is not a system or a principle but a personality, so that which should rule it must not be abstractions or systems, but a personality—God.

Spiritual laws for social welfare are everywhere felt and recognized, though no one makes them. Related minds, classes of people, fellow-countrymen, children, members of similar professions, all have thus common grounds by these laws.

The standard for conscience is, however, either made by God, by man (society), by oneself, or is inherent, which to us is equivalent to the first alternative. To disobey the first or last standards is sin, to disobey the others not necessarily so.

Artificial moral Standards.

Each one creates for himself a permanent individual moral ideal which also acts as a standard. It is the

image of the sort of man we think we ought to be. If we live up to it the conscience is at rest; if not, we are uneasy. Artificial standards are created by the man himself, by public life, school and university life, business and professional life, by the services, by clubs, by churches, by society cliques, by newspapers. The ideal or standard of professional morality or business morality notoriously differs from private morality, so that people are said with much truth to have two distinctive consciences, one for home use, and another for the daily work or office. That is to say the moral faculty is called to respond to two distinct standards at different hours of the day in the same person. It is, of course, a truism to say there can be but one right standard.

It is more important to observe that both standards are probably more or less artificial, but that the business one is almost certain to be the more corrupted.

Low Standards of Morality in Business.

This corruption is not without its defenders as being necessary in the present day to the accumulation of wealth. We have, indeed, men who have nobly stood out against this pernicious doctrine, men of weight and practical experience, and who have endeavoured in the main to carry on their businesses on good moral principles current in ordinary life. But the very nobility and interest that attaches to such men is in itself, alas! evidence of their rarity; and we greatly fear the larger number accept the double standard as a necessary evil —and use it.

On the other hand, in some professions the moral ideal is excessively high, calling one to lay down one's

very life for one's duty ; and it is probably this element, that can be discerned more or less in the services and in the medical profession, that has always surrounded them with a special distinction.

A deliberate lowering of the standard of conscience is a moral catastrophe, and the prelude to the downfall of the soul, not the less so because the standard is lowered for the love of money. The danger is that a man "may forget or deny the existence of immaterial ends at all, not from the temptation to plunge into licence, but from absorption in that 'virtuous materialism' which is even more deadly".[1]

Serious Danger of this.

The present condition of the commercial standard of morality is a most serious question for this country ; for business is gradually predominating over all other human activities. Wars themselves are now largely waged on commercial grounds, and commerce is more powerful than rank, or art, or science.

The standard by which the pursuit of money is conducted, as this pursuit gets more and more the absorbing passion of mankind, will naturally become more and more universal, and all will agree that there could not be a greater downfall for humanity than the universal lowering of the common moral standard of life to the commercial level.

Its Cause and Cure.

We naturally ask, therefore, "why should not the standard in buying and selling be as high as in other professions, and as great pride be taken in maintaining

[1] M'Cunn, *The Making of Character*, p. 109.

its morality and honour as in fighting, or ruling, or healing?" The real difficulty appears to lie not so much in competition, for that rages fiercely in the professions where the standards are much loftier, as in the wholly selfish nature of the pursuits. In other professions there is even an element of unselfishness, but the pursuit of money seems to foster the lower and stifle the higher instincts. It is the "love of money," not money *per se*, that is the "root of all evil".

In spite of this we are not without hope that the standard will be gradually raised, and nothing could conduce more to the welfare of our country and to our true prosperity than this. I do not say England may not compare favourably with many other nations: but that is not the question. "It is precisely," says M'Cunn, "in the sphere of . . . commerce that ideals are most needed to uplift the practice of the world; and unless those who lead these find time besides commercial ambitions for moral ideals, the life of citizenship will remain the imperfect school of virtue we have seen it to be."[1]

The improvement cannot be forced. It must take place by the increased pressure of public opinion, and of the diffusion and power of Christian principles.

If business morality were once raised to the level of true Christian morality, most of our great labour problems would be solved, as well as many others which are solely due to this perversion of the moral sense.

[1] M'Cunn, *The Making of Character*, p. 125.

Returning to the analysis of conscience, all our senses whether common, special, or abstract, have their appropriate sensations. In common sensations we thus get pain and pleasure: in the special senses we get sight or blindness, hearing or deafness: in the mental sensations, taking the negatives—vanity may be mortified, love chilled, pride humbled, hope disappointed, modesty shamed. In the same way the conscience may prick or approve or condemn us. Senses and Sensations.

This preliminary "prick" is the voice of conscience rousing us; and the approval or condemnation is the voice or sensation of conscience pronouncing on the action that caused it to "prick".

The conscience, if dormant, is first awakened by some word, or thought, or deed, and then it speaks. If not dormant, it speaks without delay.

Conscience has from its moral sense—perception and judgment: from its sense of duty—obligation or precept. The three Voices.

When the social standard is the only one that speaks, and the divine and personal standards are silent, conscience sometimes does not speak till aroused by the voice or opinion of others. Thus many are not disturbed in conscience till they are found out; while the most shameless, being dead altogether, not even then.

Of the three voices, the voice of God is the most important to the moral being, then the voice of the *ego* or self, and lastly the voice of others.

It is sometimes easier to satisfy the social standard than the other two; it is generally, however, easier to satisfy the personal than the social standard.

God speaks through Conscience.

It should again be repeated here emphatically that in no sense is conscience in itself the voice of God. As well may a piano be said to be the voice of Paderewski. It is the instrument through which he can express himself; but if played upon by a school girl, it responds with equal facility to her crudities as to the fine touch of the master. "Conscience is that faculty which may be brought into contact with the will of God" (Canon Gore). It is that sense through which God can and does directly speak to the soul of man, through which His will can be impressed on the heart. Conscience alone convicts of sin, and reveals its power, its stain, its guilt. Naturally, it is endowed with the power of distinguishing broadly between right and wrong; but artificially, it may be perverted to any extent.

When it speaks it is inexorable: no external considerations can change its decrees. It may be obeyed or disobeyed, but cannot be cajoled; and the penalties it exacts for disobedience are frequently truly awful.

The Pricking of Conscience.

The amount of pain we suffer from conscience is due to two factors: the intensity of the light brought to bear upon it, and the earnestness of our will in a right direction.

The first case we find illustrated is those sinners who have no feeling or care whatever until a bright light is brought to bear upon the conscience. It is then alone—not when the deed is done, but when they are convicted of it—that they are "pricked in their hearts". The second is found in an opposite class of earnest moral and earnest religious people with high ideals, who suffer their pain from falling short of their aim.

In fact and in brief, the pain produced by conscience in the hardened and careless is due to external causes—the intensity of the light—while the pain experienced by the earnest is due to internal causes—falling short of their ideal.

Now the pain felt, as we have previously shown, bears no proportion to the amount of error or sin. A man in the service may commit various breaches of the decalogue and be not nearly so much upset as if he find out he has broken one of the Queen's regulations or the unwritten laws of the mess.

Pain is in Proportion to the Value set on the Ideal.

The pain is most felt in connection with that life and standard for which the man or woman lives. If this be that of the social world, that is the tender spot; if it be his profession, it is there he suffers; if it be his country, to be a traitor is the deadliest sin; if the life be Christian, and the standard the will of God, it may be sin unknown to any but God that may cause the deepest pain.

Conscience acts according to general laws, but only in particular instances; it does not lay down principles, though they move it.

The Neutral Zone.

Besides right and wrong in action, there is a large neutral zone where these questions do not enter. No doubt theoretically everything must be relatively right or wrong, but practically it is not so. We do not praise our butler for not carrying off our spoons, and our conscience does not condemn us if we happen to walk on the wrong side of the pavement.

Power of the Moral Sense.

Conscience does not speak of what was, or is, or will

be, but what *ought* to be. There is no real logical basis to the "ought," or why "ought" is "ought," any more than there is for the idea of beauty. It is an inherent sense, but its power on individuals and even nations is amazing. It is the moral sense that really controls New York and London; not the police or the laws. For this "ought" men have been burnt and racked and torn asunder, and in all ages have "suffered for conscience' sake"; and even in the vilest of men its voice is heard. Conscience shows the right way, but gives no power to follow it; the more sensitive the conscience the more need is there to have power to follow its leadings; and this can only be found in a character of high Christian principle. To be "strengthened with all might by His Spirit in the inner man" (*i.e.*, unconscious mind) is really the formation of this character.

The action of conscience, even when normal, may be slow in slow temperaments; but as a rule it is so quick as to seem instantaneous, simply because it is not the result of conscious reason, which always requires time, but of intuitive perception that wants none.

The conscience goes behind the deed itself, and sits in judgment on the motives that prompted the acts, and often drags these to light, to the dismay of its owner.

Conscience must be Obeyed.

In conclusion we will give one or two maxims before we finally consider the effects of conscience on character.

We should always seek that the conscience should be enlightened and its standards raised, but we should never sin against it, even when the standard is artificial: that is, we should never do what we believe to be wrong. It

may not be wrong, but we may feel it is. On the other hand, a course of action may *be* wrong and we may not know it, and look back on our past conduct with added light. We may not approve the act, but we feel no remorse, because we recognise that at the time our motive and acts were in accordance to the standard we then had.

Two more maxims: "Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth".

"To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to *him* it is sin."

The effects that flow from a good conscience are summed up in the *mens sibi conscia recti*, which is a high and sufficient reward. "Given a sound (moral) judgment," says Aristotle, "and all the virtues will flow in its train."[1]

Peace flows the moment the path of duty is discovered and followed amidst conflicting alternatives.

Principles on which Conscience Acts.

The principles on which conscience acts are the principles of character, and may be grouped as follows:—

Self-sacrifice, *Self-reverence*.—These two neutralise *individual* selfishness, and are the complements of each other.

Righteousness, *Love*.—These two neutralise *social* selfishness, and are the complements of each other, and express the Divine character.

From all that has been said on conscience it needs but few words to show how largely in all moral worth

[1] Aristotle, *Ethics*, vi., cxiii., p. 6.

character depends upon the right education of and obedience to this marvellous sense.

We can see also by comparison with the other abstract senses the bearing on conscience or character.

A painter paints under the guidance of his æsthetic sense—as arbitrary in its way as conscience. The æsthetic sense itself is educated in schools of art, which provide standards, and the result is twofold. Works are produced (acts), and a style or character is formed which stamps the artist, and becomes a part of himself.

So with the moral sense. Obeyed, good acts follow, and, sinking into the unconscious mind, the character itself is ennobled with each such act. Disobeyed, evil results, the character deteriorates, and the man himself is defiled. On the other hand, the practical value of a conscience depends upon the character, just as the character depends on the conscience.

Conscience and Character.

The best conscience in the world soon becomes valueless and silent and useless unless there be a will proceeding from a formed character to carry out its decrees.

It is this that is the main difficulty, and herein consists the power of a virtuous character formed in early life, and herein is seen the enormous value of the inward energy of God's Spirit in fortifying our will in a right direction.

Character seems to be the bank in the unconscious mind on which conscience draws. If the deposit be small in the bank of character it soon becomes exhausted, and the cheques of conscience are dishonoured.

The right use of each of our senses has its good

effect on character; but the right use of the moral sense far transcends all the others put together.

Conscience, we see, does not make a man virtuous unless he follow it. Peace of heart or conscience, moreover, never is attained by making it an object, but by obeying its voice. "A good man," says the "wise man," "shall be satisfied in himself."[1]

The records of conscience too are lasting, whether for or against us. Every good act builds up and strengthens the character by the approving verdict of conscience; and every idle word weakens it by its condemnation.

The end and sanction indeed of conscience is the perfecting of self and others in the order of a perfect life.

"They who will do His will shall know of the doctrine." The moral order is not made, but gradually revealed and discovered. The horizon of duty recedes as we advance, and ever leads us onwards and upwards.

Obeying Conscience may involve much Suffering.

The effects of acting conscientiously may, however, involve much sacrifice. The conduct of many affairs may have to be altered, and perhaps some callings abandoned altogether; though we believe where the conscience is healthy and not morbid this will be rare.

I know one case where the senior partner in a large business of a special nature had to resign between ten to twenty thousand pounds a year for conscience' sake. Protestants have often had to give up all they possessed to keep a good conscience. Self-interest (apparent) and the moral law are often in opposition, and it is the right

[1] Prov. xiv. 14.

choice between the two that makes the man. The honest man must have motives and acts that will stand self-examination. Intellectual honesty demands self-criticism. The honest man will forego pleasure, will suffer pain and loss for truth and consistency. On the other hand, a man is considered mean and contemptible who, having done wrong, seeks to justify himself; the reason being that the consciences of his critics condemn him, and they know that his own conscience has done the same, or ought to have, according to a common standard; and that he must be self-condemned therefore all the time, and his effort at justification neither true nor honest.

Conscience shuts us up to one life if we would know inward peace, and that life is obedience to its voice; and if it be a conscience whose standard is the highest and Divine, its voice will then be the voice of God within; and the life will be eternal, and the peace enjoyed, that of God "which passes all understanding".

CHAPTER XIII.

CHARACTER AND CHRISTIANITY.

WE now turn to a consideration of supreme importance at the present time, and that is the connection of character with Christianity.

Christianity and Modern Views.

We have indicated already in various places that very many views are held on this relation. The chapter on ethics alone shows this, for instead of closing as it should have done with Christian ethics it has been necessary to supplement these by a further system which we have called "modern ethics".

That these do exist should be frankly acknowledged, for nothing whatever is to be gained by adopting the ostrich policy of burying one's head in the sand and denying the obvious.

The time has undoubtedly come for it to be clearly understood that there are now many sober, thoughtful and honest men who earnestly believe and teach that they know and follow a more excellent way than Christianity, That they look on this religion as merely a bygone episode in the world's history, an act in the great drama of mankind, of which the interest to us now is chiefly historical. Consistently and candidly they declare

there is no *via media*, and that to all who would be abreast of the times the Bible, while still regarded as a valuable English classic (in Greek it is not a classic) containing more or less incomplete moral codes, can no longer be the light of their path. Their philosophy varies much in detail, but generally agrees in a more or less cultured Hedonism, based on a self-caused evolution; their scheme is the advancement and improvement of mankind, so as to secure the maximum of pleasure for themselves and others in this world; any future world and any present Divine power or control being not actually denied, but dismissed as a negligible factor in the grand scheme.

The horizon of this modern thought is hard and well defined, and is bounded by the material, and thus commends itself to (very) common sense and to the "practical man," who is tired of hearing the "passon abummin' o'er his ye'ad".

Is the old better?

While fully recognising the popularity, engaging simplicity, and practical character of schemes of life based on some such foundation, we take a different and more old-fashioned standpoint, and we believe that to exclude Divinity is not only to leave the greatest problem of our being unexplained but inexplicable, and cannot therefore regard any scheme that practically excludes it as scientific. It seems to us painfully apparent that what modern thought gains in breadth is due to loss in depth; that it is clear because shallow, and definite because limited.

Moreover, if it be true, as we believe, that every

man carries a witness to the Divine within himself, we think it doubtful if any one of our modern apostles is really finally and exhaustively satisfied with his own creed. We therefore take our stand upon Christianity in its revelation of a personal God and Saviour, of a future life, and of moral responsibility, and upon its view that the glory of God rather than the mere pleasure of man is the highest object in life, and the most powerful force in the formation of character.

There is also an extensive class which has found a *modus vivendi* between the views just advanced and the modern speculations (which are really ancient revivals) previously mentioned. There is a Middle Cours

These, eliminating from Christianity all they consider objectionable, and borrowing chiefly from its ethics without encumbering themselves with its distinctive doctrines, unite what they select with modern speculations and humanistic ends, and then bid for support from both sides. One might, however, almost as well have Buddhism pure and simple as this emasculated Christianity, and one turns with relief from such incongruities to the noble and lofty pre-Christian ethics of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, which represented the highest flights of human moral thought before the revelation of Christianity. Now, however, when what professes to be "the true light" is shining, and what claims to be a Divine revelation is in our midst, it seems to us to demand either honest acceptance or equally honest rejection. For either of these one instinctively feels a respect which it is difficult to yield

to the middle class, who would select the rays they fancy out of the white effulgence, and reject the rest, while they still appropriate for themselves and their followers the name of the religion most of whose essential doctrines they deny.

Many of our acutest thinkers see clearly that morality and religion, or the worship of the Divine, are distinct; and it is fatal to limit Christianity to ethics.[1] Let it be clearly understood and never denied, therefore, that, while we cannot have true religion without morality, and that the truest religion finds its exposition in the highest morality, we can and do have morality (as generally understood) without religion. The greater includes the less, though the less cannot include the greater.

Is Christianity to be the Standard of Character?

There can be no doubt that no choice on earth is so important as whether or no we are to accept Christianity as the standard and goal of character. So imperious are its claims, and so absolute the distinction between accepting and rejecting, that endless remorse must one day fill the soul of the one who now rejects the higher for the lower—Christianity for modern ethics. "We have to choose," says Ruskin, in his impassioned language, "between a Love that cannot end, and a worm that cannot die."

[1] Christianity has of course two parts—the means and the end of true life—the means being the implanting of new power and spiritual force in the soul of man and his moral reconciliation to God by the one atonement; the end being the worship and glory of God, not by sacrifices and ritual, but by the practice of the highest Christian morality and self-sacrifice. These moral sacrifices of the New Testament distinctly take the place of the ritualistic sacrifices of the Old; and it is thus that ethics and Christianity coalesce in "ends," if not in "means".

If Christianity be lost, there is nothing left to form character comparable to faith, love and hope. Moreover, duty itself divorced from the real and eternal soon loses its character and becomes degraded to mere expediency. Surely much that has passed recently in a neighbouring country is a melancholy illustration of this.[1] Dr. C. H. Pearson observes,[2] speaking of those who have lost all Christian ideals or hope of immortality as incentives to a higher life: "Our morality will become emasculate tenderness, our mental discipline the day-book and invoice, our intellectual pleasure the French novel; and yet there seems no reason why such men should not increase and multiply; and thus the savour of vacant lives will go up to God from every home."

It is a great thing in these matters to make a good and irrevocable beginning, hence the value of a "sound conversion" when crossing this Rubicon. Carlyle's everlasting "yea" must be pronounced with emphasis in favour of the Divine and the Eternal, if we would escape the eternal night of an everlasting "no". Yes, for it is best.

Let a man, therefore, own and fulfil his relations, human and divine, with a willing heart, and he will develop his character on the highest lines.

"It is well," says Maeterlink,[3] "men should be reminded that the very humblest of them has the power to fashion after a Divine model . . . a great moral personality, composed in equal parts of himself and the ideal."

[1] Dreyfus Case.

[2] Dr. C. H. Pearson, *Natural Life and Character*, p. 357.

[3] Maeterlink, *The Treasure of the Humble*, p. 190.

With a Christian ideal we get a stricter sense of justice, a more complete realisation of duty, more delicacy of feeling, greater refinement of manner, more kindliness and quicker sympathies; in short, although Christianity is more than mere morality, no morality is so lofty as that formed on a Christian ideal.

At the same time, it is easy to criticise many noble characters, for the greater the polish on a stone the more are the flaws, as well as the perfections, revealed. The finer the character the more difficult is the advance, and the more frequent the shortcomings. The Christian ideal of perfection is indeed nothing less than perfect obedience to God and perfect communion with Him and one another in His light.

We talk of obedience, but such a service is perfect freedom. It is the "truth" alone that can make us free, not "freethought"—and not only free, but happy—and not only happy, but beautiful.

"When a man," says Emerson, "lives with God, his voice (character) shall be as sweet as the murmur of the brook and the rustle of the corn. He will weave no longer a spotted life of shreds and patches, but he will live with a Divine unity. He will cease from what is base and frivolous in his life, and be content with all places and with any service he can reach. He will calmly front the morrow in the negligency of that trust which carries God with it, and so has the whole future in the bottom of the heart."

Not that, if we are to accept the Bible teaching, we ever see the full development of Christian character here.

The soul is a seed, and though it may leaf and bud and blossom now, we do not see the full fruition in time, for "it doth not yet appear what we shall be".

Christianity lies in the unconscious.

This Christian principle, this inward energy of the Divine Spirit, lies deep in unconsciousness. By virtue of the unconscious mind our conscious will is often overpowered, and our true inner selves speak. That which we *are* is what we really teach, not what we say. True progress is seen in a man's tone, rather than heard in his words. If he has not found his home in God, his speech, his opinions, his acts all unconsciously confess it. If he has found a creature's only true centre, the Creator shines through him. The tone of the *seeker* is one; that of the *possessor* is another, and the latter should be the humbler of the two. The centre round which a life revolves cannot be hid.

One may perhaps be allowed to quote here a few words of Dr. Creighton's, when the Bishop was addressing the Christian endeavourers at Alexandra Palace this year (1900). He says: "More important than what they said was the way they said it. The spirit that radiated from them was the most important part of their influence in the world. . . . The world could do without their ability and zeal, but not without their reflection of Christ's temper. It was by their temper in the small things of life, by their grace, humility, and self-sacrifice, that they would turn the hearts of others to a power the world did not contain."

One evolves, perhaps, at first the unusual attractiveness of the personal character with which one feels a

special sympathy; until at length one sees the attraction is due to the common factor of a greater presence—God.

The Difference between a Christian and a natural Character.

The essential difference between Christian and the highest character evolved on purely natural lines lies perhaps most largely in the change of centre round which the deposit of character, so to speak, is made. The highest type of the purely natural pre-Christian character is the Stoic; and the centre of the Stoic character is the individual *ego*—self. He is Nature's nobleman governed by a natural *noblesse oblige*. The fundamental law upon which his character is built up is the fundamental animal law of *self-preservation*. It is the product of the most enlightened self-interest. On the other hand, the Christian character is built up under the law of love (St. John xiii. 34), *not self-interest but charity* forms the nucleus and centre. The true Christian does not even try to make himself a noble man; but, leaving himself to God, he tries to help and ennoble others. The true Christian's eyes are so fixed on Christ that he is free from all self-regarding. He "follows the Lamb" and he finds the Master not in Jerusalem with the Pharisees, but in Galilee going about doing good among the publicans and sinners.

True Christianity is undoubtedly a homologous, as distinguished from a heterologous idea; of the difference we have spoken in Chapter VII., p. 99. It is clear that there *is* that within that can and does respond to the Presence and law of God without. If the material world is in three dimensions our spirit is in a fourth, to use the

language of transcendental geometry ;[1] and thus one side of it is ever "naked and open to Him with whom we have to do".

If we will let our thoughts flow, and the stream run on, we may often learn much—for God is behind the soul. "God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man perceiveth it not . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their instructions."[2]

"Amid the mysteries," says Herbert Spencer, "which becometh more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will soon ever remain the one absolute certainty that man is ever in the presence of an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed."

The Response from Within.

An animal, not having a human mind, can only look on blankly at the abstract thinker, the attitude of prayer, or the face of remorse, though quickly responsive to sensations common to its nature ; and ours shows that we, in understanding Divine attributes and qualities, must have that within us that enables us to comprehend them.

We are wiser than we know, and if we will not stifle our inspirations, they will surely lead us on to further light, though we may not at the time be in the least conscious of the end towards which we shall nevertheless progress if humble enough.

. . . Looking within and around me, I ever renew,
With that stoop of the soul, which in bending, upraises it too,
The submission of man's nothing-perfect, to God's all-complete,
As by each new obeisance of spirit, I climb to His feet.—*Browning.*

[1] A. T. Schofield, *The Fourth Dimension.* (Swan Sonnenschein.)

[2] Job xxxiii. 14, 16.

The hidden and unconscious depths of the soul once recognised explain much. It has long been felt that the doctrines of Christianity, of the implanting of a new nature, of the in-dwelling of the Holy Spirit, just as much as the source of a conscience, are not directly realised within the sphere of consciousness.

In religious services for the "deepening of the spiritual life" it is to be noted how prominent a place is given to the "cessation of effort," to the "casting out of self," to "lying passive" and "yielding up our powers," etc. A well-known Christian teacher, the Rev. Dr. Andrew Murray, writes: "Deeper down than where the soul with its consciousness can enter, there is spirit matter linking man with God; and deeper down than the mind and feelings or will—in the unseen depths of the hidden life—there dwells the Spirit of God."

Necessity of the New Birth.

We have referred to the "new birth," which is hardly better understood by our philosophers now than it was by Nicodemus of old.

Plato in his *Republic* in describing the art of dyeing the true Tyrian purple says: "The wool must be purely white first, otherwise this profound colour soon washes out." So, if the heart is as white as wool, the character truly dyed will never change. But is the heart as white as wool? The Bible only echoes the voice of all experience when it answers "no".

What then is the "new birth"? Is it not, under the power of the Holy Spirit, the impartation of a pure and holy principle to guide the will and life in accordance with the will and word of God; and is it not evident

that any "dyeing" that is attempted before this principle is imparted will "wash out"?

Since this is in no sense a theological treatise, we will not enter here on the question when this "inward grace" is imparted.

Its sphere is the unconscious mind. At the first birth a child has no conscious mind as far as we know, or it would be conscious of its birth; and when a fresh principle is introduced as the commencement of a higher life the influx of the new spirit is unsearchable, and the only proof of its existence lies in its fruits in consciousness.

Character is not suddenly changed.

In the new life it appears the Holy Spirit is the subjective, and God the objective power. The new birth gives new motives and objects rather than new faculties. The character, therefore, is not suddenly changed, but rather gradually transformed by new objects. Those parts of the character that cannot now be used atrophy from disuse, while those that are useful are freshly moulded as required.

"In the life of every man," says Maeterlink,[1] "has there been a day when the heavens opened . . . and it is almost from that very instant that dates this true spiritual personality."

We wish we could endorse the "every man"; it is true of all who know "the truth".

It is the actions, the fruits of the character, that must show the new inspiration: there is a new principle of faith in active exercise; the lamp of hope is lighted, and

[1] Maeterlink, *The Treasure of the Humble*, p. 172.

burns steadily, while the flower of Divine love fills the life with fragrance.

To love one's neighbour is after all to love in others that which is Divine and eternal. All men are my neighbours; but not all equally so: those who are next or in greatest need are most so. Charity begins at home and near home. Moral introspection is an essentially Christian practice. I am my brother's keeper, and so far called to bear the world's need and sorrow, for which I am utterly inadequate. Here Christianity comes in, and reveals the existence of an Infinite and efficient Agent for this infinite work in which we are permitted to be fellow-labourers. Christianity takes new views of my duties in all the three spheres of self, neighbour, God. Holiness and righteousness are new and guiding principles of life, and by them and other qualities is the inward motor power exhibited.

Moral goodness can never be conferred, it must be acquired. We may be even accounted righteous, but cannot be practically righteous save by doing righteousness.

Dependence and Obedience.

The spirit of dependence upon God is as marked in Christian men as obedience.

Ruskin observes[1]: "There is nothing so small but that we may honour God by asking His guidance, and as thus every action done, even to the drawing of a line or the utterance of a syllable, is capable of a peculiar dignity in the manner of it; so also . . . still higher is the motive of it. For there is no action so slight or so

[1] J. Ruskin, *Seven Lamps of Architecture*, Introd., 4-6.

mean but it may be done to a great purpose . . . most especially that chief of all purposes . . . the pleasing of God."

Although, however, the new principle may have entered the life, the old is by no means gone, and not only acts, as we have seen when considering the two natures in Chapter VIII., but is capable of concealing itself under the name and guise of Christianity. For instance, no worse selfishness is seen anywhere than is often found under a religious guise. Religious humility may recognise inherent sin and weakness with no further result than the formal statement (that loses all its force by constant repetition) that we are all "miserable sinners". Self-righteousness and Pharisaical pride are not unknown in characters otherwise good, as well as more than traces of conceit, malice and all uncharitableness.

The Imitation of Christ.

The Christianity of practical life is, alas! by no means always so idyllic as some of our quotations depict.

If the subjective power for the higher life be found in God's Spirit, the objective is not derived from a study of doctrines, however sound and dry, but from the imitation of Christ our Saviour. His is the model character, and the deeper and more profoundly it is studied the more do we begin to understand what is comprehended in a perfect character. The more His life is contemplated the greater the ability to copy it, for, as Bickersteth so beautifully says[1]:—

> Not living only, He infused new life;
> Not only beauteous, for He beautified;
> Not only glorious, for He glorified.

[1] Bickersteth, *Yesterday, To-day, and For Ever.*

And there is more in it than this. We see pre-eminent amid all the rival systems of ethics set before us as purposes of life the simple and sublime end of Christian life as declared by St. Paul[1]: "We are predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son". That, according to God, is the end and goal of a rightly-ordered human life, and meanwhile we are commanded to "follow Him, to walk as He walked, to follow His steps," in short, to make Him the pattern, example and standard of life, as He is predestined to be its end. Now can any one cavil at this? Is there a nobler ideal within the whole range of human thought? Have we within the whole circle of other religions one single utterance so authoritative as regards the object and plan of life? It is an immense relief to have such a purpose and end placed before us, and we think no worthy substitute will ever be found for it. "Come happiness or sorrow," says Maeterlink,[2] "the happiest man will be he within whom the greatest idea shall burn the most ardently."

The Goal of Christian Life.

Follow Christ's Example.

Christ is the only ideal worth following, the only Personality that can draw the whole world.

He alone can fill a human life with love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance—with that Christian character which is one of the hall-marks of the true precious metal; and this, as we have already said, not alone by making Him the ideal, but by having within that new spring and power that both give the desire and ability in any way to copy it.

[1] St. Paul, Rom. viii. 29.

[2] Maeterlink, *Wisdom and Destiny*, p. 43.

Character is not formed by introspection; though the power that forms or transforms it is within.

Abstract ideas can never possess and control a personal soul; we must have as our Owner and Inspirer a personal God. No standard indeed of character is possible but Christ. What would He do? is the question of chief interest to His followers. All our greatest teachers insist on this.

The only thing that can satisfy a human mind is an object of devotion, not himself, to which he can feel it worthy and right to devote his life and talents.

The pursuit of the unattainable is what ennobles. The Pursuit the Impossibl
"A pupil from whom nothing is ever demanded which he cannot do," says Mill,[1] "never does all he can." With such an ideal as Christ, the Standard of perfection, we are ever growing, never grown; ever perfecting, never perfect; ever attaining, never attained; and this preserves humility, as we have said, and stimulates pursuit.

[1] J. S. Mill, *Autobiography*, p. 32.

CHAPTER XIV.

CHARACTER AND DESTINY.

Sow an act, reap a habit; sow a habit, reap a character; sow a character, reap a destiny.

OUR study of the springs of character is completed, and if this chapter be added it is merely because there are often those who like to have what they have been reading briefly summarised, so that they can better carry away into practical life those points that seem to them of value. This short summary is therefore given, together with a few words on the formation of character, and the connection between character and destiny.

Chapters I. and II. Character then, is the mental expression of our personality, and its home is in the unconscious mind. This personality is unknowable save to God, as it can never be wholly brought into consciousness or wholly seen by others. Fictitious or partly fictitious selves abound of various sorts, and are made consciously or unconsciously by their owners for various purposes. Others, as a rule, know us better than ourselves, partly because they can

Chapter III. see more readily the unconscious impress of the character on the body and in the thousand details of daily life. This impress of the character on the body, and especially on

the face, has led to the construction of a pseudo-science of character (phrenology), which localises character in a series of "organs," represented by "bumps" in the cranium.

No real science of character has, however, been constructed, the nearest to it being the science of ethics, which is the abstract *science*, of which morality is the *art*, and character the concrete *expression*. Ethics are often set in the place of Christianity as a substitute for it; but Christianity is more than ethics: it is a religion, and a religion has power over character which ethics have not; the difference may be compared to that between a train and Bradshaw, between a power and a guide. Chapter IV.

Passing from these preliminary considerations to character itself we have considered its springs. The original source is undoubtedly heredity; but on close examination we see that it is hardly actual character that is inherited, but rather a number of potentialities and tendencies which the after-life converts into virtues and vices and more or less prominent features of character. The force of early education in determining this is very great; hence the importance attaching to child culture. The great power of this education, which is almost wholly unconscious, is in forming habits, which force of habit may be regarded as the second great spring or source of character, acting as it does in two ways: first, in modifying the original tendencies of heredity; and secondly, in adding fresh qualities to the character. The value of good habits to character, and the corresponding evils when such habits are bad, cannot be overrated. Chapter V. Chapter VI.

Habit is induced by environment and ideals, or what is around and before us, the choice of both being largely under our control. The value of good and inspiring ideals have in their influence on character perhaps the larger share in determining the destiny.

Chapter VII. The growth of character proceeds on the same lines as the body, by means of food and exercise; the *food* consisting of ideas and the *exercise* of the various circumstances of life through which we pass. The special value of suffering and various forms of adversity to noble characters is very great, and is one of the speediest ways of raising the diligent pupil to the sixth form of life's school.

Chapter VIII. The analysis of character presents great difficulties, for this complex mental compound derives its activity and value not alone from its infinitely varying ingredients and the endless proportions in which they combine, but to the power and direction of the moral energy or will in bringing them into action.

All we can really do, therefore, is to enumerate the better known varieties of character without examining

Chapter IX. their composition in detail, and make lists of the qualities, good and bad, that may enter into their composition.

We must, however, lay very great stress here upon the fact that the real value of a character consists not alone in the excellence of its elements, but upon their harmonious combination; so that the character is a compound, and not a mere mixture; a symphony, not a discord; well-balanced and stable, not cranky or one-sided.

Chapter X. We now pass on to the motor power or spring, in the

sense of mainspring or force of character—the will. Here the first thing to observe is that the will is practically and consciously free; and moral responsibility, therefore, can, and does, attach to its actions.

A little consideration will show that it is in the exercise of the will that merit or demerit attaches to character.

A close connection exists, therefore, between morality and will, the finest character in the world being valueless if it does not include a strong and vigorous will.

This leads us on to conduct or the expression of will and of character. A man is rightly estimated by his conduct. What he *is* has little value to others if it be never expressed. Of course we can only very roughly judge of a character by the actions; but at any rate we see its most active and leading qualities, even if the more passive ones are hidden. The value of the conduct depends on the motives that move the will, and to analyse these is often a difficult task. They largely spring from the moral sense within, which we call conscience. Chapter XI.

This conscience is seen, on closely looking at it, to be one of the abstract senses that distinguish humanity from the rest of the animal kingdom. It differs from reason or the logical faculty and æsthetics or the love of the beautiful in bringing us into connection with not only abstract but spiritual truths. Considerations of morals and right and wrong bring in the question of responsibility and God; and although the moral sense as such can in no way be said to be the voice of God in the man, there is no doubt Chapter XII.

it is the channel through which He often speaks and is the faculty that brings us most into His presence.

In civilised man conscience is always more or less educated, either along natural and true lines, or artificially, by conventional or false, and even vicious standards, so that it can be made to pronounce wrong to be right and darkness to be light. In this dependence on the standard before it, it resembles a sundial, which, while always correct when in the sunlight, can be made to say midnight is noon-day by the artificial light of a candle. The light in which the conscience acts is therefore all-important, and the higher and truer the standard the greater is the value of the voice of conscience. This voice, moreover, should be heeded, or it soon ceases to speak.

The two practical points, therefore, are to beware of false standards, and of stifling the warnings of conscience.

Chapter XIII. Lastly we come to Christianity and its effects on character. This is not, as we have seen, merely a system of ethics. It is a religion and a revelation. It sets before us in explicit terms the highest purpose for which life can be lived. It gives us not a set of doctrines, but a Divine Personality, who as a man Himself lived an absolutely perfect life, as an Example to those for whom He afterwards died as Saviour. It also supplies an inward force or spring of action in the Holy Spirit, who gives our moral sense the needed power to overcome our lower nature.

The standard Christianity requires can never be attained, and the purpose it proposes is not realisable in this life; the example it sets before us can never be success-

fully copied ; and it is the impossibility of reaching this absolute perfection, this unattainable height and depth of Christianity, that gives to it its supreme power over the character, making it ever to advance in growth and keeping it ever humble in spirit. We thus consider that there is nothing to compare with true religion in its power of forming a noble character ; and, shall we add, nothing that we know of that can form a baser one than a counterfeit of it.

Character and Destiny.

What connection then has character with destiny ? Time was when the idea itself would have seemed foolish if not impious. Did not the fates cast their baleful shadow over the polished worlds of Greece and Rome ; and were not the gods of the East and of Egypt mysterious representatives of the powers of nature in whose laps all human destiny lay ? whom it was needful therefore to propitiate, often with sacrifices, often human lives, to keep them in a good humour, and secure their aid. Human character was then at a low ebb, for although lofty ethical principles were taught by the great founders of Buddhism, Confucianism and Greek philosophy, theirs were doctrines without power ; guideposts rather than guides, for they supplied no motive force, they furnished no inspiring ideals ; and Christianity then rose upon the world of dark fates and powerless ethics. The conflict between the old and new began very early.

The Story of Christianity.

Looking back over the ages, one is indeed surprised to see how soon, almost from the very first, Christianity was corrupted and adulterated with the superstitions it came to supersede.

Before long the new religion degenerated into a replacing of the old fatalism with superstition, and raising ethics in some respect to a higher level than was known before. But through all there still flowed the pure stream of true Christianity, as it has done all through the dark ages, though often in subterranean and little noticed channels.

Protestantism.

In Protestantism, with all its faults of detail, we see the reaction against this world-wide corruption of Christianity: though with the emancipation of thought that accompanied it the opposite extreme was soon reached.

Revolting against degrading superstitions little removed from idolatry, and a religion that was the death-blow to progress, advanced thinkers, aided by the rapid progress of all the sciences, for the first time relegated supernatural considerations and influences to a very secondary place, and put before man that he, and he alone, was the arbiter of his fate; that all that was, was cause and effect; that the only duties he owed were to himself and his neighbours; that faith was naught and works were all.

This revolt of intellect did good as well as evil; but, as is ever the case with the human clock, the pendulum had now swung too far.

Casting off superstition, men would fain dispense with the Divine altogether.

This was, however, found impossible, for God had two witnesses left, even when His Word was discredited.

There was the mysterious sense of right and wrong within—whence came it? There was also the earth

around, and, as Kant says, "the starry heavens above" —whence came they?

So the unknown God having revealed Himself in Christianity, and that Revelation being by many rejected, is again sought for by philosophers, as He was in Athens 2,000 years ago. Such is human progress Godward! Position to-day.

But what has all this to do with character and destiny? Simply this much. As long as we have two rival schools—the one crying aloud for faith and the other for works—we shall never arrive at the true relation of character and destiny, for the "believers" tell us destiny depends on faith and not works, while the "workers" tell us it depends on works and not faith. As we have said elsewhere, we are often right in what we affirm, but wrong in what we deny, for truth is greater than ourselves; therefore we should affirm and deny not. If we say destiny depends on faith, well and good; if we say it depends on works, also well and good. Let us be content with the two affirmatives, which have the highest authority; and dispense with the negatives.

Character, then, as shown in works or conduct, according to the latter school, *is* the seed that determines destiny here and hereafter. But what says the former? Does it not deny this? No, in no wise. For the faith that saves is the power that can alone produce the character or conduct that determines our eternal destiny for good; faith shows itself by works. Faith and Works.

Our position, partly in this world (for there are the circumstances of birth, accident, etc., to be considered) and

wholly in the next, is determined by character; but the character that can alone please God and dwell with Him must be inspired by faith, and energised by the Holy Spirit. "Sow a character and reap a destiny!" Yes; but it is impossible to sow the right character, unless we have the moral force within, the sower as well as the seed; and this we cannot find in the elementary natural conscience alone, but in the possession and guiding of our wills by God's Spirit.

Now, in this view, we have gained much. We do not exalt faith at the expense of works, or works at the expense of faith; but seek to give each its place as laid down by our inspired teachers.

The Greatness of Character.

Consider then how great a thing is character both for this world and the next. It has the casting vote in our destiny.

"Nothing befals us that is not of the nature of ourselves."[1]

A man in this world has exactly the place his character makes for him. If he be clever and unscrupulous and selfish he may rapidly get his reward in riches without honour, in power without love. A nobler character may be poorer in wealth, but richer in respect, and in the eyes of all whose opinion is worth having he is the one to be envied. Riches may be amassed by the worst of men and means; but a good character implies a good man, for the character is man's self.

And the hereafter? While faith alone can inspire those acts that are truly pleasing to God, He in His final

[1] Maeterlink, *Wisdom and Destiny*, p. 31.

tribunal will render "to every man according to his deeds," —his conduct, the expression of his character. Let us then, in view of the supreme importance of this subject, try and give finally a few practical hints as to the formation of character, first by others, and then by oneself.

Formation of Character by Parents.

Parents nowadays are slowly and dimly beginning to see that they stand face to face with a most interesting and difficult task, with which is bound up in a way that was little understood a few years ago the welfare and destiny of their children. Fatalism has had its day, cause and effect are more clearly seen everywhere, the sowing and the reaping follow each other without question, and, as we have seen, faith no longer casts a doubt on the reality of this process, but appears in its true light as the only power that can enable it to be carried on to the glory of God.

As parents, therefore, we must ever accustom ourselves to look at our children through a mental *Röntgen screen* (which, as most of us know, enables us with a certain light to see the whole inner workings of the human body). So we, disregarding external details, must regard in our children the nascent characters; we must be able to pierce through the outward covering and discern the spirit growing before our eyes. But we must not only be admiring spectators; we must earnestly pray for wisdom as *gardeners*, and, using all the knowledge that is accessible, must seek to nip the evil tendency in the bud, to uproot the weed, while we encourage the tender plant and water the growing shoots.

Twelve Tools for forming Character.

For all this the gardener has his tools, tools Nature is ever using herself, but tools also that with reverent care may immensely help the character to develop and grow on right lines.

1. We have the power of forming *habits* of good, of moral value in the young child as none others have.

2. We can control the child's *environment*, so that suggestions of good, physical, mental and moral, and not of evil, are ever unconsciously sowing themselves in its brain.

3. We have the power, by example and story, of filling the child with inspiring *ideals*, so as to give direction to its will and energy of growth to its character.

4. We can feed the child's mind with *ideas*, the character of which is nearly all under our control, and on which the quality of the child's future character so largely depends.

5. We can exercise the child's growing moral powers with *circumstances*, not too smooth, so that "overcoming" and "courage" may be learned and hardships endured; not too rough, so that the young growth may not be discouraged.

6. We can, by watching the various tendencies, *balance* the one against the other, so as to prevent the character straggling too far in any one direction.

7. We can strengthen the *will*; and make it carry out its own designs, and accustom it to act with energy and decision.

8. We can educate the *moral sense* with reverent care; keeping it tender in its sensitiveness to evil, and only putting such standards before it that we know will hold good through life.

9. We can increase the sense of *responsibility*, first to oneself, then to others, and, above all, to God.

10. We can by direct teaching instil the leading *moral principles* of action; and can imbue the young mind with the sequence, and all-importance, of cause and effect.

11. We can by inspiring an unquestioning reverence and *faith in God*, and in Christ as our Saviour, cultivate the spirit of humility and dependence on the power of His Spirit to produce in the life the character that pleases Him.

12. We can understand and obey the two Bible maxims for child training: "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it," and "Offend not, hinder not, despise not one of these little ones".

When we turn to the training of one's own character the question is a different one. A parent can do all we have indicated without in the least turning the child's thoughts too much inwardly or producing any unhealthy introspection or self-consciousness. But in training one's own character how is this to be avoided?

Only by not making it an object.

Let the ideal for which life is being lived be clearly realised; let it be the highest and best; and let it be steadily pursued, and all that would turn it aside into

The Ideal of Life.

lower and easier paths be suppressed. The character will thus grow in the likeness of that which it is following and if that object be Christ, the character will evidently and naturally become Christian.

At the same time it may be remembered that good habits can be formed to overcome evil as long as life and mental faculties endure; that surroundings always help or hinder; that ideas still feed or poison; that circumstances are still of the utmost use in producing vigour and self-control; that conscience may be used or abused, cultivated or deadened; and that lastly and finally religion may be made a collection of dead dogmas which dwarf and atrophy the character, or true Christianity may become the breath of life, the inspiring ideal, that, by "sowing" the character aright, "reaps" the Eternal Destiny hereafter, where "self" at last is gone, and where the personality is but the reflex of the Eternal; where "*non nobis*" is the eternal cry, and where Christ is all in all.

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